



**COVID-19
RESPONSE**

COVID-19: The Great Lockdown and its Impact on Small Business



1 Thought
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8 Case
studies

85 Country
profiles



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The International Trade Centre supports small business through the COVID-19 crisis. For more information, see <http://www.intracen.org/covid19/>

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COVID-19: The Great Lockdown and its Impact on Small Business

The *SME Competitiveness Outlook 2020* analyses the impact of the pandemic on small firms, international supply chains and trade. It provides projections and a 15-point action plan for businesses, policymakers and business support organizations to weather the crisis – and gear up for a ‘new normal’ that needs to be resilient, digital, inclusive and sustainable.

The report combines analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on firms based on a large-scale global survey, with case studies and a thought leader viewpoint. The projected drop in supply chain trade is evaluated by region, and in 85 country profiles.

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Acronyms

Unless otherwise specified, all references to dollars (\$) are to United States dollars.

EU	European Union	LDCs	Least developed countries
G3	Group of Three (China, European Union and United States)	LLDCs	Landlocked developing countries
G20	Group of Twenty	MSMEs	Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
GDP	Gross domestic product	PPE	Personal protective equipment
IMF	International Monetary Fund	SIDS	Small island developing States
ISO	International Organization for Standardization	SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
ITC	International Trade Centre	WBG	World Bank Group
		WTO	World Trade Organization

Thought leader



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Keep up the momentum during a crisis




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Foreword

The year 2019 ended with a sense that the global economy was in for a turbulent 2020. Tensions between major trading powers were on the rise, there continued to be concerns about inequality within and between countries, and climate change remained high on the agenda, ranking as the top global business risk in a 2019 survey of insurance industry experts. Global debt was reaching record levels and rapid technological change was disrupting the way that goods and services were produced, traded and consumed.

At the International Trade Centre, we were gearing up to prepare our main stakeholders – micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – for the challenges ahead. We did not expect, however, that a major crisis would hit so rapidly, and that it would be so different from anything experienced in this century thus far.

The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented global crisis, affecting human health and economic welfare across the globe. It is first and foremost a health crisis, with governments around the world taking measures to prevent the spread of the virus. Yet the pandemic has also resulted in a planet-wide economic slowdown, affecting trade, investment, growth and employment. The World Trade Organization estimates that world merchandise trade in 2020 could fall sharply, between 13% and 32%. Estimated global losses in GDP growth currently hover around 5 percentage points.

Although the pandemic has affected every corner of the world, the economic earthquake unleashed by COVID-19 does not affect everyone in the same way. With fewer resources to ride out the storm, MSMEs have been particularly vulnerable to the repercussions of the crisis.

These firms in developing countries will be disproportionately affected, especially in Africa, least developed countries and small island developing States. Small businesses active in trade tend to be more competitive



and resilient. Yet many of them have been shaken by serious disruptions in international supply chains.

Country profiles, specially designed for this edition and available for 85 economies, provide a detailed forecast of how the lockdowns in China, Europe and the United States will affect international supply chains.

The economic effects of health crises and lockdowns at home and abroad have been devastating. Findings from our global COVID-19 Business Impact Survey, presented in this report, suggest that one in five small firms may go bankrupt within three months. For every bankruptcy, closed store, unpicked crop or drop in online orders, people will lose jobs and families will, in many cases, lose their only income. For Africa – which should be creating 12 million–15 million jobs annually to keep up with a growing population – the implications of these employment figures could be catastrophic. And Africa risks \$2.4 billion worth of exports lost in 2020 due to factory shutdowns abroad, as our new supply chain methodology estimates.

As the only international organization fully dedicated to supporting the competitiveness of micro, small and medium-sized firms, ITC has allocated all possible resources to assist our stakeholders in weathering this crisis and in preparing them for the future:

- Through our network of business support organizations, we reached out to businesses across the globe to understand their concerns and needs. The findings of this unique COVID-19 Business Impact Survey are presented in this report;
- We developed a 15-point action plan, with concrete advice for small businesses, business support organizations and governments to help small businesses through the COVID-19 crisis and towards the future.

- We are helping businesses, business support organizations and governments around the world to implement the action plan, and develop an agile response to the crisis.
- Our assistance to firms has taken multiple forms. We are, for instance, working with MSMEs to move their business online or to go into new product lines – like the case of textile producers, which are moving into production of masks. Together with major international private sector partners, we have also delivered webinars to women-owned enterprises on how to cope with the current crisis.
- On the Global Trade Helpdesk, a joint ITC-UNCTAD-WTO effort, we have introduced specific COVID-19 features that help micro, small and medium-sized firms assess how border measures at home and abroad are evolving and potentially affecting their businesses.

The experience and evidence collected during the past four months have been compiled in this report. We hope it will serve businesses, business support organizations and governments to understand better the economic effects ahead and to design the most effective responses.

The report goes beyond the immediate crisis response by looking into the future. We expect this future, the 'new normal' as many call it, to have four characteristics.

First, the future will be about *resilience*, as societies will no longer accept to be unprepared for external threats.

Second, the future will be more *digital*. This virus has shown us the full power of these technologies in a context of crisis.

Third, the future has to be *inclusive*. The inclusiveness of globalization was already a matter of concern before the pandemic. It will be crucial to ensure that the recovery phase manages to 'lift all boats' in order to maintain popular support for open economies.

Fourth, the future has to be *sustainable*, if we want to avoid a climate shock as the next global crisis.

The multilateral trade agenda already embraces three of these four themes. The theme of resilience will make its entry into the multilateral debate. In our view, we must accompany this innovation with a redefinition of the relationship between the multilateral trading system and global supply chains. Resilience within these chains is best achieved by new approaches towards supply chain governance.

At the International Trade Centre, we are joining multi-agency and partner platforms that advocate for stronger partnerships between major buyers and suppliers and a fairer distribution of risks between different players. Governments can support this process through new engagements with supply chain players and the WTO may have a role to play in this process.

The year 2020 is not only the year of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also the year of the 75th anniversary of the United Nations and the 25th anniversary of the World Trade Organization. The year 2020 may also enter history books as a turning point. We may be standing before the stark choice of national or regional blocs in permanent lockdown versus a more carefully and jointly managed open world. The International Trade Centre stands firmly on the side of the latter, by charting in this report a path out of the economic crisis that is true to the values of the United Nations and the 2030 Agenda.



Dorothy Tembo

Executive Director a.i.
International Trade Centre

Executive Summary

The year 2020 has been incredibly challenging for the global community. The spread of the novel coronavirus, known as COVID-19, has led to an unparalleled health crisis in countries across the world. The crisis has had unprecedented and serious impacts on all aspects of how people communicate, work, produce, trade, consume and live.

The economic ramifications of the pandemic quickly became apparent, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been on the front lines. With workers and customers staying indoors, and supply chains tested by shutdowns, the small companies that provide 70% of jobs in countries around the world and about half of economic activity have been put under stress.

International trade in turmoil

The pandemic hit the world when trade was already in turmoil. World trade dropped in all quarters of 2019, with declines intensifying in early 2020 in a ripple effect that started in China.

Monthly data presented in this report show that Chinese exports fell about 21% in February 2020 from a year earlier. Although Chinese exports recovered slightly in March, the pandemic began to hit exports from other countries. Exports from European countries and the United States in March decreased 8% and 7% year on year. The full effects of the crisis are not yet visible, as most countries went into lockdown in late March or April 2020, and data about the months that followed were not available at the time of publication.

Travel and tourism are among the most affected sectors. As of 7 May, 113 countries had banned travel to contain the spread of COVID-19. The World Tourism Organization predicts that international tourist arrivals could decline 60%–80% in 2020 from 2019. This would mean a reduction 15 to 20 times larger than during the 2008 global financial crisis.

Travel and tourism are key industries in many developing countries – and international tourist arrivals constitute a major source of their service exports. Nine of the 10 countries that are most dependent on travel exports are small island developing States.

When it comes to merchandise trade, sectoral data for China, the European Union and the United States suggest that skins and leather products, footwear, vehicles and clothing are among the most affected goods. Exports of all these products have fallen at least 20% since the COVID-19 outbreak.

Many developing economies face further headwinds due to the appreciation of the US dollar, which increases costs for trade between third countries priced in dollars. On a trade-weighted basis, the dollar strengthened by 9.5% in February–April 2020 against emerging-economy currencies. This puts further downward pressure on international trade.

China, the European Union and the United States are not only the largest exporters in the world. They are also major players in global supply chains, and therefore important importers of raw materials, parts and components. Lockdowns in these three economies not only affect domestic business – they also affect firms in partner countries and even companies in third countries that have no direct trading relationship with China, the EU or the United States.

China, the EU and the US account for over 60% of supply chain trade. This has had an impact on economies everywhere.

African exporters may lose more than \$2.4 billion in global industrial supply chain exports, due to factory shutdowns in China, the EU and the United States.

Together, these three major trading hubs are responsible for 63% of world supply chain imports and 64% of supply chain exports. ITC estimates that the global disruption of manufacturing inputs will amount to \$126 billion.

Factory shutdowns in the European Union will have the biggest repercussions for the supply chain exports of other countries. The EU is highly integrated into global supply chains and is the top importer of industrial inputs (China is the leading exporter) and the largest market for both Africa and Asia.

African exporters may lose more than \$2.4 billion in global industrial supply chain exports due to the shock caused by factory shutdowns in China, the EU and the United States. More than 70% of this loss results from the temporary disruption of the supply chain linkages with the EU.

This report contains country profiles with data on supply chain trade. Evidence in these profiles suggests that a few product lines and countries are driving the results that we see at a regional level. For instance, Morocco is expected to lose almost \$300 million in exports of wiring sets for vehicles to the European Union. That amounts to 15%–20% of the entire loss of African exports to the EU.

Stress tests and new beginnings for supply chains

COVID-19 has given governments around the globe the challenge of directing essential goods, such as food and medical equipment, where they are most needed to address the immediate health crisis. High demand for certain sanitary products, supply chain disruptions and logistical constraints made this difficult. Fearful that their populations would be unable to obtain goods needed to cope with the immediate health crisis, many governments imposed new trade measures on these items.

Ensuring access to essential goods

This report finds that export bans and other restrictions cover 73% of worldwide trade in virus-related products as of early May 2020. A total of 93 countries apply temporary export measures related to the virus, such as export bans or restrictions on medical products and, less frequently, food.

The frequency and type of export restrictions differ by region. Few African countries restrict exports of goods related to COVID-19, largely attributable to the fact that they do not manufacture them. Most export restrictions around the globe involve masks, with 55 measures on textile masks and 48 on masks with filters. These measures affect 90% and 76% of world trade in the two products, respectively.

The share of imports of virus-related goods that are affected by restrictions also varies by region. It is highest in Africa, at 74%, followed by 67% in Asia-Pacific and 60% in the Americas.

Although 105 countries apply temporary measures on imports related to COVID-19, most of these aim to facilitate access to essential medical supplies or food. Almost three-quarters of developed countries have removed or reduced tariffs on medical products since the start of the crisis. Only 46% of developing countries and just 18% of least developed countries have done so.

As the virus spread across the world, it became clear that measures restricting trade of essential goods could severely limit access to these products for the most vulnerable. In this context, G20 ministers declared in May that any 'necessary' emergency measures designed to tackle COVID-19 must be 'proportionate, transparent, temporary [and] reflect our interest in protecting the most vulnerable'.

Export bans and other restrictions cover 73% of global trade in COVID-19-related goods.

Strengthening supply chains to boost production of essential goods

It is hard to foresee how the pandemic and sanitary measures to manage the crisis will evolve over the coming months. Countries are moving or have moved out of total confinement, though in most places this has happened in a controlled way to avoid steep increases in new infection rates.

The strategic importance given to the medical supply sector will likely remain in the near future. Developing countries around the globe are assessing the possibility of ramping up production for certain health-related products that rely on raw materials widely available in their own region.

The supply of medical products is highly concentrated, with just five countries accounting for half of world exports: Germany, the United States, Switzerland, China and Ireland. Developing countries in Africa, the Americas and the Pacific account only for a small share of global exports of personal protective equipment. Yet, they often export a significant share of certain inputs for these products. This opens up opportunities to develop regional supply chains and help diversify the global supply of these goods.

Estimates in this report suggest that in the case of masks, gloves and disinfectants in Africa, masks and gloves in the Americas, masks in Asia and disinfectants in the Pacific, there are sufficient quantities of inputs to develop regional supply chains to meet demand for these COVID-19-related products in the region.

Enhancing technical infrastructure around sanitary standards

With the pressing need to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the demand for sanitizers and personal protective equipment has hit fever pitch. To make these items available to the public, governments in developing countries are adopting flexible approaches in border controls. They are also encouraging their local small businesses to produce sanitizers and masks despite, in some cases, the lack of national standards on these items.

In this context, standards and conformity assessment bodies have an important role to play to ensure the quality and safety of these goods.

First, standards on the products should be made available to small businesses. Second, border control authorities should adopt a risk-based approach to official controls, leveraging on past conformity assessment data of suppliers and manufacturers.

Third, where certification bodies are unable to conduct on-site audits due to safety reasons, desk audits should be possible in these exceptional circumstances, based on relevant documents, records, stakeholder interviews, pictures and other available information.

Lockdown: the impact on small businesses

One-fifth of SMEs are at risk of shutting down permanently within three months.

Small companies tend to be vulnerable during an economic crisis, in part because they have fewer resources with which to adapt to a changing context. The ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey gathered evidence on how the pandemic affected 4,467 companies in 132 countries.

Analysis of this data, collected from 21 April–2 June 2020, shows that the pandemic has strongly affected 55% of respondents. Nearly two-thirds of micro and small firms reported that the crisis strongly affected their business operations, compared with about 40% of large companies. One-fifth of SMEs said they risked shutting down permanently within three months.

In Africa, two out of three businesses said they had been strongly affected by COVID-19, mostly involving reduced sales (75%) and/or difficulty accessing inputs (54%).

Service companies have been the hardest hit around the world. In accommodation and food services, for instance, 76% of surveyed firms said partial and full lockdowns strongly affected their business operations.

COVID-19 strongly affected 64% of women-led firms, compared with 52% of men-led companies.

Women-led firms operate in many of the industries most immediately affected by the crisis, such as accommodation and food as well as retail and wholesale. Even when the distribution of gender across sectors is taken into account, the differences persist, with 64% of women-led firms declaring their business operations as strongly affected, compared with 52% of men-led companies.

Youth-led enterprises reported a high risk of closing. About 26% of youth-led firms said they risked shutting down permanently within three months, compared to 18% for non-youth-led businesses.

Many companies that are not registered with national authorities are small and have little cash on hand to finance themselves when operations are shut down. The ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey found that informal enterprises are 25% more likely to say that the pandemic is pushing them towards bankruptcy.

Surviving the pandemic

21% of surveyed small businesses were agile in their response to the crisis, compared to just 16% of larger firms.

Governments around the world realize that SMEs act as a lynchpin connecting the pandemic to broader economic recession. In addition to addressing the health crisis, they have scrambled to alleviate the impact of COVID-19 on small businesses, introducing policies to help them cope with the short-term financial risks and long-term business implications. This will, it is hoped, reduce layoffs, prevent bankruptcy, encourage investment and help economies get back on their feet as soon as possible in the aftermath of the crisis.

How are governments trying to protect small businesses?

Most governments are implementing programmes to respond to both the health and the economic consequences of COVID-19. The magnitude of responses has varied considerably, however, from almost nothing to about half of gross domestic product (GDP). The higher the GDP per person, the higher the level of COVID-19 measures as a percentage of GDP. Simply put, small businesses in richer countries get a higher level of support from the government than small businesses in poor countries.

Companies that participated in the ITC COVID-19 business survey said that tax waivers, temporary tax relief and financial programmes would be the most helpful government measures.

A third of small enterprises also highlighted the importance of cash transfers, showing their concern about surviving the crisis. Large companies, on the other hand, favoured employment programmes to support the income of their workers.

Business approaches to COVID-19: Retreat, resilience and agility

In the first days of the pandemic, small and medium-sized companies across the world responded in similar ways. They took steps to protect employees and customers against infection, and communicated to clients about whether the business was going to close temporarily. Many firms also reached out for support from government, industry groups and business support networks.

Beyond these common immediate tasks, businesses diverged in their responses. Some adopted retreating strategies, drawing down their assets to get through the day. Many firms laid off employees, sold off assets or took on new debt, all of which may hurt their long-term viability. Approximately 20% of the businesses that participated in the ITC COVID-19 survey took this type of approach.

Other companies followed a strategy of resilience, scaling down or adjusting the business temporarily in a manner that will allow it to resume fully later on. Being resilient during the pandemic entailed strategies such as shifting the sales mix towards online channels, sourcing

from new suppliers or learning to telework. About 60% of the businesses that responded to the ITC survey adopted this approach to cope with the pandemic.

The most agile firms transformed themselves to fit the new situation, creating novel products such as designer masks or rapid testing technologies. When lockdowns prevented their businesses from opening, they loaned their workers to other active businesses in essential industries. Roughly 21% of the businesses that participated in the ITC COVID-19 survey adopted this approach to cope.

The survey responses reveal that smaller firms were significantly more likely to adopt agile responses to the crisis than larger enterprises. At the same time, however, they also tended to adopt retreating strategies more than bigger companies. Small firms that exported were significantly less likely to take the retreating approach than those that sold only domestically.

Large businesses, for their part, were more likely to adopt a resilient approach than smaller enterprises, underscoring their greater capacity to ride out the storm. The take-away from this analysis is that while big companies can afford to stay put and be resilient, small companies must adapt in an agile manner or collapse.

Many assistance programmes aim to nudge at-risk SMEs from a retreat-type approach to crisis towards a more resilient, enduring strategy. Some even encourage them to leapfrog towards the kind of agility that can be seen in particularly dynamic small firms.

Transparency and information are vital for firms to benefit from government assistance programmes. It is therefore worrisome that more than half of survey respondents found it difficult or very difficult to access information and benefits from government COVID-19-related assistance packages.

The key role of business support organizations

Business support organizations deliver services to and represent the interests of enterprises to promote their growth. They are chambers of commerce, sector associations, trade promotion organizations and investment promotion agencies, as well as cooperatives. When these organizations cooperate, they create growth opportunities for companies, competitive advantage for a country and help deliver economic, social and environmental objectives.

To help firms deal with the crisis, business support organizations can provide information on COVID-19 from a business perspective, perhaps through a specialized webpage.

A business support organization can bring firms together, match business opportunities with a shared offer or common need, and test willingness to cooperate in ways that are neutral, fair and respect commercial sensitivities. Businesses working together can reduce costs through shared procurement, create economies of scale and access new opportunities by sharing knowledge and resources.

Good business support organizations benefit from their knowledge of business, their convening power and their credibility to represent micro and small businesses and make their needs known to policymakers and funders. For example, a bank and business support organization could promote an emergency bank loan with reduced collateral requirements for firms with a record of having engaged with a business support organization.

Preparing for the 'new normal'

With shutdowns being gradually lifted in China, Europe and elsewhere, business owners and policymakers are shifting their focus towards the post-pandemic world. Companies, business support organizations and governments will have to adapt to this 'new normal' in the months and years ahead.

Four main characteristics of the 'new normal'

The new normal will be resilient, digital, inclusive and sustainable.

If the world seizes the opportunities presented by this crisis to address fundamental challenges in the global economy, the new normal can be one that emphasizes resilience to change and unexpected shocks, embraces the possibilities offered by digitalization, prioritizes inclusiveness and leads to sustainable growth.

Resilience

Countries learned an important lesson in the early days of the pandemic as they rushed to strengthen their small enterprises. It became clear that fostering business resilience in good times would help firms ride out crises, reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy and improve the state of the economy.

Diversifying, connecting with business support organizations and building financial buffers can help contribute to increased SME resilience. For small businesses that are active in international supply chains, the resilience of their relationship with buyers and suppliers will also matter greatly.

Digital

Digital technologies were flourishing before the pandemic hit. During lockdowns, whole parts of the world's economies shifted onto digital platforms. Teleworking, remote learning, teleconferencing, online health services, e-commerce and digital payments really made the world go round in many regions in the first half of 2020.

In the months and years to come, digital facilities will no longer be optional. Consumers, clients, business partners and workers will come to expect them as a matter of course. Yet the move towards digital technologies must be accompanied by technical assistance, skill building and infrastructure support to ensure that it is inclusionary and equitable.

Inclusive

As is often the case with crises, COVID-19 has put the spotlight on those who are economically disadvantaged, such as informal sector workers, migrants and people in microenterprises. Inclusiveness globalization was already a concern before the pandemic. There is now a unique opportunity to rebuild the international order together, in a way that leaves no one behind. It will be crucial to ensure that the recovery phase lifts all the boats to maintain popular support for open economies.

Sustainable

Climate change was ranked as the top global business risk in a 2019 survey of insurance industry experts. The high perceived likelihood and severe impact of climate-related risks have ranked them highest in the World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report.

There is no reason to believe that climate risks will abate once the health crisis ends. Sustainability will therefore continue to be important in the new global economy. Retrofitting for both COVID-19 sanitary requirements and environmental friendliness may be a wise move.

Inclusive globalization was already a concern before the pandemic. There is now a unique opportunity to rebuild the international order together, in a way that leaves no one behind.

New governance approaches are necessary for supply chain resilience.

Trade governance for the new normal

Small businesses are reopening into a world that has been reshaped by the pandemic. They do not operate in a void: they operate in a business ecosystem that will influence whether they sink, or swim, in the new normal. The resilience of this ecosystem will greatly determine the future of trade flows and the role of small enterprises in international trade.

Supply chain governance for resilience

Given the importance of supply chains in international trade, their resilience will matter greatly for the future of trade. Lead firms often have a significant role in directing supply chains, making decisions about production practices, branding, sourcing and sales.

In many cases during the crisis, lead firms passed the risk burden along the supply chain to vulnerable SMEs in developing countries. As a result, the shock triggered job losses and bankruptcies in these economies.

Lead firms should redesign their approach to collaborating and splitting costs with small suppliers to ensure more equally shared value. The mutual trust that results encourages sharing of information and collective action to withstand challenges. Indeed, this 'social capital' in the supply chain can be crucial to transmit information and funds as necessary and to respond to crises.

Standards and regulations for the new normal

New standards and regulations will increasingly govern cross-border business – including travel and tourism – as it recovers. These fall into two categories.

The first category helps companies meet new market requirements. These include management system standards on quality, food safety, occupational health and safety, and social accountability, as well as specific product standards.

The second category concerns security, resilience and risk management, which includes business continuity management, emergency management, crisis management and supply chain security.

National standards bodies must actively engage the private sector as a means of providing solutions, support and advice on relevant standards available to small businesses. In addition, international organizations, in partnership with business support organizations, can provide technical assistance to small enterprises related to training and advisory services to implement these standards.

And most importantly, there should be closer collaboration and coordination among international organizations, business support organizations and regulatory bodies to synergize their efforts in assisting small businesses and ensuring a fair business environment.

Multilateralism reconfigured

Humanity today is faced not only with the COVID-19 pandemic, but with ground-shifting disruptions on the technological, environmental, trade and financial fronts as well. These challenges are so complex, global and interrelated that no government or intergovernmental organization will be able to solve them alone. The post-pandemic recovery period provides a unique opportunity for global cooperation to rebuild the international order, including in the field of international trade.

For the multilateral trading system this may imply embracing new concepts, new fields of work and new partnerships.

Factory shut-downs abroad affected small companies around the globe, with the demand and supply shocks crossing borders through disrupted supply chains. Resilient supply chains can

transmit knowledge, provide stability and generate agility under a new normal. Proposals exist on how to link supply chain players to the multilateral trading system, for instance, by creating supply chain councils. Implementing some of these proposals could strengthen the multilateral trading system.

Future discussions at the multilateral level may focus more on the way logistics networks operate. This has already been reflected in G20 ministerial statements during the pandemic. Trade facilitation and customs will also be revised, to ensure that border agencies can safely undertake necessary controls regarding new standards and regulation while maintaining smooth border crossings.

The measures needed to support the real economy in this exceptional crisis will put government budgets under pressure in most countries, especially developing and emerging economies. Responses to these challenges require international collaboration, given that the stability of the financial system is at stake. Global finance is not governed by the multilateral trading system, but finance and the real economy are closely linked. Ignoring these interlinkages would put the multilateral trading system at risk. Dealing with them would strengthen it.

On this 75th anniversary of the United Nations and 25th of the World Trade Organization, it is timely to kickstart a process of international coordination for a whole-of-society approach to deal with the menace of COVID-19, as well as other threats on the horizon. Ensuring an open and predictable world trading system, including through reforms that enable the World Trade Organization to address current realities in international trade, will also be part of the solution.

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COVID-19: The Great Lockdown and its Impact on Small Business

Introduction

SME Competitiveness Report 2020 is published at a time where the world is carefully moving out of the 'Great Lockdown', which closed the majority of economies across the globe for six weeks or longer. There are reasons to believe that this simultaneous shutdown of economic and social activities has succeeded in pre-empting what could have become a disastrous global health crisis. But the lockdown is likely to have major economic consequences that remain difficult to assess.

The world as a whole is likely to enter into a recession. According to the latest estimates of the International Monetary Fund, global gross domestic product will contract by 3% in 2020. Some sectors have suffered more than others, with travel, hospitality and manufacturing hit particularly hard. Government initiatives to cushion the blow have their costs, and global debt levels have increased to finance fiscal and monetary measures. There is uncertainty about the impact of this increased debt burden on global financial markets.

The Great Lockdown is unprecedented in many ways. One striking characteristic is that small businesses across the globe have more in common than ever before. The lockdown has led to major revenue drops for most and the survival of many is at stake. With the majority of global employment depending on the health of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the future of the global economy will very much depend on how SMEs manage to get through, and emerge from, the crisis.

This flagship report of the International Trade Centre – the joint agency of the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO) – focuses on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The report has been prepared to provide timely material and insights to ITC's constituencies at this difficult time.

Based on new and unique evidence from recent trade data, granular supply chain analysis and a global COVID-19 Business Impact Survey, this report intends to contribute to understanding how SMEs across the globe have been affected by the crisis and the policy interventions that are most effective in supporting them. The report also charts a path out of the crisis to a 'new normal' that is resilient, digital, inclusive and sustainable.

Following this introduction, Chapter 1 documents the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international trade flows. The analysis draws on very recent data including monthly trade statistics for 54 countries. The section also presents new estimates on the economic effect that the lockdowns of China, European Union and United States will have on the economies of trading partners.

Supply chains have come under stress because of the ripple effects caused by lockdowns and have suffered from temporary export or import measures adopted by governments to manage access to essential goods. Chapter 2 of the report assesses these measures, relying mainly on data made available by ITC, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the WTO through the Global Trade Helpdesk data portal. The second part of Chapter 2 examines a question currently of considerable concern to policymakers in many emerging economies: Is there a role for national or regional supply chains in facilitating access to essential goods in future health crises?

Chapter 3 focuses on the main protagonist of this report: small and medium-sized enterprises. Using data from a global business impact survey conducted by ITC in April and May 2020, the report examines channels through which SMEs have been affected and assesses for how many weeks or months SMEs can survive under lockdown conditions. The chapter highlights regional and sectoral differences, as well as gender differences and particular features of businesses run by young entrepreneurs.

In Chapter 4, the report describes the role that various economic actors have in helping SMEs to cope with the crisis. Governments worldwide have been at the forefront of supporting small businesses. SMEs, of course, have a crucial role in defending their own interests, and Chapter 4 describes the coping strategies deployed by SMEs across the globe, distinguishing between strategies of retreat, resilience and agility. It describes the role of business support organizations as intermediaries between policymakers and SMEs.

Chapter 5 concludes the report by looking towards the future and describing what ITC considers the four characteristics of the 'new normal': resilience, digitalization, inclusiveness and sustainability. This chapter further develops concepts first presented in ITC's 15 Point Action Plan, launched in April 2020. It adds three new proposals on trade governance for the new normal, directed towards lead firms in supply chains, actors in the standard setting and regulatory world, and policymakers shaping the multilateral trading system.

While global in scope, the report also focuses specifically on each continent and on different country groupings (including least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and sub-Saharan Africa). This is complemented by country specific estimates for 85 countries in the Country Pages provided in the annex to the report.

This year will be remembered as one in which the world shut down to cope with a pandemic, but it is also the year in which the United Nations is celebrating its 75th anniversary. Its history shows that on trade and finance fronts, as well as for a multitude of other social and political issues, international collaboration is key to addressing successfully the type of crisis in which the world finds itself.

The COVID-19 crisis of 2020 may not be the last global shock that SMEs are exposed to in the 21st century. Lessons learned from *SME Competitiveness Outlook 2020* aim to equip small businesses, business support organizations and national and international policymakers with understanding and tools that will allow SMEs to weather future shocks, whatever their nature or origin.

CHAPTER 1

International trade in turmoil

To slow the spread of the novel coronavirus, governments worldwide have imposed strict containment measures. These include confinement and lockdowns, travel restrictions and bans, prohibition of large gatherings, and temporary shutdowns of schools and economic activities. Taken to protect public health in a time of crisis, these measures directly and indirectly affect economic prospects.

This chapter analyses the impact of the pandemic on international trade flows. The evidence shows that disruptions to supply chains and national demand have affected exports and imports in countries that have imposed lockdown measures and in their trading partners. Analysis of the data reveals that certain sectors and regions have been hit harder.

Pandemic disrupts trade flows

The COVID-19 pandemic hit at a time when trade was already in turmoil, with world trade declining in all quarters of 2019 compared with a year earlier. That drop was partially linked to a number of trade disputes, including those between the United States and China.

Merchandise trade drops sharply in 2020

The decline accelerated sharply with the advent of the pandemic, which caused exports from China to drop steeply in the first few months of 2020. According to monthly data,¹ Chinese exports to selected countries were 21% lower in February 2020 than in February 2019 (Figure 1).² As a result, Chinese exports declined in value to the lowest level since August 2009, during the 2008 financial crisis.³ In March 2020, Chinese exports recovered slightly, but as Figure 1 shows, they remained 10% below their March 2019 level.

As the COVID-19 pandemic hit other countries and regions later than China, monthly data available at the time of publication only reflect the beginning of their decline in exports. March exports from European Union (EU) countries and the United States dropped by 8% and 7% from a year earlier, respectively. Other countries' exports decreased by 4% in the same month. Because most countries went into lockdown in late March or in April 2020, the full effect of the crisis is likely to be more visible in later months.

Strong impact on textiles and vehicles


Some EU countries and the United States implemented lockdowns during March 2020, while most of China did not return to business until late March. Sectoral data for China, the EU and United States, also known as G3 economies, suggest that the pandemic, and the measures taken to contain it, had most impact on trade in skins and leather products, footwear, vehicles and clothing, with declines of 20% or more in exports of such goods (Figure 2).

Travel and tourism at stake

In addition to provoking a decline in merchandise trade, the pandemic crisis has hit services heavily, with travel and tourism among the most affected sectors. During the period from the onset of the pandemic to 7 May 2020, 113 countries imposed global travel bans.


The World Tourism Organization estimates international tourist arrivals could decline by 60%-80% in 2020 from a year earlier – a reduction 15 to 20 times greater than during the 2008 global financial crisis. The World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that 100.8 million jobs in travel and tourism are at risk, more than half of them in Asia (Figure 3).

FIGURE 1 Chinese exports decline by 21% in February 2020 from a year earlier




Note: Percentage change in monthly exports compared to the corresponding period in the previous year.
Source: ITC.

FIGURE 2 Exports decline 9% from locked-down United States, EU and China




Note: Percentage change in monthly exports from the EU, US and China for March 2020, compared with March 2019. For some EU countries, data is from selected partner countries. Red dots: below average export decline. Yellow: above average export decline. Green: sectors with export growth.
Source: ITC.

FIGURE 3 Asia forecast to have most job losses in travel and tourism



Source: World Travel and Tourism Council.

FIGURE 4 Travel bans in more than 100 countries threaten tourism



Note: Percentages (and corresponding dot colours) reflect national travel exports-to-GDP ratios. Trade and GDP data from 2018. Territories coloured in yellow had imposed a travel ban as of 7 May 2020, while those in green had not. Countries for which data is not available are in grey. The software generating maps does not apply United Nations definitions of national borders.

Source: ITC, World Bank and New York Times (*Coronavirus Travel Restrictions, Across the Globe*).

Travel and tourism are key industries in many developing countries, with international tourist arrivals constituting a major services export. Of the 10 countries most dependent on travel exports, nine are small island developing States. In six Caribbean countries, travel exports account for between a quarter and half of gross domestic product (GDP) – Antigua and Barbuda (50%), Grenada (48%), Saint Lucia (47%), Saint Kitts and Nevis (36%), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (29%) and Belize (26%) (Figure 4).

In Asia, Macao SAR and the Maldives are particularly vulnerable to a slump in tourism, with travel exports accounting for 73% and 56% of GDP, respectively. In Africa, the Seychelles is at risk, given that the ratio is 35%. As of 7 May 2020, three of the 10 countries most reliant on travel exports had imposed their own travel bans.

Dollar’s rise damps trade

The appreciation of the US dollar also has served to reduce trade volumes because exporters outside the United States have to bear the higher cost of the more expensive dollars with which they are paid. It is estimated that the dollar’s use as an invoicing currency for imports is 4.7 times the United States’ share of world imports and 3.1 times its share of exports.⁴

A consequence of dollar dominance is that when the US dollar strengthens against world currencies, the volume of trade declines between countries other than the United States. Evidence suggests that a 1% appreciation of the dollar results in a fall of 0.6% in the volume of trade in the rest of the world within a year.⁵ On a trade weighted basis, the US dollar strengthened by 9.5% between February and April 2020 against emerging economies (Figure 5). This could reduce trade flows in 2020 between countries other than the United States and reduce the availability of dollars to trading SMEs.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Gambian youth tour guides emerge as first responders to COVID-19 awareness and prevention

With support from the Youth Empowerment Project, young leaders in the Gambia are playing a role in ensuring safety and good health.

The effects of the global coronavirus pandemic are visible in the Gambia, as elsewhere. The budding tourism industry in the country has taken a hit with travel bans, flight suspensions, quarantines, lockdowns and social distancing measures.

To protect their communities and build resilience against further impacts to the vulnerable tourism industry, young leaders have sprung into action. ITC in the


Gambia engaged these young leaders from its community-based tourism initiative and mobilized them with funding and resources to undertake an awareness campaign across the rural region of Janjanbureh, initiating the first critical step towards prevention.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-Youth-tour-guides-in-the-Gambia-emerge-as-first-responders-to-COVID-19-awareness-and-prevention/>

Source: ITC.

FIGURE 5 US dollar appreciates against emerging market currencies in early 2020



Note: Monthly trade weighted US dollar index based on both goods and services trade. January 2006=100, not seasonally adjusted. Data run monthly from January 2006 to April 2020.

Source: Federal Reserve of St. Louis economic data, accessed on 10 May 2020.

Supply chains transmit effects of shutdowns globally

China, the European Union and the United States are not only among the world's largest exporters, they are also key players within global supply chains. This makes them major importers of raw materials, parts and components. As a result, in addition to the impact at home, lockdowns in the G3 economies affect businesses in partner economies and in countries that do not have a direct trading relationship with China, the EU or the United States. The complexity of global supply chains means lockdowns in one economy can have major ripple effects across the globe (Figure 6).

The three major supply chain trade hubs (China, the EU and United States) account for 63% of world supply chain imports and 64% of supply chain exports (Figure 7). ITC has estimated how lockdowns in these three economies affect the rest of the world by assuming a two-month complete shutdown of all manufacturing production, and calculated the dollar value of the supply chain disruption (see Technical Annex for further details). While this assessment is only relevant for 12% of all industrial trade, it is useful in demonstrating that economic developments in one country often depend on decisions made elsewhere.


Figure 7 provides an overview of ITC's estimates showing that due to their direct interlinkages, the G3 economies are among the global players most affected by COVID-19 and the measures taken to stop its spread.

Strong impact of European Union lockdown

The reduction in international trade in manufacturing inputs due to the shutdown of the G3 supply chain hubs is expected to amount to \$126.3 billion.⁶ The factory shutdown in the European Union will have the greatest repercussions for supply chain exports elsewhere. The EU is highly integrated into global supply chains and is the world's largest importer of industrial inputs, with China the largest exporter. The EU is also the biggest market for three of the world's five geographic regions. It is the main importer of industrial inputs from both Africa and Asia and buys almost as many industrial inputs from Latin America as the United States.


According to ITC estimates, EU imports of industrial inputs will drop by \$147.1 billion in 2020. Of these, \$101 billion represent intra-EU trade and \$46.1 billion are imported from other regions. Next come China and the United States, where shutdowns are expected to reduce imports

FIGURE 6 COVID-19 disrupts international supply chains



Source: Adapted from the *World Development Report 2020. Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains*. (World Bank, 2019)

FIGURE 7 Slump forecast in exports of manufacturing inputs for supply chains



Note: Colours indicate the share of supply chain exports in the total exports of the country. The values indicate the predicted loss of manufacturing exports in 2020. The data for Europe exclude intra-EU trade. The software generating maps does not apply United Nations definitions of national borders.

Source: ITC.

of industrial inputs by \$41.9 billion for China and \$38.2 billion for the United States (Table 1). The combined reduction amounts to \$126.3 billion, or 2.1% of the total industrial imports by the G3.

Countries in the Americas will export \$24.5 billion fewer industrial inputs, mostly caused by the pandemic-induced shutdowns of factories in the United States and the European Union. The exposure of the Americas to the European Union mainly reflects the sizeable trade flows between the United States and the EU, which account for about 80% of the Americas' expected \$8.7 billion loss in trade with Europe.

In Asia, exports of industrial inputs are expected to drop by \$71.4 billion, with most of this loss stemming from the lockdowns in China and the EU. About 50% of Asia's exposure to the EU is linked to the trading relationship between the EU and China. The exposure of Asian countries to China centres on electronics supply chains (Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).⁷ India's exposure, meanwhile, mainly relates to trade with the EU in automobile components.

Europe is heavily affected by the factory shutdowns in both China and the United States, which mainly reflects direct links between the G3 hubs, as more than 90% of the \$10.8 billion and \$9.3 billion losses in exports of industrial inputs (Table 1) are linked to EU-China and EU-US trade. Non-EU European countries mainly depend on the EU market and are therefore heavily affected by the lockdown there, with a \$6.6 billion loss in exports of industrial inputs

expected. Exporters in Oceania are projected to lose \$793 million in exports of industrial inputs (Table 1), due mainly to exposure in China.

African exporters may lose more than \$2.4 billion in global industrial supply chain exports due to the shock caused by factory shutdowns in the G3. More than 70% of this decline is caused by the temporary disruption of supply chain links with the EU. Just a few product lines and countries seem to be driving this reduction in exports. Morocco's losses in exports of wiring sets for vehicles to the European Union, for example, are projected to amount to nearly \$300 million, accounting for 15%–20% of the loss of African exports to the European Union. North African countries are also affected by the disruption of the textile supply chains that link North African exporters to Europe.

Many other African countries are affected because of their exports to China of raw materials, such as copper for Benin, Mauritius, Namibia and Zambia, and cotton for Burkina Faso. While the declines may be significant for individual countries, however, the projected figures per country and product line are not so high as to stand out in regional averages.

Small island developing States (SIDS) are most exposed to the lockdown in China (2.7%). For landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), the largest drop in exports in dollar terms is expected to be to the EU, but disrupted participation in supply chains with the United States is expected to be more significant (3.2% of LLDC exports to

TABLE 1 Supply chain disruption will cause trade to plunge

Importer Exporter	Projected reduction of trade within manufacturing supply chains							
	China		European Union		United States		G3	
	\$ billion	%	\$ billion	%	\$ billion	%	\$ billion	%
Africa	0.4	0.4%	1.8	1.2%	0.3	1.2%	2.4	0.9%
Americas	4.5	2.0%	8.7	2.0%	11.3	1.6%	24.5	1.8%
Asia	25.9	3.1%	28.3	2.5%	17.1	1.7%	71.4	2.4%
Europe	10.8	3.3%	6.6	1.5%	9.3	1.7%	26.8	2.0%
Oceania	0.4	0.4%	0.2	1.1%	0.2	2.3%	0.8	0.6%
WORLD	41.9	2.7%	46.1	2.1%	38.2	1.7%	126.3	2.1%
Landlocked developing countries	0.2	0.6%	0.4	0.8%	0.1	3.2%	0.6	0.8%
Least developed countries	0.4	0.8%	0.3	0.5%	0.1	0.4%	0.7	0.6%
Small island developing States	1.3	2.7%	0.6	1.7%	0.7	1.8%	2.6	2.1%

Note: The data for the EU include EU27 and the United Kingdom. The data for Europe exclude intra-EU trade. Trade values indicate the expected loss of trade in inputs with G3 in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss with the corresponding G3 country in 2020 in the total trade (inputs and final goods) with the world as measured in 2019. Darker colours indicate higher losses. World total includes free zones and areas not elsewhere specified. Projected supply chain disruption is calculated as the loss of imported inputs by the G3, assuming a two month shutdown of all factories within the G3, and taking into account the direct effect only (one link in supply chains, i.e. the reduction of exports in countries supplying inputs to the G3).

Source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics.

the United States are expected to be lost due to the factory shutdowns in the United States).

Overall, these estimates show that the lockdowns in China, the EU and the United States have the greatest impact on the other two G3 economies. Effects for other economies are significant, but in many cases relate to specific supply chains, as shown by findings in the following section.

Sectors exposed to disruptions

Based on the countries that were initially hardest hit by COVID-19 – China, Japan, Republic of Korea, France, Italy, and Germany – researchers have estimated that the supply shock caused by the pandemic is biggest in automotive, apparel and footwear, computer and electronics products, and fibre optic components.⁸ ITC's findings make it possible to identify the regions, countries and sectors most affected by pandemic-related production stoppages through their links to global supply chains.

Supply chain disruption mainly affects machinery, plastics and rubber, chemicals and electronic equipment (Figure 8). These sectors are likely to experience the biggest export declines globally, with exports of industrial inputs dropping by \$44 billion, \$29 billion, \$23 billion and \$23 billion, respectively. As a percentage of total global export value of each individual sector, ferrous metals, mineral products, and pearls and semi-precious stones are the sectors most affected by supply chain disruptions, with declines in exports to the G3 exceeding 7%.

Non-EU European countries are deeply affected by supply chain shocks because they provide industrial inputs to countries within the EU. Plastics and ferrous metals are the sectors most affected in relative terms.

Losses in machinery and electronic equipment are at the same level as the most affected sectors in Europe. Asia is a significant part of international supply chains connecting the world through China, particularly in providing inputs for computers, electronics, pharmaceuticals and transport equipment.⁹


For the Americas, including the United States, the magnitude of trade disruption in dollar terms is lower than in Asia and Europe. However, the decline as a share of total exports is similar for the sectors most affected by supply chain disruptions because for Canada and Latin America the main disruptions come from the United States, while for the United States the main disruptions emanate from the European Union. The analysis shows that supply chain trade from the United States to China is only a quarter of supply chain trade in the opposite direction, reflecting bilateral patterns of trade.

Africa and Oceania are mainly exposed to supply chain disruptions in metals and inputs for machinery. The stoppage of processing plants in Europe hits Africa the hardest, while Oceania is more dependent on China. Only the metal sector seems to have a similar loss in both regions because of China's shutdown (about \$150 million), although the decline is more significant as a percentage of the sector's total exports in Oceania (5% compared with 2%).

Exports of electronic equipment from small island developing States have been most hit by COVID-19 induced supply chain shocks, although chemical, plastic and rubber industries are also strongly affected. While all of these industries have been affected by COVID-19 containment measures in Europe, the damage is most severe in the plastics and rubber sectors, where the reduction in exports is largest relative to the size of the sector.

The scale of the supply chain disruptions experienced by landlocked developing countries and least developed countries is just a third of the shock experienced by SIDS, according to ITC calculations. For LDCs and LLDCs, exports of metals are affected by disruptions in international production chains, but there is also an impact on other important industrial sectors. In LDCs, disruptions have most impact on apparel exports, while in LLDCs, exports of machinery inputs bear the brunt of the shock. Compared with LLDCs, LDC exports are more dependent on China than on the European Union.

FIGURE 8 Percentage reductions in manufacturing exports to the EU, China and United States



Notes: The data for the EU include EU27 and the United Kingdom. The data for Europe exclude intra-EU trade. Trade values indicate the expected loss of trade in inputs with G3 in 2020. Percentages indicate the proportion that loss accounts for in the region's trade in that sector. Projected supply chain disruption is calculated as the loss of imported inputs by the G3, assuming a two month shutdown of all factories within the G3, and taking into account the direct effect only (one link in supply chains, i.e. the reduction of exports in countries supplying inputs to the G3).

Source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics.

CHAPTER 2

Stress tests and new beginnings for supply chains

Ensuring access to essential goods

COVID-19 has given governments around the globe the challenge of directing essential goods, such as food and medical equipment, where they are most needed to address the immediate health crisis. High demand for certain sanitary products, supply chain disruptions and logistical constraints made this difficult. Fearful that their populations would be unable to obtain goods needed to cope with the immediate health crisis, many governments imposed new trade measures on these items.

Many of the temporary measures applied in response to the pandemic curbed the exchange of goods and services. Indeed, export bans and other restrictions covered 73% of worldwide trade in virus-related products as of early May 2020. However, 46% of the new measures aimed to


liberalize trade – notably, easing import conditions for critical items needed to address the pandemic.

The number of countries enacting new trade measures climbed in March, as Figure 9 shows. On 3 February, Iran and Kyrgyzstan became the first two states to apply export measures. By early April, 87 governments had done the same. Import measures followed a similar trend.

The number of countries imposing measures has remained relatively stable since early April, with 93 applying export measures and 105 using import measures as of 6 May.


While the measures discussed in this report are temporary, countries may impose additional measures affecting trade in the medium to long term. This happened after the financial crisis (for example, subsidies to relaunch economic activity).

FIGURE 9 Countries imposing trade measures rose rapidly in March 2020



Source: ITC.

FIGURE 10 Countries are restricting exports related to COVID-19



Note: Data are from 6 May 2020. The software generating maps does not apply United Nations definitions of national borders.

Source: ITC.

Temporary export measures

Many of the measures in place today prohibit or limit exports of medical products and, less frequently, food. The frequency and type of curbs differ by region.

Few African countries restrict exports of goods related to COVID-19, largely attributable to the fact that they do not manufacture them. Africa accounts for less than 0.5% of exports and 2.6% of imports of these products, indicating that regional imports exceed exports by more than five times.

Most of the 84 countries restricting exports of medical products are European (37) and Asian (26). These curbs mainly concern masks, with 55 measures affecting textile masks and 48 involving masks with filters. The measures affect 90% and 76% of world trade in the two products, respectively.

Restrictions on food exports remain mostly limited to rice in South-East Asia, wheat and buckwheat in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and beans in Latin America.

BOX 1: Rice prices soar, threatening hunger and malnutrition


Trade measures, coupled with restrictions in production and logistics, have pushed up rice prices. Fourteen countries have imposed export bans or quotas on rice. These include three Asian net exporters of rice – Viet Nam, Myanmar and Cambodia – that together represent about 12.8% of world exports of the grain.

India is the biggest rice exporter, accounting for a third of world rice exports. While the Government has not banned exports of rice, Indian rice traders have suspended signing new export contracts amid the nationwide lockdown.

Rice prices from several major exporters rose almost 20% in March and the first two weeks of April. They stabilized (and even declined in the case of Thailand) in the second half of April and May.

Surging commodity prices could be devastating for the most vulnerable populations. While almost 90% of countries are net importers of rice, some depend more than others on these imports to nourish their population.

Rice prices shot up in 2020



Source: ITC Market Price Information.

Many of the biggest net per capita rice importers are LDCs and SIDS


RANK	COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES	NET RICE IMPORTS PER CAPITA (kg)
1	Djibouti	268
2	Benin	137
3	Kiribati	71
4	Gambia	68
5	Qatar	66
6	Maldives	65
7	Togo	59
8	Kuwait	59
9	Seychelles	56
10	Liberia	55
11	Senegal	48
12	Brunei Darussalam	46
13	Federated States of Micronesia	46
14	Singapore	44
15	Mauritius	43
16	Saudi Arabia	43
17	Haiti	42
18	Sierra Leone	41
19	Hong Kong SAR	41
20	Cabo Verde	40

Note: The following territories have been excluded from the table: United States Minor Outlying Islands, Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Curaçao.

Source: ITC.

The countries with the highest net per capita imports include many least developed countries and small island developing States.¹⁰ These countries import less than 9% of their rice from suppliers banning or restricting exports in May 2020. However, 54% of their imports are from India, where supply chain disruptions have been reported.


FIGURE 11 Most medical and surgical gear imports are banned or restricted



Note: Light blue: Share of exports from countries with export restrictions. Dark blue: share of exports from countries without export restrictions.

Source: ITC.

FIGURE 12 Developed countries more likely to cut tariffs on medical supplies



Note: The data refers to the period 30 January – 4 May 2020.

Source: ITC.

Countries and regions that rely heavily on imports of specific medical or food products will suffer the most from export restrictions imposed by their partners. Some regions have been hit harder than others by trade limits on COVID-19-related products (Figure 11). Africa is the most affected region – 74% of African imports are subject to bans or limits – followed by Asia-Pacific (67%) and the Americas (60%).

More than three-quarters of African imports of disinfectants and sterilizers, medical and surgical equipment, and personal protective equipment (PPE) originate in countries that prohibit exports of these items or have a licence and permission scheme that could make it more difficult for importing countries to procure the equipment they need.

Temporary import measures

The vast majority of the temporary import measures in place as of 6 May 2020 seek to facilitate access to essential medical supplies or food. Of the 105 countries that have such measures in place, most (92) use tariff reductions, while 13 have lifted other rules and regulations to stimulate imports of these products. However, 15 governments have imposed new import restrictions, mostly bans on trade of live animals.

Governments in developing countries rely on revenues from customs duties to a much higher extent than governments in developed countries. Tariffs imposed by developing countries on virus-related goods average about 9.3% – more than twice as high as those applied by developed countries.

Almost all least developed countries apply a tariff of 20% or higher on at least one COVID-19-related product. Alcohol faces the highest average tariffs (on average, 28% for ethanol containing less than 80% alcohol and 23% for undenatured ethyl alcohol).

The Solomon Islands, Nepal, Bhutan and Liberia impose tariffs of more than 80% on different types of alcohol and have not resorted to temporary trade-liberalizing measures. However, Angola, which usually applies a 60% tariff on alcohol, temporarily exempted medical goods to combat COVID-19 from customs duties, value-added tax and other taxes.

High tariffs are also applied to disposable hair nets (26%) and different types of soap (around 20%). Textile masks, widely affected by export bans, are subject to average import tariffs of 18% in LDCs and up to 35% in the most restrictive markets (Ethiopia and Sudan).

Almost three-quarters of developed countries have removed or reduced tariffs on medical products since the crisis began. Fewer than half of all developing countries and only 18% of LDCs have done the same (Figure 12).

Striking the right balance

As the pandemic spread across the globe, it became clear that measures restricting trade of essential goods could severely limit access to these products for the most vulnerable. Under pressure to balance the perceived needs of their own nationals with those of the most vulnerable, and conscious of the need to abide by the trade rules that help countries strike this balance, ministers from G20 countries pledged to adopt trade measures only for vital supplies and other essential items when necessary.

G20 ministers said that any 'necessary' emergency measures designed to tackle COVID-19 must be 'proportionate, transparent, temporary [and] reflect our interest in protecting the most vulnerable'. In addition they must not create any 'unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains' and they must comply with World Trade Organization rules.¹¹

Ministers also noted that trade facilitation measures can streamline customs procedures, helping to expedite clearance of essential goods. Accelerated clearance processes for trusted traders and authorized economic operators, and expanded use of integrated risk management to include health-related criteria can all improve efficiency at the border.

Mutual recognition of conformity assessments and certificates for vital goods from countries with similar or higher standards would also facilitate trade of medical supplies and food. Governments should consider creating enquiry points to share information on crisis-related restrictions and regulations and better coordinate border management (see Box 2: Global Trade Helpdesk). The crisis also highlights the importance of working with the private sector to digitalize trade documents and procedures.

Strengthen supply chains to boost essential goods production

It is impossible to predict how the pandemic – and the sanitary measures to manage the crisis – will evolve in the coming months. Countries are moving or have moved out of lockdowns, but this has happened in a controlled way in most places to avoid a second wave of infections.

At the same time, the world is racing to develop a vaccine, step up testing capacities and improve tracing methods. Some pundits believe all three are necessary for business activity – including cross-border trade – to reach pre-crisis levels.

Until that happens, a lot can be done to manage the transition period optimally. This includes improving regional supply chains to fuel the manufacture of essential products.


FIGURE 13 Millions of masks, gloves and gowns are needed

Every month, frontline health responders around the world need these supplies (and more) to protect themselves and others from COVID-19.




Source: World Health Organization.

FIGURE 14 Concentrated exports of virus-related goods and protective items




Note: Protective products considered: disinfectants (HS 380894 & 380840), gloves (HS 401511), masks with filters (HS 902000). COVID-19-related products are based on the World Customs Organization’s reference list.¹² Data reports from the exporting country and its trade partners between 2014 and 2018.
Source: ITC.

FIGURE 15 Developing countries supply many inputs for PPE and disinfectants



Note: Americas excludes the United States and Canada. Pacific excludes Australia and New Zealand. Asia excludes China.
 The following inputs are considered: disinfectants (HS 380894 & 380840) – ethanol (HS 220710), gloves (HS 401511) – latex (HS 400110), masks with filters (HS 902000) – synthetic nonwoven fabrics (HS 560311). Data come from reports from both the exporting country and its trade partners in 2014–2018.
Source: ITC.

FIGURE 16 Africa and the Pacific could rely on local supply for disinfectant inputs



Note: Price estimate for ethanol — \$0.63 a litre, for glycerine — \$2.06 a litre.
Source: ITC.

Personal protective equipment: Demand to persist

The strategic importance given to the medical supply sector during the crisis will likely remain even after the pandemic ends. Developing countries could position themselves by ramping up production and export capacities for certain health-related products that rely on raw materials that are widely available in their own region.

The World Health Organization estimates that global production of personal protective equipment (PPE) would need to increase by 40% to be able to meet the surge in international demand stemming from COVID-19.¹³ Shortages of other medical supplies, such as test kits and ventilators, have also been reported.

The supply of medical products is highly concentrated, with just five countries accounting for half of global exports: Germany, the United States, Switzerland, China and Ireland.

Production of the three goods highlighted in this section – disinfectants, gloves and masks with filters – is even more concentrated. China, the United States, Germany and Malaysia furnish half of all global exports. Export restrictions by some of the main suppliers have made it difficult for other countries to access these essential healthcare products.

Developing countries in Africa, the Americas and the Pacific account for a small part of global PPE exports. Yet, they often export a sizeable share of certain inputs used to manufacture these goods. This creates opportunities to develop regional supply chains and help diversify the worldwide supply of these inputs.

Figure 15 identifies products for which regional exports fail to meet the needs of frontline health responders, but for which enough inputs exist to develop supply chains to supply these goods to the region. These items are masks, gloves and disinfectants in Africa, masks and gloves in the Americas, masks in Asia and disinfectants in the Pacific.


Africa and the Pacific: Opportunity to make more disinfectants

Breaking down World Health Organization estimates to the regional level, Africa alone needs nearly half a million litres of disinfectants a month to battle COVID-19. Just 17% of African imports of disinfectants come from the region.

How can Africa ramp up production of disinfectants?

Disinfectants rely on three key inputs: ethanol diluted with distilled water, glycerine and plastic bottles. Africa already produces ethanol, plastic bottles and caps in sufficient

FIGURE 17 Just a few countries export most of the world's latex and surgical gloves



Note: Countries appearing higher have a big share of world latex exports, used in making gloves. Countries more to the right have a high share of world exports of surgical gloves. Countries on the upper left have a large share of world latex exports, but a low share of surgical glove exports, indicating that transformation mostly happens abroad. Data are from the exporting country and its trade partners, 2014-2018.

Source: ITC.

quantities. The half a million plastic bottles and caps that would be needed corresponds to just a fraction of monthly African exports of these products (0.2% and 0.1%), with Egypt and South Africa being the main suppliers.

This indicates that Africa has more than enough relevant packaging to meet demand on the continent. Likewise, the required 374,000 litres of ethanol constitute only 1.5% of the continent's current monthly exports of the product.

Africa may not produce enough glycerine to manufacture disinfectants locally, meaning a short-term global sourcing strategy is needed. South Africa, the only African net exporter of disinfectants, sources glycerine mostly from Malaysia and Argentina. Another supplier could be Germany, with an unrealized export potential for glycerine of \$2.9 million to South Africa and \$6.9 million to all Africa.

Health responders in developing countries in the Pacific need 4,420 litres of disinfectants a month during the pandemic. These countries are not among the global net exporters of disinfectants. Dedicating 2.3% of monthly ethanol exports to the production of disinfectants, however, would be sufficient to meet the regional demand.

Secondary inputs such as glycerine and plastic bottling could be sourced from global suppliers if local production proves inadequate. China has the highest untapped export potential to the Pacific for plastic bottles, and Indonesia and Malaysia could supply glycerine.

Africa and Latin America: Producing and exporting surgical gloves

The World Health Organization estimates that frontline health responders around the world need 76 million gloves to deal with COVID-19.¹⁴ Although different materials can be used to make surgical-grade gloves, latex is the most common. Polyvinyl chloride, nitrile and polyurethane are also used to manufacture these gloves.¹⁵

Figure 17 shows each country's share in global exports of natural rubber and surgical gloves in 2018.

If countries had the same market share in the manufactured glove market as they did in the raw latex market, all countries would be on a diagonal line in Figure 17. Yet several developing countries with abundant rubber resources export latex, but few gloves (e.g. in Cameroon), indicating there is potential for them to dedicate their latex resources to the production of gloves.

Furthermore, the fact that just a few countries are in the upper right part of the figure shows that global exports of latex and surgical gloves are highly concentrated. Thailand accounts for more than 73% of natural rubber exports and three countries, Malaysia, Thailand and China, account for 63% of exports of surgical rubber gloves.

Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon already export surgical gloves, but African demand exceeds supply. By using 6% of their monthly latex exports, the two countries could

produce the 13 million gloves that African health responders need each month to face COVID-19.¹⁶ Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria also export latex, though none sells surgical gloves abroad.

Guatemala is the top latex exporter in Latin America, with annual exports worth \$60 million. Few Latin American countries export significant amounts of medical gloves, with Mexico accounting for 57% of regional glove exports (worth \$2.2 million). This means the region cannot meet its monthly need for 6.4 million gloves.

There are solutions, however. By dedicating 1% of its monthly rubber exports and subject to suitable investments in production technology, Guatemala alone could produce the necessary number of gloves to satisfy Latin American demand.

Africa, Asia and the Americas can produce masks locally

Filtered masks, which are subject to trade measures in 74 countries, are made using synthetic nonwoven fabrics. Africa contributes 3.5% to world exports of these fabrics, yet mask production on the continent has been limited. By allocating 7% of synthetic nonwoven fabrics, Africa could meet its own monthly requirement of filtered masks.

Egypt is the main African exporter of synthetic nonwoven fabrics. However, South African is a major exporter of the raw input (polypropylene in primary forms).

Countries in Asia and the Americas are also unable to meet their monthly requirements of 36.6 million and 7.4 million masks, respectively. However, they could do so by allocating 2.1% of their exports of synthetic nonwoven fabrics to the production of masks with filters.

Malaysia is the leading exporter of the fabrics in Asia (6% of global exports), while Brazil is the main exporter in Latin America (2% of global exports).


Enhance technical infrastructure around sanitary standards

Countries are simplifying import processes to get sufficient amounts of important sanitary and hygiene products and personal protective equipment across borders while ensuring their quality and safety. However, this has led to reports that some imports, such as hand sanitizers and face masks, are substandard.¹⁷

Conformity assessment is indispensable to ensure that quality and safety requirements defined in standards and regulations are met. It includes certification, inspection and testing. The question today is whether we can still rely on conformity assessment processes to guarantee the quality and safety of essential healthcare products.

The certification process often requires an on-site audit. Testing laboratories or inspection bodies need lab technicians or inspectors to be physically present for testing or in the field scrutinizing goods (for example, at the port).

FIGURE 18 Developing countries are among the top suppliers of synthetic nonwoven fabrics



Note: A country located on the upper left corner has a large share of world exports of the input and a low share of world exports of the output, indicating that transformation mostly happens abroad. Data is a combination of reports made by the exporting country and its trade partners for the 2014-2018 period.

Source: ITC.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Small firms stay ready to receive tourists in Myanmar, post-COVID-19

Small tourism-related businesses in southern Shan state are preparing to welcome guests soon.

Tourists have been absent in Myanmar for many weeks, severely affecting everyone who depends on tourism for their livelihood. To reduce the pain caused by the COVID-19 crisis, the ITC team promoting inclusive tourism in southern Shan state quickly began to identify ways to connect effectively and efficiently with the roughly 100 SMEs with which it works.

Since 80% of them rely on internet and online platforms for advertising their services to customers, ITC is using social media to share the latest information and recommendations on the way forward. A Facebook post now goes out regularly with practical tips to help tourism SMEs in Shan State prepare to welcome tourists in the COVID-19 'New Normal'. By sharing engaging content such as information updates, latest statistics and videos, these social media posts encourage tourism businesses to produce innovative content, such as virtual tours of scenic destinations in the area.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-Staying-ready-to-receive-tourists-in-Myanmar-post-COVID-19/>

Source: ITC.

With movement restricted in many countries, certification bodies are unable to conduct the necessary audits because fewer lab technicians and inspectors are at work.

A few accreditation bodies have flagged the significance of reduced activity at relevant conformity assessment bodies. The European co-operation for Accreditation said in March that the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent travel restrictions imposed by many national governments had 'seriously affected' both conformity assessment and accreditation activities.¹⁸

In particular, conformity assessment bodies and national accreditation bodies are being forced to cancel or postpone most 'in situ' activities, such as on-site assessments, audits, witnessing visits and inspections. Many are only able to provide their services with a workforce that is now mostly working remotely. This will affect the service provided and also lead to a possible temporary lack of access to certain supplies or services normally subcontracted by conformity assessment bodies.


The urgency of preventing the spread of COVID-19 has caused demand for sanitizers and personal protective equipment to reach a fever pitch. To make sure these products are available to their citizens, developing countries are being more flexible on border controls. At the same time, they are encouraging local small businesses to produce sanitizers and masks even though, in some cases, there are no national standards on these products.

What can standards and conformity assessment bodies do to ensure the quality and safety of these goods?

First, standards on the products should be made available to small firms. There are already a few good initiatives. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has made some standards on protective equipment and medical devices available free of charge in read-only versions. These include:

- ISO 374-5:2016, Protective gloves against dangerous chemicals and micro-organisms – Part 5: Terminology and performance requirements for micro-organisms risks;

FIGURE 19 Recession will weigh on air travel recovery



Note: Global revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) profile, quarterly data, % change year-on-year.

Source: IATA Economics.

- ISO 13688:2013, Protective clothing – General requirements;
- ISO 10993-1:2018, Biological evaluation of medical devices – Part 1: Evaluation and testing within a risk management process.

The French national standards body *Association Française de Normalisation* has produced a reference document proposing requirements when manufacturing new protective masks. The document 'AFNOR Spec – Barrier masks' can be downloaded for free.¹⁹

Other national standard bodies should follow these approaches and make their standards available.

Second, border control authorities should adopt a risk-based approach to official controls, leveraging past conformity assessment data of suppliers and manufacturers. Reliable accredited bodies should issue such data. This would facilitate the quick release of goods from customs by reducing the need for thorough inspections and testing.

Third, when certification bodies are unable to conduct on-site audits due to safety reasons, desk audits should be possible in these exceptional circumstances, based on relevant documents, records, stakeholder interviews, pictures and other available information. The audit report must include a justification for replacing an on-site audit with a desk audit.

That said, flexible approaches towards certification do not come without risks. Unscrupulous suppliers of personal protective equipment are trying to benefit from the pandemic by supplying fake or dangerous products.

Strict controls for these products remain vital.

International travel: Slow return, new protocols

Concerns about air travel

The outbreak of COVID-19 has caused an unprecedented restriction to mobility. While countries have reconciled movement within sovereign borders, cross-border movement remains problematic. More than 120 countries have imposed travel restrictions that affect consumers and businesses alike.²⁰

Airlines have endured significant losses from the pandemic, despite the availability of cheaper jet fuel after oil prices plunged in the first quarter of 2020.²¹ Globally, demand for jet fuel fell 47% in the second quarter of 2020 from a year earlier.²² This contributed to the dramatic drop in oil prices as of April. Some low-cost airlines that operate on tighter margins have already declared bankruptcy, suspended operations or collapsed.²³

The air transport industry measures demand for its services using revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), a metric that shows the number of kilometres travelled by paying passengers and is also known as airline traffic. The data show that global airline traffic was on track to plummet 80% in the first two quarters of 2020 (Figure 19).

The International Air Transport Association believes domestic markets may recover enough in the third quarter to partially offset that decline. As restrictions on international movement are relaxed, airline traffic may recover by 50% in the fourth quarter, according to the association.²⁴

However, this optimistic forecast assumes that the recovery of passenger numbers hinges solely on travel

restrictions. Once recessionary impacts are taken into account, projections are sobering, showing that slowdowns in economy-wide economic activity will likely slow recovery in the air travel sector. As a result of all these factors, IATA predicts that air traffic levels will only recover to 2019 levels by 2023.²⁵

Consumer confidence in air travel has sunk. A survey assessing passenger confidence in April 2020 found that 40% of respondents intended to wait at least six months before travelling again, more than in a February survey.²⁶

Even without the restrictions, it seems that people may be unwilling to travel in the short term. In April 2020, 74% of surveyed respondents in the United States reported concerns about travelling (a 288% increase from January), especially if health professionals advised them not to do so.²⁷

The impact on cargo and the movement of goods has been less severe, largely because freight has been subjected to fewer restrictions than passengers. Although global air cargo has declined 15.2%, this is less than during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

The spike in demand for medical supplies mitigated the fall in cargo activities.²⁸ Nevertheless, the air freight industry faces a capacity crunch that is expected to worsen once global goods demand eases.

Bracing for new protocols

Although many governments began to relax quarantine measures in May 2020, sovereign borders are expected to remain closed until the third quarter. For example, while

China has already transitioned to recovery, cross-border movement is still restricted to avoid importing virus cases.²⁹

The emphasis placed on better hygiene during the pandemic will be central to how the travel industry recovers post-containment.³⁰ The International Air Transport Association has already introduced new guidelines requiring cabin crew to wear masks and goggles,³¹ and is expected to announce similar measures for passengers. Some airlines have already done this.³²

Changes are also coming to airport security. For instance, passengers will probably be allowed to carry hand sanitizers, and screening measures are bound to continue even after the pandemic subsides.³³


Air travel may also soon become more expensive. The grounding of flights by most carriers has already driven up ticket costs. As the world transitions to the post-pandemic era, innovation in communication will prompt businesses to alter current operating models to discourage traveling.

Furthermore, general apprehension over the next six months to one year will keep tourism demand low. Flying costs could rise if social distancing measures continue, reaching a new normal.

Reduced logistics services

More than half of firms operating in the primary sector experienced reduced logistic services due to COVID-19 – a higher share than in manufacturing and services (Figure 20). This makes it more difficult for businesses in the primary sector to reach international markets.

FIGURE 20 COVID-19 reduced access to logistics services in all sectors



Note: Respondents were asked 'Has the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic affected your enterprise in any of the following ways?' and 'What is the main sector of activity of the business?' Data on 2,558 businesses in 128 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected from 21 April–2 June 2020.



Wamkele Mene

Secretary General

African Continental Free
Trade Area Secretariat

THOUGHT LEADER

African growth: A new model for a post-COVID-19 world

More than ever, the creation of a single continental market remains a game changer.

The coronavirus pandemic has triggered a new economic paradigm that is as unprecedented and radical as the Great Depression. Although the economic consequences of this global crisis are still unfolding, its impact on African economies is already alarming.

For the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and other multilateral bodies, mitigating the effects of the pandemic is not only the priority for today. It is also vital to salvage past gains and to maintain carefully laid plans for the future.


The AfCFTA is a far-reaching initiative, designed to foster industrial development and ensure Africa's prosperity. To this end, it seeks to create an institutional ecosystem to address the continent's marginal role in global value chains, its structural trade imbalance and its overreliance on bumpy commodity markets – namely, mineral resources and fossil fuels.

The global drop in industrial production means less demand for key African exports amid a collapse of international trade and a disproportionate decline in the terms of exchange.

The pandemic has not only crippled the production sector; it has also ruined the travel and hospitality industry, which had flourished for two decades. The obliteration of services trade and the predicted sharp decline in international remittances due to the global recession are shaking the foundations of the prevalent model of growth, steered by the tertiary sector.

Calls for debt relief in international fora overshadow the perennial reality of Africa's marginal role in global supply chains,⁵⁵ which creates a recurrent shortage of foreign exchange. This limits the continent's ability to absorb the fallout of a sharp downturn in the global economy. As the effects of the pandemic deepen and the crisis grows in magnitude, it is clear that a model of development that depends heavily on raw commodity exports has reached its limits.

¹ See <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/08/11/figures-of-the-week-african-participation-in-global-value-chains/>



Africa must step up production of drugs and medical supplies

The pandemic highlights the need for African Union members to manufacture more pharmaceuticals. Some countries, such as Egypt and Morocco, rapidly boosted production to meet demand. However, many African governments face limited access to essential drugs and health equipment due to shortages aggravated by restrictions that many countries² imposed on exports of medical supplies (including personal protection equipment).

The AfCFTA is anchored on trade liberalization, even as global supply chain disruption is likely to further deteriorate the world's overall sanitary position. Member states require fair access to critical equipment. The AfCFTA Secretariat encourages member states to turn this crisis into an opportunity by redeploying their production so there is an extraordinary increase in the fabrication of drugs, personal protective equipment, soap, hand sanitizers, intensive care unit beds, testing kits and even ventilators.

The AfCFTA has a dual track approach. In the short term, its priority is to ensure that intra-African trade continues to grow, by alleviating trade restrictions while promoting a policy of 'local production first' whenever available and competitive. In the medium term, the AfCFTA's strategy is to champion the development of a credible pharmaceutical industry capable of meeting Africa's growing demand, and even playing a role in the global market.

Recognizing the effect of border closures on trade, the Assembly of Heads of States of the AU established trade corridors or 'green lanes' that allow for the free flow of essential medical goods used in the fight against the pandemic. Support and resources also were garnered for the pharmaceutical industry to produce affordable medicines and medical equipment to meet African demand.

The AfCFTA plays a vanguard role in spurring rapid industrialization through regional trade integration: a focus on small industrial enterprises to boost trade among African states and create jobs. As a by-product of regional integration, industrialization will strengthen economic diversification and resilience.

Resetting priorities

The AfCFTA is a nascent giant. It is respected by its partners for its potential strategic significance to become the largest and most dynamic regional market by 2030. Unfortunately, the pandemic struck just as the AfCFTA's organizational framework was being finalized, delaying many milestones scheduled for 2020.

Mitigating the pandemic's effects is not only the priority for today. It is vital to salvage past gains and to maintain carefully laid plans for the future.

² For a list of national legislation of countries that adopted temporary export restrictions on certain critical medical supplies in response to COVID-19, see <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/activities-and-programmes/natural-disaster/list-of-countries-coronavirus.aspx>

Nevertheless, the AfCFTA has capitalized on the goodwill of member states to provide the impetus to coordinate national and regional institutions that ensures coherent policymaking and better coordination with the private sector, by bridging the information gap.

In a sense, the disruption in the global supply chain caused by COVID-19 – and the economic downturn that followed – provide a powerful rationale for the immediate implementation of AfCFTA, as a vehicle to spur economic growth and build resilience across the continent.

African businesses, mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, have been at the forefront of the pandemic response. They have unveiled many innovations, from providing medicines and medical equipment to redesigning new supply chains to prevent shortages. The AfCFTA must embrace this new spirit of industrial development in Africa.

The AfCFTA Secretariat supported this positive development by advocating for the establishment of deep value chains to boost intra-African trade and accelerate investment in pharmaceutical industries. While trade information was non-existent at the beginning of the pandemic, a catalogue of African drug companies and production is now being compiled. It will be circulated to relevant national authorities. With the African Union Commission, we are looking into harnessing digital trade and e-commerce as key drivers to implement AfCFTA effectively.

Fighting the pandemic has led us back to the drawing board to reset our priorities for AfCFTA. We called for adequate support (including financial) for small drug companies so they could expand their production capacity and improve the range and the sophistication of their output. Seizing the crisis to unlock the vast potential of Africa's pharmaceuticals market will indeed be a key achievement for the AfCFTA in its early years of existence.

A model of development that depends heavily on raw commodity exports has reached its limits.

A catalyst to support small firms

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) play a crucial role in Africa's economy. Their importance became even more pronounced as the global downturn wreaked havoc on the export-led travel, hospitality and extractive industries – sectors dominated by big companies. Providing MSMEs with an ecosystem that nurtures investment and opening borders for their development is a precondition for post-coronavirus recovery – and beyond, it is a foundation for resilient economic and social development.

African MSMEs are characterized by low productivity, limited access to financial resources and a negligible role in regional and global value chains and the trading system. The current foreign exchange crunch is compelling member states to address the competitiveness gap of their MSMEs, by directing scarce resources towards investments in the productive sector. This has a significant social and economic impact.

The vulnerability of MSMEs and start-ups stems from a lack of market space to grow, compete and thrive. Without growth, they can create neither sustainability nor resilience to future crises. The trade environment in Africa today, coupled with the even greater challenges of limited access to finance and small national markets, does not encourage MSMEs to grow beyond their borders.

The AfCFTA can act as a catalyst for these enterprises to achieve greater economic efficiency to meet the demands of an integrated market. Opening borders to trade will accelerate the reconfiguration of value chains, by easing cross trade of raw materials and semi-finished goods. Integrating regional trade by lifting all tariffs and technical barriers will create a market of 1.2 billion consumers.

Seizing the crisis to unlock the vast potential of Africa's pharmaceuticals market will be a key achievement for AfCFTA in its early years of existence.



Spurring investment to diversify production

More than ever, the creation of a single continental market remains a game changer. However, there are prerequisites for this free trade area to become a potent reality. Member states must converge on rules and regulations governing trade, to give the business community needed visibility for their investment. Specialized institutions and the business sector must work together to harmonize product standards, so MSMEs can better target regional markets.

Voluntary policies targeting capacity building and regional coordination are essential to reap more than the implicit benefits of the AfCFTA. Greater capacity will be needed as industry is revitalized and regional trade grows. This means the next challenge will be cooperating regionally, to attract investment to diversify production.

Governments must understand the needs of MSMEs, provide skill development training and make it easier for them to access finance and new technologies. This will empower small firms and ensure that they are more involved in intra-African trade.

ITC has an important role to play to support AfCFTA member states and their enterprises as we manage the crisis today and begin to consolidate tomorrow. Africa cannot emerge economically without participating more in manufactured goods trade. For this to happen, policymakers and business support groups need more skills and knowledge about regional trade facilitation and export market access.

ITC has been a great partner to the AfCFTA and the African Union in advancing trade on the continent. It contributed significantly by helping to set up the African Trade Observatory, an online market intelligence platform that provides information and data on African trade and markets. MSMEs can use this great tool to guide their trading activities.

However, vulnerable groups such as women and youth often struggle to access such platforms. Women and young entrepreneurs lead most MSMEs – as both informal traders and cross-border traders. They require extensive training to truly engage with the platform and trade itself. Thus, we look to ITC's initiatives for entrepreneurs, such as SheTrades and the Youth and Trade Programme, and we hope to work together to develop more programmes to empower African MSMEs.

The way forward: A new paradigm

The effective implementation of AfCFTA will provide African enterprises with the space they need to thrive and create synergies, raising the profile and volume of investment in the continent. Trade integration creates an opportunity for MSMEs to grow, and it also increases the attractiveness of Africa as an investment destination.

The African Union has already initiated a framework to develop digital trade infrastructure so as to implement the trade agreement. We will build on this work to set in motion a new paradigm for economic growth and social development.

Governments: Understand needs of MSMEs, provide skill development training and make it easier to access finance and new technologies. This will empower small firms in intra-African trade.

BOX 2: ITC in focus: Global Trade Helpdesk for small firms



Getting timely information to small firms, for the crisis, recovery and more

Most small firms are concerned about the viability of their businesses, due to economic lockdowns around the globe. Demand dropped and supply chains were disrupted.

Getting good market information to these small firms can help them forge their path through the crisis.

Sharing this information through enquiry points could help get information on crisis-related restrictions and regulations, including at the border, to those who need that information most.

The crisis also shows the importance of improving progress towards the digitalization of trade documents and procedures, in collaboration with the private sector.

Managing uncertainty

As market conditions and trade policy responses continue to fluctuate, businesses need updates on evolving policies, such as temporary trade restrictions on medical supplies and food. They also need business resources and policy information at the country level.

Recovery will oblige companies to step outside of their comfort zones, look beyond their traditional markets and spread risks. The Global

Trade Helpdesk allows firms to efficiently compare opportunities across potential target markets.

Small companies have little time to collect and analyse trade information that is complex and dispersed. This is why the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Trade Organization launched the Global Trade Helpdesk at the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, in December 2017. The aim has been to create an accessible and centralized digital information platform for MSMEs.

Since then, the network of partner agencies has grown to include the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Chamber of Commerce, the United National Industrial Development Organizations, the World Bank Group, the World Customs Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization. This unique network has joined forces to centralize their data through one accessible, digital entry point.

The platform – www.GlobalTradeHelpdesk.org – brings together key information from across partners into a single search. It is currently available in English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian.

Up-to-date information

Firms can stay updated on changing trade policies in response to COVID-19, compare export opportunities, check market access conditions and connect with partners to put their export plans into action. The tool offers import statistics and export potential figures, tariffs and rules of origin, regulatory requirements and notified changes, trade remedies, domestic trade procedures, intellectual property protection tools, and information on private sustainability standards.

Advice for finance and business competitiveness

The platform also facilitates contact with trade finance institutions and trade promotion organizations, as well as potential buyers.

Business needs: Reflected through partnerships

Reaching the target audience of global firms of all sizes, particularly smaller firms, requires a far-reaching and connected network. Working in partnership with the International Chamber of Commerce, and its network of 45 million of members across the globe, allows for cooperation with national chambers across countries to test and refine the platform to ensure it meets firm needs. National chambers across Europe and Latin America have played an active role in shaping the platform and its continued development. The Global Trade Helpdesk was recently highlighted in an ICC Policy Statement on *10 Ways Governments Can Use Trade to Save SMEs*, as a tool to keep businesses informed of trade policy changes.

CHAPTER 3

Lockdown: The impact on small businesses

While the discussion on reducing the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic response often focuses on macroeconomics, a decades-old observation by renowned economist Paul Krugman comes to mind: 'Countries do not buy or sell goods overseas; companies do.'³⁴ The pandemic-induced slowdown first and foremost affects the real economy, made up of businesses and the people who work for them.

Within this business world, small companies are likely to suffer more than larger ones because they tend to be more vulnerable with fewer resources to adapt to a rapidly changing context. To help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), it is useful to consider the way in which the pandemic crisis affects such companies. It does not strike all at once, but in a cycle of phases.

Four phases of pandemic impact


As small businesses face the COVID-19 crisis, they travel through four phases, whether in succession or simultaneously. From shutdown to supply chain impacts and depressed demand, the cycle eventually moves to the recovery phase (Figure 21).

1. Shutdown impacts have affected countries and regions where the pandemic led governments to adopt measures shutting down economic activity. Such containment efforts have hit hardest in tourism, travel, wholesale and retail, hospitality and entertainment. In the short run, governments in affected countries have focused on keeping SMEs in these sectors afloat.

2. Supply chain disruptions have affected companies around the world. The pandemic-induced lockdowns in China, the European Union (EU) and United States, also known as the group of three (G3), have had major impacts on production, imports and exports. Halts in production in

affected economies reduced the inputs available for global supply chains. SMEs elsewhere in the world that supply affected countries have seen their orders reduced as demand declined. The extent of this trade-induced cascading contagion of input and output effects has differed by supply chain and country.

FIGURE 21 Small business recovery cycle



Source: ITC.

3. Demand depression has occurred first in pandemic-affected countries, where confinement reduced sales to consumers and businesses. But even when the health emergency begins to ease, business investment can remain low due to run-down savings. Households may reduce spending in the medium to long term to compensate for lower incomes during the pandemic period. Confidence might be low, credit overstretched, and bankruptcies among SMEs may follow.


4. Recovery has begun gradually in instances where containment measures have been eased. The evolution of business recovery in each country depends on how the health situation evolves and on the depth and timing of the original suppression of demand. In the weeks after lockdowns cease, economic activity is likely to rebound sharply as people go back to buying products they have missed from their favourite small businesses. Manufacturing and agricultural businesses may have

higher sales as inventories are restocked and consumers make postponed purchases.

Yet the period of shutdown may permanently change production and demand. Economies are being reshaped by the pandemic. The 'new normal' makes recovery more challenging for some, and easier for others. This, combined with specific differences in the way that small businesses experience the four phases, underscores that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all businesses in all places, as discussed in more detail later in this report.

Although it is widely assumed that the impacts of the pandemic are greater for small businesses, there has been little detailed information available on the subject. Insights from an ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey help to fill that gap. The findings confirm that the crisis has affected small businesses more severely. The results presented below are based on the third phase of data collection.³⁵

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Keep up the momentum during a crisis

Online coaching is unlocking access to finance and markets for producers of avocados, coffee and spices in the five East African community countries.

Mambo Coffee is a green specialty coffee exporter from the United Republic of Tanzania that ships both Arabica and Robusta varieties. All of its customers are based outside Africa, except for one in South Africa. Travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have taken a toll on Mambo Coffee, which cannot ship its products as before. The restrictions make it difficult for the company, a beneficiary of the Market Access Upgrade programme (MARKUP), to meet with buyers and producers. Mambo Coffee attended a series of MARKUP trainings and received coaching that helped it secure a \$1 million loan as working capital.

Under MARKUP, ITC continues to help deliver better results, reduce losses and improve market linkages and access to finance. The programme adapted its activities to remain as close as possible to beneficiaries during the crisis, offering online webinars and one-on-one coaching sessions as well as virtual trade fairs to small and medium-sized businesses and trade institutions in the five East African Community countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Keeping-up-the-momentum-during-a-crisis/>

Source: ITC.


Large impact on small businesses

The majority (55%) of businesses responding to the survey said they had been strongly affected by the pandemic and the measures taken to contain it. Smaller companies tended to be more strongly affected by COVID-19 than larger ones (Figure 22). Nearly two-thirds of micro and

small firms said their business operations were strongly affected by the crisis, compared with about 40% for large companies (Figure 22).

The crisis has had a severe impact on firms in Africa, with two companies out of three reporting that they were strongly affected by COVID-19, mostly through reduced sales (75%) and/or difficulty in accessing inputs (54%).


FIGURE 22 Smaller companies see larger impact from COVID-19



Note: Respondents were asked 'How have your business operations been affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic?' and 'How many full-time employees does the business have?' Definitions: Microenterprises, up to 4 employees; small firms, 5-19 employees; medium-sized firms, 20-99 employees; large firms, 100 or more employees. Data on 2170 businesses in 121 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.


FIGURE 23 Businesses in Africa, developing countries cite strong effects of COVID-19



Note: Respondents were asked 'How have your business operations been affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic?' and 'Which country is your company based in?' Data on 2198 businesses in 121 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions. Only regions with more than 100 observations are included in the Figure.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.


FIGURE 24 Sectoral impact of COVID-19 varies



Note: Respondents were asked 'How have your business operations been affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic?' and 'Has the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic affected the ability to purchase inputs for your enterprise and/or sell outputs?' and 'What is the main sector of activity of the business?' Data on 2079 businesses in 121 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.

FIGURE 25 Women-led firms are in industries most affected by COVID-19



Note: Respondents were asked 'What is the gender of the top manager of the business?' and 'What is the main sector of activity of the business?' Data on 2508 businesses in 126 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.

Severity varies by sector

The impact of the crisis differs by sector. Companies operating in services have been most affected by COVID-19 (Figure 24), with the biggest impact reported by those in accommodation and food services. Next in terms of severity were non-food manufacturing; retail and wholesale; and travel and transport. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are overrepresented in most of these sectors.

In accommodation and food services, 76% of businesses said their operations were strongly affected by COVID-19 as a result of partial and full lockdown (Figure 24). More than three quarters of companies in this sector experienced a reduction in sales.


On the other hand, COVID-19 has presented an opportunity for some manufacturing firms. About 10% of firms in agri-food processing experienced an increase in sales due to COVID-19.

Different gender, different impact

While all firms are affected by the crisis, male and female entrepreneurs differ in their sector of operation, type of businesses and business strategies. As a result, the pandemic has generated a different pattern of impact on men and women-led enterprises. A higher proportion of women-led firms are in the three sectors that reported being most affected by the pandemic, with the largest presence in accommodation and food and retail and wholesale (Figure 25).

Women-led firms reported being more strongly affected by COVID-19 than men-led ones, even when the analysis controls for the higher share of women-led businesses in hard-hit sectors. According to the survey, about 64% of women-led firms declared their business operations were strongly affected by the crisis, compared with 52% for companies led by men (Figure 26). This suggests that women-led firms may be more sensitive to crises or have fewer support options.

FIGURE 26 Women-led firms: More affected



Note: Respondents were asked 'How have your business operations been affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic?' and 'What is the gender of the top manager of the business?' Data on 2109 businesses in 120 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions. To control for sector composition, shares are calculated at sector level, then aggregated using simple averages.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.

Shutdown risk higher for smaller and youth-led firms

SMEs are likely to face more severe resource constraints than larger firms and thus find it harder to survive when negatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Not surprisingly, one-fifth (21%) of SMEs reported that they risked shutting down permanently within three months, highlighting the need for rapid government action to assist some companies (Figure 27). Youth-led firms were also at higher risk of permanently closing their business. About 26% of youth-led firms reported that they risked shutting down permanently within three months, compared with 18% for non-youth-led firms (Figure 27).

This eight-point gap shows that respondents in youth-led companies felt more threatened by pandemic-induced bankruptcy than those in other companies. This contrasts with the survey's findings regarding severity of impact, where the percentage of young entrepreneurs that reported being strongly affected by COVID-19 was similar to the rest of the population.

It suggests that even though youth-led firms may be no more exposed than others to the pandemic's economic impacts, they are more susceptible and less able to cope. Even after taking into account that youth-led firms tend to be smaller, it appears they find it harder to adapt to turmoil. Possible reasons include lack of diversification, social networks, experience and access to resources.

The data also indicate that young entrepreneurs have had a somewhat different attitude to government support

measures during the COVID-19 crisis. Young entrepreneurs found it easier, on average, to access information and benefits from COVID-related government assistance programmes compared with older respondents.


When asked what the government could do to help, young entrepreneurs emphasized support in the short term to reduce costs. They were significantly more likely to view rent subsidies as most helpful, for example. Employment programmes and support to self-employed people were also popular among young people.

Informal businesses often lack safety net

Many companies that are not registered with national authorities are small and have little cash to tide them over when operations are shut down. In some African and Asian countries these informal businesses account for 90% of all companies, and their struggle to cope with the impact of the pandemic is having extensive economic and human repercussions. In countries with pandemic-induced confinement, informal companies have struggled to pay their employees, many of whom depend on daily wages for basic needs.

With informal businesses providing jobs to some of the most disadvantaged people in developing countries, and more than 60% of jobs around the world,³⁶ the loss of the income they deliver has exposed many to hunger and precariousness. In India, where more than 90% of the population is in the informal sector, this has led to mass migration as workers returned to their home villages in search of a social support net.³⁷

FIGURE 27 SMEs and youth-led firms are at higher risk of permanently shutting down in coming months



Note: Respondents were asked 'Do you think there is a risk that your business will permanently shut down because of this crisis, and if so, when could this closure occur?' and 'How many full-time employees does the business have?' and 'What is the age of the top manager of the business?' Data on 2547 businesses in 127 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions. In order to control for sector composition, shares are calculated at the sector level and then aggregated using simple averages.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected 21 April – 2 June 2020.

Unlike their formal sector counterparts, informal firms are not eligible for government emergency business support programmes. Similarly, their employees do not qualify for unemployment insurance. As a result, informal sector firms are more likely to go out of business due to the pandemic. According to ITC survey data, informal firms are 25% more likely to report that the pandemic is pushing them towards bankruptcy.³⁸

Moreover, the pandemic's heavy impact on informal companies is of concern because of the key role they play in local economies and global supply chains. In the Philippines, for example, informal businesses provide crucial economic services such as food selling, transportation, childcare and healthcare. In that country,

and elsewhere in Asia and Africa where informal businesses are widespread, the demise of such companies would hamper the functioning and growth of the economy.

Registered companies that export overseas often count on informal businesses for key inputs. For example, small informal enterprises in China supply electrical components for digital technologies. The informal sector roots of the trade tree go even deeper once the employees of formal firms are considered. The women workers in Bangladeshi apparel factories rely on informal childcare workers and informal street vendors of meals to be able to go to work each day. Without the key support services provided by the informal sector, trading businesses would be in trouble.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Ugandan start-ups are part of the solution to the pandemic

Start-ups in Uganda are developing innovative online services to help consumers and businesses survive during COVID-19.


Being locked at home with borders sealed, seeing transport halted and curfews imposed – Uganda is feeling the all-too-familiar consequences of COVID-19. Increasing market uncertainty has meant decreasing revenues for many small businesses. However, a few innovative enterprises are doing their best to turn this crisis into an opportunity – not only to keep themselves afloat, but also to help consumers and other businesses ride out the pandemic with as little pain as possible.

These include e-commerce start-ups such as Bringo Fresh and Online Butchery, which enable people to shop for groceries online, and fintech firms like ChapChap Africa and Xente, which have added cashless features to reduce customers' risk. Mfeyti, another beneficiary of the Netherlands Trust Fund IV project in Uganda, has developed interactive platforms for Ugandans and other East Africans to obtain accurate information and statistics about the virus.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-Ugandan-start-ups-part-of-the-solution-during-COVID-19/>

Source: ITC.



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CHAPTER 4

Surviving the pandemic

The measures aimed at containing the spread of COVID-19 have short-term consequences that risk undermining the social and economic fabric of nations. They also threaten the survival of the small businesses that make up more than 70% of the labour force in many countries, yet have the fewest assets with which to ride out the storm.

SMEs face a bigger risk than larger firms of collapsing or being unable to compete. Yet because they employ so many people, the associated job loss would aggravate the economic downturn created by the pandemic.

Governments around the world realize that small businesses act as a lynchpin connecting the pandemic to broader economic recession. In addition to addressing the health crisis, they have scrambled to alleviate the impact of COVID-19 on small firms, introducing policies to help them cope with the short-term financial risks and long-term business implications. If these measures succeed, they will reduce layoffs, prevent bankruptcy, encourage investment and help economies recover as soon as possible in the aftermath of the crisis.

How are governments trying to protect small businesses?

Most governments have taken steps to tackle the consequences of COVID-19 on both human health and the economy. The magnitude of responses – including health measures and economic stimulus packages – has varied considerably, however, from almost nothing to about half of gross domestic product.

The level of support offered to firms depends on various factors, with GDP per capita being a key determinant. The higher the GDP per person, the higher the level of measures as a percentage of GDP. Simply put, small

businesses in wealthier countries get more support from the government than small businesses in poorer countries.

Figure 28 shows the clear disparity in the level of support available to small enterprises in rich and poor countries. This could have repercussions for international competition unless measures are taken to address these imbalances.

Companies want specific kinds of government support

Media around the world have heralded the need to support small businesses. When these firms were asked about their needs in a survey, however, it became clear that they prefer certain types of support.


Companies that responded to the ITC COVID-19 business survey said that tax waivers, temporary tax relief and financial programmes would be the most helpful government measures (Figure 29). This confirms the liquidity crisis accompanying the health crisis.

A third of small enterprises highlighted the importance of cash transfers, signalling their concern about surviving the pandemic. Yet surveyed companies were also concerned about retaining their workforce for future production: indeed, 37% of medium-sized businesses and 39% of large companies favoured employment programmes to support the income of their workers.

Targeted policies to help trade flow

Policymakers have taken many targeted actions to safeguard export-oriented businesses. This has been done for several reasons. Exports must be prioritized to meet the need for foreign currency to pay for essential imports. Furthermore, many export industries have been built up over decades, and countries want to retain their foothold in international markets.

FIGURE 28 Richer nations spend more on recovery



Note: Based on all 136 countries for which GDP per capita and fiscal measure estimates were available. Fiscal measures correspond to discretionary actions of governments in response to COVID-19 as of 16 April 2020. Figures are expressed as a percentage of 2019 GDP.

Source: ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook database (October 2019), Bruegel (2020) 'The fiscal response to the economic fallout from the coronavirus' and International Monetary Fund (2020) 'Policy responses to COVID-19'.

FIGURE 29 Most firms favour financial programmes and tax waivers

Micro	Small	Medium	Large
Financial programmes 59%	Tax waivers or temporary tax breaks 64%	Tax waivers or temporary tax breaks 70%	Tax waivers or temporary tax breaks 71%
Tax waivers or temporary tax breaks 54%	Financial programmes 61%	Financial programmes 63%	Financial programmes 64%
Support to self-employed people 36%	Rent subsidies 34%	Employment programmes 37%	Employment programmes 39%
Rent subsidies 31%	Cash transfers 33%	Rent subsidies 29%	Rent subsidies 28%
Employment programmes 27%	Support to self-employed people 29%	Support to self-employed people 22%	Reduction of tariffs on imported inputs 27%
Cash transfers 24%	Employment programmes 28%	Reduction of tariffs on imported inputs 21%	Cash transfers 17%
Reduction of tariffs on imported inputs 16%	Reduction of tariffs on imported inputs 15%	Cash transfers 19%	Support to self-employed people 15%
Other 6%	Other 4%	Other 4%	Other 4%

Note: Respondents were asked 'Please select the top three government measures that would be most helpful as you cope with the COVID crisis' and 'How many full-time employees does the business have?' Figure indicates the percentage of respondents who chose that option as one of the top three measures. Data on 2,458 businesses in 125 countries; response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected from 21 April–2 June 2020.

In Bangladesh, for example, the government committed to pay the wages of employees in export-oriented industries. The Philippines has exempted export-oriented industries and business process outsourcing from the shutdown. In Pakistan, accelerated tax refunds are being granted to companies in export industries.

Trade finance can help cash-strapped small businesses keep their export clients, and is particularly relevant for firms that export to compensate for lower local demand. For example, the Export Credit Bank of Turkey extended its credit repayment periods by two to six months and stretched its rediscount credit terms to two years.

To facilitate trade and reduce domestic prices, many countries are waiving customs fees. For example,

China reduced cargo dues and port facility fees by 20% over 1 March–30 June 2020. Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates is exempting all bulk goods from port storage fees for 90 days and has cut the tariff for truck parking at ports by 50%.

Some countries are changing their border procedures to encourage timely issuance of international commercial documents. Indonesia, for instance, has introduced accelerated customs procedures for reputable traders and authorized economic operators. Government legal services – issuing force majeure certificates and legal advisory services, for example – can be particularly relevant for SMEs that export, because they may face more business disputes as cargos become blocked in transit.

Trying to reach informal businesses

Informal businesses have been excluded from most COVID-19 support programmes because they are not registered with their governments. It is admittedly difficult to reach them with support. By virtue of their importance for jobs, poverty reduction, the economy and exports, however, they are vital to a post-pandemic world. That means tailored efforts to support them must be made.

Several governments have taken steps aimed specifically at the informal sector, to reduce their costs during the pandemic. For example, Burkina Faso suspended fees charged to informal sector operators for rent, security and parking in urban markets. A few countries are trying to extend concessional financing available to firms in the formal sector to companies that are informal. For instance, Mauritius has deferred interest payments for informal-sector SMEs.

Given the difficulty of identifying and reaching businesses in the informal sector, the most popular way to support them during the pandemic has been through cash transfers to their employees. Direct transfers of cash,

food or health supplies to informal workers can prevent outmigration, hunger and illness – and help guarantee a healthy workforce for tomorrow's workshops.

For example,³⁹ Brazil's Cadastro Unico programme is delivering a three-month emergency cash transfer of \$115/month to informal workers in the country. India's state of Uttar Pradesh has transferred 1,000 rupees (\$13) to 2.3 million people who have participated in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Cabo Verde is paying informal sector workers 70% of their gross salary, with half funded by the employer and half paid by the Government.

Some countries are providing for basic needs in food, water and health supplies for vulnerable informal-sector populations. For example, Nigeria's Lagos and Kaduna regions are providing food support to their citizens.

Technology and certification, used wisely, could also be helpful. For instance, China has issued certificates that identify small businesses as 'COVID-free', enabling some to reopen relatively early.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Urban logistics benefit small businesses in Guinea

Home delivery services with improved hygiene measures are working well for a start-up in Guinea.

Mamoudou Sery Barry operates several retail stores and employs four full-time and 20 seasonal workers. Launched three years ago, his start-up Aoudi Food produces and sells organic honey-based goods. Business was booming before the pandemic, with satisfied customers in Morocco, France and Senegal.

But when a state of emergency was declared in Guinea on 27 March, it was clear that small businesses in the country faced a turbulent future. Barry was worried, saying: 'I will be forced to close some of the sales points and cut

wages to keep my workers. Increasing costs for raw materials and the need to maintain my business prices have left me with no choice.'

To help Barry cope with sweeping measures in Guinea, INTEGRA-ITC upgraded his website so he can sell products online – and business is picking up. Aoudi Food is offering home-delivery services, ensuring that delivery workers are safe by equipping them with masks, gloves and hand sanitizer. Urban logistics is a solution that will keep many small businesses like Aoudi Food generating revenue.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-Urban-logistics-benefit-small-businesses-in-Guinea-during-COVID-19/>

Source: ITC.

Business approaches to COVID-19: Retreat, resilience, agility

In the first days of the pandemic, small and medium-sized enterprises around the world responded in similar ways. They took safety measures to protect employees and customers against infection, and informed customers whether the business was going to shut down temporarily. Many companies also reached out for support from government, industry groups and other business support networks.

Beyond these common immediate tasks, firms diverged in their responses. Some adopted retreating strategies, drawing down their assets to get through the day. Many are resilient, weathering the storm. Some are proving themselves remarkably agile.

The current situation is a litmus test of the ability of businesses to cope, and thus a window into what the future may hold in our era of trade, technological and environmental disruption. This highlights which strategies will allow small businesses to survive – and thus our economies.

Retreat

Retreating responses to the crises undermine the long-term competitiveness of the company. Taken up after a shock has hit and without any advance planning, such a strategy can, for example, entail the distress sales of assets to pay for rent during a pandemic shutdown or for emergency repairs to the business premises after a storm.

These retreat responses thus take as a given that damage will occur, and either involve doing nothing or taking emergency measures that will cause harm in the long run.

For instance, a farmer in a crisis might sell a cow that was producing milk that paid for school fees for the children who could have earned a good income in the future as a result.

Many businesses laid off employees, sold assets or took on new debt to cope with COVID-19 – all of which may hurt their long-term viability. About 20% of the enterprises that responded to the ITC COVID-19 survey took this approach.

Interestingly, small firms that exported were significantly less likely to adopt this sort of approach than those that sold only domestically.


Unfortunately, repeated shocks that trigger retreating responses can lead to a vicious cycle. When each shock is followed by the sale of assets and shrinking of the business, it is progressively weakened and further exposed to future risks. If it cannot ride out the next shock, or stay viable in its smaller, weakened state, this can lead to business failure in the long term.

Resilience

On the other hand, pro-competitive approaches build the adaptive capacity of the business every time a shock hits, as employees learn how to adjust and start to take advantage of each new round of change. Resilient and agile approaches maintain competitiveness by ensuring that a business can weather the storm in as good shape as before, or even stronger.⁴⁰

Resilient firms are getting through the pandemic with their basic form intact. They often have a deliberate strategy – sometimes concocted beforehand⁴¹ – that temporarily scales down the business in a manner that will allow it to resume fully later on. One way they do this is by moving to back-up-products, suppliers or markets.

FIGURE 30 Small firms are more likely to opt for agile strategies



Note: Respondents were asked 'Have you adopted any of the following strategies to cope with the crisis?' Categorizations: Agile – customized/created new products or loaned employees to other enterprises. Retreat – filed for bankruptcy, laid off employees, sold off assets, took on new debt or took no action. Resilient – didn't follow a retreat or agile strategies; chose one or more options: temporarily reduced employment; teleworking; rescheduled bank loans; greater marketing; online sales; sourcing from new suppliers; or temporary shutdown. SMEs are defined as having fewer than 100 employees. Data from 4,374 business responses in 117 countries.

Source: ITC calculations based on the ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey Data collected from 21 April-2 June 2020.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



Webinar series for women in business addresses COVID-19 impact on small firms

SheTrades, the ITC initiative for economic empowerment of women, launched an emergency webinar series on the business impact of the pandemic.

The new series focused on the short- and long-term implications for small businesses, especially those in developing countries. SheTrades delivered the webinars together with UPS, Maersk, VISA, Working Capital Associates and their technical experts to provide insight and guidance to small entrepreneurs as they navigate the operational stress caused by COVID-19.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-New-webinar-series-in-response-to-the-COVID-19-launched/>

Source: ITC.

Resilient approaches use win-win options that pay off now and/or have added social, environmental and economic benefits.⁴² This can lead to a virtuous cycle as a company strengthens its capacity to change and its alignment with new business realities. As a result, resilient firms emerge from the crisis in as good shape as before, if not better.

Resiliency during the pandemic has entailed strategies such as shifting the sales mix towards online channels, sourcing from new suppliers or learning to telework. About 60% of the enterprises that responded to the ITC COVID-19 survey adopted this approach to cope with the coronavirus.

Agility

An even more constructive reaction to risk is to take advantage of it. Agile firms change form in response to the current situation, however new it is.⁴³ This may include customizing or proposing new products or business models according to new market trends.

Agile firms have created new products and services such as designer masks and rapid testing technologies during the pandemic. When lockdowns prevented them from opening, they lent their employees to other active businesses in essential industries.⁴⁴ Roughly 21% of the companies that responded to the survey adopted this strategy to deal with the pandemic.


Here is where it is good to be small, because it's easier for small firms to take swift decisions and develop new products quickly. What SMEs may lack in productivity, they gain in agility. Indeed, the ITC COVID-19 survey reveals that small and medium-sized companies were far more likely to adopt agile responses to the crisis than larger firms (Figure 30).

At the same time, however, they were slightly more inclined to adopt retreating strategies than bigger companies (Figure 30). Large businesses, for their part, were significantly more likely to adopt a resilient approach than SMEs, underscoring their greater capacity to ride out the storm (Figure 30).

The fact that small firms were more likely to be agile or retreat can be explained by another fact: they were significantly more likely to expect to go bankrupt because of the COVID-19 crisis.

The take-away from this analysis is that while large companies can afford to stay put and be resilient, small companies must either adapt to the crisis in an agile manner or collapse. Many assistance programmes aim to tip at-risk SMEs from a retreat-type approach to crisis towards a more resilient, enduring strategy – or even encourage them to leapfrog towards the kind of agility that can be seen in some particularly dynamic small enterprises.

FIGURE 31 Smaller firms struggle to access information and benefits from government



Note: Respondents were asked 'How easy is it to access information and benefits from government COVID-related SME assistance programmes?' and 'How many full-time employees does the business have?' Data on 3,920 businesses in 127 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected from 21 April–2 June 2020.

For companies to benefit from government assistance initiatives, transparency and access to information are critical. It is therefore worrisome that more than half of survey respondents – particularly smaller enterprises – said it was difficult or very difficult to obtain information about COVID-related assistance programmes. Access to information varies across firm size, with about 42% of large companies finding it difficult or very difficult, compared with 60% of micro enterprises.

Coping mechanisms differ across firms and sectors

The most common way for businesses to cope with COVID-19 was to reduce employment temporarily. Smaller enterprises also stepped up online sales, while many medium-sized and larger firms saw teleworking as a solution.

Not all firms have the option to telework, however. In general, bigger enterprises are more capable of working from home than smaller firms (Figure 32).

The key role of business support organizations

Business support organizations deliver services to and represent the interests of enterprises to support their growth. They are chambers of commerce, sector associations, trade promotion organizations and investment promotion agencies, as well as cooperatives. When they work together, they create growth opportunities for firms and competitive advantages for a country, and help deliver on economic, social and environmental objectives.

Business support organizations must continue to deliver on their mandate, even though they are themselves facing health concerns, teleworking challenges and risks to their sources of revenue. The core job of these organizations – to help businesses grow – remains pivotal. They must be proactive, despite disruption and anxiety, and forge their place at the front line.

As supply chains are disrupted, small businesses must be agile and able to diversify their markets. Business support organizations can provide information on COVID-19 from a business perspective, perhaps through a specialized webpage.

Because these organizations can act on behalf of many micro and small enterprises, they are in a great position to shoulder some of the risks when entering new markets or international supply chains. They conduct and share research, build in-market networks of partners and experts, and break down tariff and non-tariff barriers – including through sharing market analysis tools, or blogs and podcasts from in-market experts.

A business support organization can bring firms together, match business opportunities with a shared offer or common need, and test willingness to cooperate in ways that are neutral, fair and respect commercial sensitivities. Businesses working together can reduce costs through shared procurement, create economies of scale and access new opportunities by sharing knowledge and resources.

Good business support organizations benefit from their knowledge of business, their convening power and their credibility to represent micro and small enterprises and make their needs known among policymakers and funders.

FIGURE 32 Most firms temporarily reduced employment to cope with crisis

Micro		Small		Medium		Large	
Temporarily reduced employment	34%	Temporarily reduced employment	42%	Temporarily reduced employment	40%	Teleworking	58%
Online sales	31%	Online sales	25%	Teleworking	38%	Temporarily reduced employment	42%
Customized / new products	20%	Teleworking	25%	Increased marketing efforts	26%	Increased marketing efforts	26%
Primary		Manufacturing		Services			
Temporarily reduced employment	40%	Temporarily reduced employment	45%	Temporarily reduced employment	35%		
Teleworking	31%	Teleworking	26%	Online sales	27%		
Online sales	26%	Online sales	26%	Teleworking	27%		

Note: Respondents were asked 'What is the main sector of activity of the business?' and 'How many full-time employees does the business have?' and 'Have you adopted any of the following strategies to cope with the crisis?' Options: Temporarily reduced employment; laid off employees; loaned employees to other enterprises; teleworking; rescheduled bank loans; increased marketing; online sales; customized/new products; sourcing from new suppliers; filed for bankruptcy; other; none. Figure indicates the percentage of respondents who chose that option. Data on 4,217 businesses in 129 countries. Response rates vary across countries and regions.

Source: ITC calculations based on ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey. Data collected from 21 April–2 June 2020.

For example, a bank and a business support organization could promote an emergency bank loan with reduced collateral requirements for companies with a record of having engaged with a business support organization.

With a focus on rapid business recovery, this crisis could result in even greater inequality and more climate risk. Business support organizations have a crucial role in supporting business recovery, but also in connecting this to the imperative for sustainable and inclusive growth. COVID-19 creates an opportunity to shift some of their effort away from existing businesses to innovative start-ups,

from urban to rural areas, and from exploitative to climate-friendly and socially responsible sectors, with a view to the greater good that lasts.

Disrupted supply chains may give unknown players a chance to gain a foothold, but they may face reluctance from buyers who prefer to establish trust first. Business support organizations can boost credibility by providing independent confirmation of a company's legal status, size and capacity to deliver. Furthermore, certain organizations leverage the authority of a government agency to access high-level influencers or to negotiate special conditions.



CHAPTER 5

Preparing for the 'new normal'

With COVID-19-induced shutdowns being gradually lifted around the world, business owners and policymakers alike are shifting their focus towards the post-pandemic world. Enhanced sanitary protocols and other containment measures are likely to remain in place for some time while efforts to create a COVID-19 vaccine continue in earnest.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, discussions are growing on how to prepare for the 'new normal'.

Many would like nothing better than to go back to how things used to be – a favourite restaurant, traditional suppliers, a shake of the hand. The distancing protocols that businesses face suggest a new reality. The pandemic has provided a shock that is encouraging a rethinking of established systems. There are many reasons to believe that economies will not revert to a pre-crisis state of affairs once the pandemic has been overcome.

Strong sanitary measures may persist, for example, to prevent future pandemic outbreaks. The trend towards digitalization will expand. The COVID-19 crisis also has underscored the need to boost the resilience of systems for providing goods and services. Finally, there will be concern for sustainable and inclusive solutions to economic disruptions. Central to all of this will be SME recovery and resilience.

In the months and years ahead, SMEs, business support organizations and governments will have to adapt to this 'new normal', including its greater emphasis on sanitary protocols, supply reliability and online tools.

Although they may face challenges, SMEs will be protagonists in the crisis response and recovery efforts. As they retrofit their business models to survive health-related shutdowns, economic disruption and climate-related vulnerabilities, they will draw on help from business

support organizations. More sustainable approaches to production can be spurred by government incentives to scale up for more inclusive growth.

This chapter looks at the new normal on the horizon, setting out an action plan for strengthening the recovery and resilience of the key actors. It highlights conditions under which small businesses can survive and thrive in the post-pandemic world.

Four main characteristics of the 'new normal'

Contagion of the COVID-19 virus, and the economic impacts of its containment, are leading many to rethink established systems and priorities. There were already calls to reshape globalization before the pandemic, for example to strengthen financial regulation following the 2008–09 financial crisis and to act to reduce inequality within and between countries.

Post-pandemic reconstruction provides a window of opportunity to address problems in global governance. This includes making the world more resilient to global crises.

Some expect the pandemic to be a paradigm-changing event, similar to how WWI and WWII, the oil price shock of the 1970s and recession of 2009 led to new international regimes or significant social, policy and economic change.⁴⁶

Four long-term trends will characterize the new normal on the horizon: an emphasis on resilience to shocks, embrace of digitalization opportunities, greater inclusiveness and sustainability. As small and medium-sized enterprises play a major role in most economies, they need to be involved in building this new reality.

BOX 3: ITC assists small businesses to build resilience

The International Trade Centre has more than 50 years of experience in helping to build the resilience of SMEs through programmes supporting capacity development, entrepreneurship, diversification and use of information and communications technology. In 2020, ITC is:

- Working with small and medium-sized agri-food enterprises to diversify sales to new buyers in niche, high-quality markets in urban areas;
- Building the capacity of business support organizations to support small businesses and improve their ability to respond to crises;
- Assisting small businesses to review and adjust cash flow forecasts during shutdowns as well as communicate with staff, banks, suppliers and customers on changes in payment terms and other necessary adjustments;
- Establishing youth accelerators that provide small grants and expert coaching to young entrepreneurs, enabling them to transform their businesses in the face of market change;
- Strengthening alliances among agricultural participants in supply chains to improve resilience, including through the creation of opportunities to add value that provide security for farmers; and
- Supporting small firms to digitalize. This includes training, research, facilitating innovative solutions, collaborative structures, partnerships and digital tools and technologies. The aim is to encourage dynamic small firms to use digital tools to cope with the latest crisis – and thrive from any new opportunities.

Source: ITC.

Resilience

As countries focused on shoring up their SMEs when COVID-19 began to spread, they learned a key lesson: the importance of fostering business resilience in good times, as it can strengthen the ability of firms to ride out crises, reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy and improve the state of the economy.

Today's economies are made up of thousands of small businesses. As employers and generators of value, they are the lynchpins that tie together modern-day capitalism. Systems theory suggests that the ability of a system to survive under duress depends largely on the strength of its constituent parts. Making businesses more resilient to shocks, while strengthening the links among them and with their business ecosystem, will help the economy as a whole withstand the next storm.

The new normal will feature more efforts to enhance the resilience of SMEs. By diversifying, for example, small businesses can have suppliers and buyers to fall back on when one part of the business is exposed to a crisis. Diversification is a valuable risk management strategy, whether for production, purchasing or sales.

On the production side, manufacturers make different products and farmers plant different crops so that they will have income even if output or sales of one item collapse.

Meanwhile, sourcing from multiple suppliers increases the chances that production can continue no matter what. Selling to several different buyers, through different channels, ensures that some markets remain available even if others shut down.⁴⁷

Saving profits can help provide a buffer for difficult periods. It also generates financial resources for investments in the technologies and skills needed to innovate and adapt in the face of change.

Small businesses can connect to industry associations, business support organizations and other actors in their business ecosystem to bolster their ability to cope. Building collaborative platforms among local industry actors for communicating, gathering information and solving problems helps to create an ecosystem and social forum in which participants can plan crisis responses and assist each other.

Public policy can play a role in encouraging the resilience of small businesses, for example by subsidizing investments in risk mitigating technologies and fostering economic and trade diversification. Policies can also encourage partnerships, cooperatives and research that foster the development of agile new strategies.⁴⁸

Participation in international trade can help to improve the resilience of businesses. On the demand side, sourcing from domestic and foreign suppliers secures more reliable

access to inputs, so that inputs remain available if one supplier, location or transport route is shut off. On the supply side, selling to domestic buyers as well as exporting can help to ensure there is demand for output, and that price fluctuations at home are balanced by those abroad – and vice versa.

The resilience of SMEs also depends on the resilience of their ecosystems, such as business support institutions and local infrastructure, and the supply chains in which they operate.

Indications are that the current health crisis is likely to be followed by further disruptive change, including new technologies, trade tensions, climate impact and social change. Strategies that enhance resilience help small businesses to be competitive amid turmoil.⁴⁹

That is why some businesses go one step further and build business cultures that are highly dynamic, innovative and agile.⁵⁰ These businesses have chosen to adapt their business models to take advantage of the opportunities associated with the lockdown. For example, food producers that usually sell to restaurants are experimenting with direct home deliveries to consumers, even though there are standards-related elements that must be considered.

Agile businesses have responded to the fact that while markets for some products are drying up, others are emerging. The surge in demand for designer face masks and comfort food are two such examples. In several countries, the apparel industry is reorganizing its businesses to produce medical masks, overcoats, caps and waterproof sterilized suits.

Digital

Digital technologies were ascendant before the pandemic hit, and during lockdowns whole parts of the economy shifted onto digital platforms. Teleworking, remote learning, teleconferencing, online health services, e-commerce and digital payments all kept the world going in the first half of 2020 in many places.⁵¹

The rapid rise in online opportunities encouraged many businesses to use the lockdown to improve their digital capabilities. Businesses already operating online reinforced their ability to manage the surge in demand for goods, and brick and mortar shops shifted resources to e-commerce as consumers shifted to online shopping.⁵² For example, a small Ghanaian cosmetics business reports that while before the pandemic, 95% of sales were through in person purchases, online sales swelled during the shutdown, allowing the business to stay afloat.⁵³

In coming months and years, digital facilities will no longer be optional. Consumers, clients, business partners and workers will come to expect them as a matter of course. Cash payments and paper-based documents, such as invoices or pay slips, will become a thing of the past. Files that move onto the computing cloud will not migrate back to hard drives.

Conditions experienced during the COVID-19 lockdown may spur businesses to use big data analytics and artificial intelligence more in post-pandemic decision-making. These technologies can help companies deal with the kind of phenomena they struggled with during lockdown: rapidly shifting consumer demand and confidence, operational disruptions, uncertainty and redundancies in the workforce.⁵⁴

The digitalization of several core business operations raises a number of issues, especially for small businesses. While this shift to digital methods substantially increased the volume of data in the first half of 2020, it was not accompanied by a rise in the number of data centres or their wider geographical spread. SMEs operating in countries that do not have local data centres can face lack of availability and prohibitively high costs.

In addition, data security is a significant challenge and is not guaranteed in all countries. As more businesses upload data, there is a greater threat of cyberattacks. Moreover, in countries where data privacy is not backed by strong institutional support and regulations, state measures for contact tracing, early warning surveillance and social control can be misused.⁵⁵

Many SMEs and informal businesses in developing countries also lack stable internet access; e-payment capabilities (within firms and in their business ecosystems); information and communications technology access, including affordable servers and cloud computing facilities; and necessary skills. They risk losing out to large businesses with greater access to capital to invest in technology. As a result, it is becoming urgent to provide assistance to improve the quality and reliability of local internet connections in developing and transition economies, as well as to extend internet penetration rates and levels of computer literacy.

Concerns about equitable treatment, meanwhile, arise regarding large international e-commerce platforms. These provide a way for SMEs to sell to global markets, but also control access to those markets. Platforms allow businesses to reduce costs through shared procurement, logistics and economies of scale, and to access new opportunities by sharing knowledge and resources.

However, market concentration among platforms and anti-competitive practices by some platforms can put developing country SMEs at a competitive disadvantage, reducing their profit margins and sometimes leading businesses to close down.

Appropriate regulation of such platforms, through policies on competition and data protection, would be beneficial. Initiatives by the G20, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Competition Network and the European Commission to monitor and address anti-competitive behaviour and data protection rules are steps in the right direction.

Members of the WTO are holding talks on e-commerce. Topics discussed include rules on consumer protection, e-signatures and the protection of personal data. Adopting of fair, flexible and clear e-commerce rules could create opportunities for developing countries to benefit from digital trade and help SMEs in developing countries to recover from the pandemic crisis.⁵⁶

Most of the services offered to support small businesses – such as trade missions, business matchmaking events and conferences – previously involved face-to-face meetings or large gatherings. Before the crisis, many business support institutions had begun to experiment with digital technologies to reduce costs and reach more people. This process will continue to accelerate.

Meetings and some elements of business matchmaking can go digital through a combination of online platforms and videoconferencing facilities. Conferences and workshops can be transformed into webinars, though questions remain about the degree to which these tools support sustained interactions among participants.

Inclusive

As is often the case with crises, COVID-19 has put the spotlight on those who are economically disadvantaged, such as informal sector workers, migrants and people in SMEs. Many have been deprived of even subsistence level income during economic lockdowns and have faced health and sanitary crises. This underscores the fact that lack of basic social security benefits poses a risk for vulnerable individuals and society as a whole. The same has been seen in developed countries around the gig economy.

Although improved government safety nets are key, and cash transfers during the pandemic have been helpful, the most sustainable solution is improving access to good, secure jobs.

Making economies more inclusive starts with decent jobs and social protection for all. SMEs, which account for

about 70% of jobs and half of economic activity worldwide, can be vital in providing employment. Small businesses employ a disproportionate share of disadvantaged groups, including less qualified workers, young people and women.⁵⁷ Before the crisis began, SMEs were expected to generate 600 million new jobs by 2030.⁵⁸ Without a strong SME sector, it will be impossible to get back on track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030.

With the inclusiveness of globalization already a matter of concern before the pandemic, it will be crucial to ensure that the recovery phase lifts all boats to maintain popular support for open economies. Policymakers have recognized that small businesses are particularly exposed to the risks arising from the COVID-19 crisis and have been quick to announce targeted support measures for small businesses and their employees. Efforts to expedite payments to small firms for goods and services delivered through the public procurement system can also help. SME support plans include many of the elements discussed in the previous chapter and can follow best practices from across the world.

The crisis has reminded consumers that those at the 'base of the pyramid', who pick fruit, stitch clothes and answer customer service calls for example, continue to live in precarious conditions. Both universal social protection and employer led initiatives can help improve their livelihoods.

To make a difference, employers will have to be increasingly conscious of how they relate to employees, and will need to set aside funds for unemployment insurance, pensions and other forms of social protection. This can improve employee loyalty, preventing workers from leaving the enterprise or locality in times of crisis and helping enterprises to retain human capital assets. Evidence also shows that better treated workers are more productive.

Sustainable

Although the focus is likely to be on sustaining people's health as the pandemic recedes, environmental concerns will also be high on the agenda, especially as evidence suggests that the next crisis may be on that front. Indeed, climate change was ranked as the top global business risk in a 2019 survey of insurance industry experts.⁵⁹ The strong likelihood and impact of climate-related risks have ranked them highest in the World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report.⁶⁰

There is no reason to believe that climate risks will abate once the health crisis ends. Sustainability is likely to be more important in the post-pandemic global economy, and retrofitting for COVID-19 sanitary requirements and environmental friendliness may be wise.⁶¹

BOX 4: Supporting small businesses during the COVID-19 crisis and beyond: A 15-point action plan

To support its partners through these difficult times, ITC has developed a 15-point action plan for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), business support organizations and governments. The aim is to help internationally minded SMEs through the crisis, allowing them to be at the forefront of generating resilience, inclusiveness, sustainability and growth in the future. As part of this plan, business support organizations play a key role as agile, expert and trusted connectors of SMEs and governments.

Recommendations for businesses

Prepare immediate response to the crisis:

1. Adapt business processes by applying common-sense precautions and restructuring operations.
2. Optimize cash management and identify efficiency gains.
3. Reorient activities and resources to ensure business continuity during the lockdown.
4. Foster relationships by improving communications with partners and employees.

Get ready for the new normal:

5. Build business models that foster resilience, inclusiveness and sustainability and that ride the digital wave.

Recommendations for business support organizations

Prepare immediate response to the crisis:

6. Channel flow of trusted information and build bridges to deploy solutions rapidly.
7. Coordinate collective actions by SMEs for resilience, scale and efficiency.
8. Be both global and local to inform and reduce the risks that business owners must take during the crisis.
9. Use digital platforms to enhance the competitiveness and agility of SMEs in reaching customers.

Get ready for the new normal:

10. Be a leader in an ecosystem enabling SMEs to thrive within a new global economy that is more digital and geared towards resilience, inclusiveness and sustainability.

Recommendations for governments

Prepare immediate response to the crisis:

11. Resist trade protectionism and facilitate trade to enable the movement of essential products.
12. Expand and facilitate access to finance for SMEs, including those run by women or young entrepreneurs.
13. Improve border management of trade to streamline access to essential products.
14. Hasten progress towards the digitalization of trade documents and procedures, in collaboration with the private sector.

Get ready for the new normal:

15. Prepare to operate in a new global economy that is more digital and geared towards resilience, inclusiveness and sustainability.

Source: ITC.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



'Brand Bhutan' braves COVID-19

Export readiness training supports small firms in Bhutan during the crisis, as international buyers maintain business orders.

'Despite the unusual situation, let us all try our best to turn every obstacle in our favour – let's try our best,' says Wangchuk Lhamo, who owns a handicraft business in Bhutan. Earlier this year, she travelled to Paris with a delegation of Bhutanese entrepreneurs and returned home with orders from international buyers. Not long afterward, highways and runways were closed, shaking hands was forbidden and 'business as usual' seemed almost impossible.

However, international buyers kept their faith in Bhutanese artisans and did not cancel their orders when COVID-19 struck. Bhutan's Ministry of Agriculture and Forests and ITC SME Trade Academy are working together to improve the export readiness of enterprises through online training. With these improvements, they will be prepared to reach buyers in new markets and be active players during the COVID-19 recovery phase.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/news/Story-Brand-Bhutan-braves-COVID-19/>

Source: ITC.

Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis has sparked interest in reducing costs and increasing productivity in many businesses. They should consider improving resource efficiency by frontloading investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and adopting circular economy principles. This could include optimizing water and energy consumption through smart technologies and generating energy from waste products. Careful monitoring of input use can help to reduce operational costs.

National investments in sustainable production processes will also be important in a world where dependable, reliable partners are valued. To compete effectively, governments will need to upgrade sanitary and phytosanitary control systems and embrace digital technologies.

The use of digital trade facilitation processes is an example. Clearance procedures based on electronic documents and payments are simpler, faster and safer, limiting in-person interactions between traders and border

regulatory authorities. In addition to digital processing of paper-based documents, governments can consider issuing original documents electronically.

Compliance and leadership in climate change mitigation and adaptation will continue to matter. Policy and regulatory reforms in information and communications technology services will need to be accelerated to increase access, improve reliability and reduce costs. Sustainability and inclusiveness in doing business and governing will promote resilience in this period of change. Those that begin to upgrade now will gain a head start over their competitors in the future.

As global supply chains reorganize and businesses retrofit their business models, those national economies that secure new high-value export opportunities and investment may emerge as winners. Or they can be losers, by failing to navigate a digital, service-driven economy with its new-found concerns over sanitary standards and reliability of supply.

Trade governance for the new normal

Small businesses are reopening onto a world that has been reshaped by the COVID-19 pandemic. They are facing new sanitary protocols, their buyers are looking to diversify sources of inputs and it has become urgent to adopt digital technologies. There are opportunities to thrive, but there is also a risk that SMEs could be unable to cope. Reconstruction is an opportunity to rebuild the connections between these businesses and the world around them. Indeed, it could be crucial to their capacity to thrive in a post-pandemic business environment.

Small businesses do not operate in a void, but rather in a business ecosystem that influences whether they will sink or swim in the new normal. The solution to pandemic-induced disruptions, and future shocks, lies in creating more robust links between resilient businesses, not in reducing the size of the system.⁶² The ability of a system to survive under duress depends both on the strength of its constituent parts and on the connections between them. Resilient economies can withstand change thanks in part to the strong links that connect small businesses to their business ecosystem.

Supply chain governance for resilience

COVID-19 has sharply disrupted supply chains, and stakeholders have expressed concerns about the long-term implications of this upheaval. The pandemic's impact has spurred discussion on how to make supply chains more resilient, with proposed solutions including comprehensive supply chain risk management and diversification of end markets and input sources.⁶³ The aim is to ensure other supply chain participants can continue producing for markets, even if one buyer or supplier is affected by a crisis.

All supply chain actors have a role to play in building resilient and responsible supply chains – from the governments that regulate them⁶⁴ to the consumers choosing which brand to buy.⁶⁵ However, lead firms often have a significant role in directing supply chains, making decisions regarding production practices, branding, sourcing and sales.⁶⁶

In many cases, lead firms have passed the risk burden along the supply chain to vulnerable small businesses in developing countries.⁶⁷ As a result, disruptions cause reductions in employment and bankruptcies, as well as insufficient supply to the lead firm and its customers.

The solution is not only to invest in strengthening the resilience of small-scale suppliers, but also to strengthen

the links that these firms have with supply chains. Better contracts with SME suppliers can facilitate the sharing of risk. Indeed, when buyers provide risk insurance services through contracts, it can attract suppliers and encourage them to invest in producing higher-quality output to foster long-term stable buyer-supplier relationships.⁶⁸

Lead firms should redesign their approach to collaboration and costing with SME suppliers to ensure more equally shared value. The mutual trust that results encourages sharing of information and collective action to withstand challenges.⁶⁹ This 'social capital' in the supply chain can be crucial to transmitting information and funds as necessary and to responding to crises. The way that the supply chain is managed and developed over time can foster an agile work culture that improves the capacity to adapt.

Such an approach implies embracing rather than rejecting supply chains, and acknowledging that trade and open markets are not a hindrance in building national resilience to shocks caused by virus outbreaks or other external factors.

Standards and regulations for the new normal

As cross-border business recovers, including in travel and tourism, it is likely to be increasingly governed by new sets of standards and regulations falling into two categories.⁷⁰

First, those that help enterprises meet new market requirements. This includes management system standards on quality, food safety, occupational health and safety, social accountability and specific product standards.

Second, those concerning security, resilience and risk management. This includes business continuity management, emergency management, crisis management and supply chain security.

National standards bodies need to engage the private sector actively to provide solutions, support and advice on relevant standards available to small businesses. In addition, international organizations can partner with business support organizations to provide technical assistance to small businesses, such as training and advisory services to implement new standards. The aim should be to make management systems resilient and ensure product quality and safety.

Most importantly, there should be closer collaboration and coordination among international organizations, business support organizations and regulatory bodies to work together in assisting small businesses and ensuring a fair business environment.

While international organizations can develop tools such as guidelines, assessment kits and training materials on implementing international standards, business support organizations (including national standards bodies) can customize and deploy them. Regulatory bodies must ensure there is a level playing field and that dishonest suppliers do not compete with low-quality and unsafe products.

There is no doubt that it will not be business as usual after COVID-19, especially for small businesses. A number of standards can build the resilience and competitiveness of enterprises, and their judicious use and implementation may help small businesses thrive and come out of the pandemic stronger.

Multilateralism reconfigured


The world today is confronted not only with the COVID-19 pandemic, but also with ground-shifting disruptions on the technological, environmental, trade and financial fronts. These challenges are so complex, global and interrelated that no government or intergovernmental organization will be able to overcome them alone.⁷¹

Multilateralism has time and again been an effective response to pressing issues in periods of crisis, and it can rise to the challenge once again. The most promising way forward is an inclusive multilateralism, where governments, the business community (including small businesses), civil society and academia join forces to analyse problems, define strategies and policies, and implement them together.

Global collaboration is obviously needed to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and to share knowledge on a vaccine and post-pandemic recovery. This will include, for example, getting trade flows moving again to facilitate access to food, medicine and protective equipment by establishing virus-proof transport and human travel protocols.

There is also a need for global collaboration to build the resilience of economic systems and the SMEs at the heart of them. Without such cooperation, the economy and small businesses will struggle to recover and will founder at the next crisis. The post-pandemic recovery period provides a unique opportunity for global cooperation to rebuild the international order.

CASE STUDY: ITC COVID-19 RESPONSE



ITC-China Month helps businesses adapt to the new reality

Targeted training sessions help small Chinese firms to be export competitive.

Responding to the escalating COVID-19 situation in China, ITC offered a series of remote training sessions in March 2020. In partnership with the School of International Governance Innovation at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, the training was part of webinar series called ITC-China Month. The sessions gave participants access to online ITC tools and agendas on trade. Trainees can now conduct routine activities in emergencies via video webinar. The eight training and awareness sessions showed how ITC's Trade and Market Intelligence section, SME Trade Academy, institutional strengthening

methodologies and Trade for Sustainable Development programme enhance enterprise competitiveness could benefit China. With an average participation of 230 people, the training sessions reached some 2,000 trainees.

See more:

<http://www.intracen.org/COVID-19/story/ITC-China-Month-helps-businesses-adapt-to-the-new-reality/>

Source: ITC.

For the multilateral trading system, this may imply embracing new concepts, fields of work and partnerships.

Vulnerable supply chains have transmitted disruption during the crisis. Resilient supply chains, on the other hand, can play a role in sharing knowledge, providing stability and generating agility under the new normal.

There are proposals on assisting supply chain actors to build resilience into the multilateral trading system, such as by creating supply chain councils.⁷² Such councils could lead to better multi-stakeholder private-public dialogues to ensure robust and steady operations, sustainability and better transparency in supply chains.⁷³ Analysis presented in this report on vulnerable sectors and regions provides first indications on the supply chains that could benefit from such councils to strengthen resilience in times of crisis.

The operation of logistics networks may take on greater significance in future discussions at the multilateral level, as foreshadowed in G20 ministerial statements during the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷⁴ It is crucial to re-establish and maintain transit routes for trade, notably for landlocked developing countries and small island developing States that depend on them for essential goods.

The pandemic has also shed light on the need to improve logistics involving international trade in pharmaceuticals and food products. Trade facilitation and customs need to be revised, to ensure that border agencies can safely undertake necessary controls regarding new standards and regulation while maintaining smooth border crossings.

The measures required to support the real economy in this exceptional crisis will put government budgets under pressure in most countries, especially developing and emerging economies. Responses to these challenges require international collaboration, given that the stability of the financial system is at stake. Global finance is

not governed by the multilateral trading system, but finance and the real economy are closely linked.

Two examples with immediate relevance are the impact of financial support provided during the crisis on competitiveness and the impact of potential financial instability on trade finance. Ignoring these linkages would put the multilateral trading system at risk. Dealing with them would strengthen it.

On this 75th anniversary of the United Nations and 25th anniversary of the World Trade Organization, it is timely to kickstart a process of international coordination for a global approach to COVID-19 and its social and economic implications, as well as other threats on the horizon. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres suggests that the multilateral response to COVID-19 include a coordinated stimulus package, resisting protectionist measures, measures to boost the economies of developing countries, strengthened international public financing and the waiving of sanctions.⁷⁵

Ensuring an open and predictable world trading system, including through reforms to the WTO to improve its ability to address current realities in international trade, will also be part of the solution.⁷⁶ As the world moves beyond the pandemic, a strengthened multilateral system would be an asset.

Many are calling for a post-pandemic paradigm shift, much like the post-WWII period brought the United Nations and Bretton Woods. While this may be overly ambitious, there is a window of opportunity to renew global governance mechanisms. Organizations representing SMEs could use this opening to ensure that the views of small businesses are heard during negotiations and policymaking processes at all levels. Government and business responses to the pandemic must be resilient, responsive and sustainable in the long run across multiple dimensions, if we are to be able to cope with the next shock.

COUNTRY PROFILES: Industrial supply chain disruption

SMECO 2020: What's new?

SMECO 2020 focuses on the supply chain disruption caused by the factory shutdowns in China, Europe and the United States, in response to COVID-19. The profiles comprise 85 economies, for which 2019 trade data and GDP data were available at the time of analysis in April 2020.

Reader's guide to country profiles

Each country profile starts with a short overview of the role of industry in GDP (area A) and trade (area B), including export and import of industrial inputs within supply chains.

The core information – the projected loss of trade in industrial inputs for the top five sectors – is provided for exports (area C) and imports (area D).


The bottom of the page shows selected examples at the product level, with the bar chart on the left comprising products exported within supply chains (area E) and the bar chart on the right showing products imported within supply chains (area F).

Industry snapshot, 2019

The focus being exclusively on industry, the profiles start by showing how important the industry share is in GDP and trade. The pie chart shows the total GDP, and the value added by industry, agriculture and services.

The top right table starts with the total industrial exports and imports, followed by the value of industrial exports and imports traded within international supply chains, and the share this value represents in the total trade. International supply chain trade is defined as the flow of inputs used in production (expressed in US dollars, in gross terms), located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country.

FIGURE 33 Country profile example



Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

The projected supply chain disruption is calculated as an annual loss of internationally traded industrial inputs in 2020, assuming a two-month shutdown of all industrial facilities in China, the European Union and the United States. The focus is exclusively on the effect of factory lockdowns, abstracting from other economic channels, such as trade restrictions, reduction in the final demand, as well as structural changes in demand that may boost production and trade.

Projected supply chain export loss, by sector

The top table in this section (area C) focuses on the exports of industrial inputs within supply chains, singling out the top affected sectors. The first three columns describe the sector prior to COVID-19, showing exports in 2019 and indicators of SME presence and of women employment. The round dots are green when the presence of SMEs and women are greater than or equal to the respective country average, otherwise they are red. All other industrial sectors are aggregated and shown at the end of the list, alongside the total industrial exports.

The subsequent columns report the predicted loss of industrial exports in 2020 caused by the supply chain disruption in the G3. First, the table shows the predicted reduction in relative terms – as a share of the loss expected in 2020 in the total yearly exports of the sector, then the value of the loss visually (the higher the loss, the longer the bar) and in absolute terms (\$ million). The share of the predicted loss is relatively low in most cases, because it compares the export of industrial inputs to the G3 to the total industrial exports (including inputs and final goods) to all partner countries. The three last columns disaggregate the effect by the destination market for the inputs, namely China, the European Union and the United States, where a two-month factory shutdown is assumed.

Projected supply chain import loss, by sector

The bottom table in this section (area D) provides information on the imports of industrial inputs within supply chains. The spotlight is on the most affected sectors based on the value of imported goods necessary for production, but that cannot be obtained due to factory shutdowns in the G3. The first three columns describe the sector prior to COVID-19, showing required imports of inputs in 2019, and indicators of SME presence and women employment. The round dots are green when the presence of SMEs and women are greater than or equal to the respective country average, otherwise they are red. All other industrial sectors are aggregated and shown at the end of the list, alongside the total industrial imports.

The subsequent columns report the predicted loss of industrial imports in 2020 caused by the supply chain disruption in the G3. First, the table shows the predicted reduction in relative terms – as a share of the loss expected in 2020 in the total yearly imports of the sector,

then the value of the loss visually (the higher the loss, the longer the bar) and in absolute terms (\$ million). The share of the predicted loss is relatively low in most cases, because it compares the import of industrial inputs from the G3 to the total industrial imports (including inputs and final goods) from all partner countries. The three last columns disaggregate the effect by the origin country of inputs, namely China, the European Union and the United States, where a two-month factory shutdown is assumed.

Projected export loss of industrial inputs: Examples

The left chart at the bottom (area E, Figure 33) puts the spotlight on selected industrial products (inputs and intermediate goods), showing the likely decrease in their exports in 2020 due to the factory shutdowns in the G3. The length of the bar corresponds to the projected loss in value terms (\$ million), while the shares represent the loss expected in 2020 in the total exports of the good measured in the previous year. Red, blue and grey colours are used to disaggregate the value of the loss by the destination markets, comprising China, the European Union and the United States.

Projected import loss of industrial inputs: Examples

The right chart at the bottom (area F, Figure 33) puts the spotlight on selected industrial products (inputs and intermediate goods), showing the likely decrease in their imports in 2020 due to the factory shutdowns in the G3. The length of the bar corresponds to the projected loss in value terms (\$ million), while the shares represent the loss expected in 2020 in the total imports of the good measured in the previous year. Red, blue and grey colours are used to disaggregate the value of the loss by the origin country of inputs, comprising China, the European Union and the United States.

In addition to factory shutdowns, the supply chain trade is affected by many other factors, such as restrictive trade measures enacted by governments and structural shifts in demand for selected products (e.g. pharmaceutical components and medical personal protective equipment). To keep the focus on goods for which the supply chain disruption is likely to be the strongest driver in trade reduction, country profiles do not feature industrial inputs that are likely to gain from the pandemic or that are subject to restrictive trade policies.

Index of country and territory profiles


Antigua and Barbuda.....	54	Germany.....	83	Norway.....	112
Argentina.....	55	Greece.....	84	Paraguay.....	113
Armenia.....	56	Guatemala.....	85	Peru.....	114
Australia.....	57	Hong Kong SAR.....	86	Philippines.....	115
Austria.....	58	Hungary.....	87	Poland.....	116
Azerbaijan.....	59	Iceland.....	88	Portugal.....	117
Barbados.....	60	India.....	89	Republic of Korea.....	118
Belgium.....	61	Ireland.....	90	Romania.....	119
Belize.....	62	Israel.....	91	Russian Federation.....	120
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Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	64	Japan.....	93	Senegal.....	122
Brazil.....	65	Kazakhstan.....	94	Serbia.....	123
Bulgaria.....	66	Kyrgyzstan.....	95	Singapore.....	124
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Denmark.....	75	Mexico.....	104	Turkey.....	133
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Antigua and Barbuda

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 714 \$ million
Industry: 552 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	184	4	2%	
Industrial imports	1 024	26	3%	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Chemicals	2	●	●	3%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5	
Boats & parts	125			0%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5	
Textile products not elsewhere classified	<0.5			10%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5	
Miscellaneous manufactured products	4	●	●	1%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5	
Machinery	4			0%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5	
Other subsectors	48	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Total	184	100%	30%	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Boats & parts	43			7%	3	1	2	
Machinery	1			12%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Miscellaneous manufactured products	1	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Chemicals	1	●	●	6%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Motor vehicles & parts	<0.5			10%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Other subsectors	1	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Total	47	100%	30%	7%	3	1	2	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 517 523 \$ million
 Industry: 199 246 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	31 999		1 319	4%
Industrial imports	44 203		6 291	14%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Chemicals	2 911	●	●	1%	21	6	9	6	
Skins, leather & products thereof	723	●	●	2%	16	9	5	2	
Beauty products & perfumes	635	●	●	1%	8	<0.5	6	1	
Motor vehicles & parts	7 242	●	●	0%	8	<0.5	7	<0.5	
Plastics & rubber	1 280	●	●	0%	5	<0.5	2	3	
Other subsectors	19 208	●	●	0%	25	3	10	13	
Total	31 999	73%	20%	0%	84	19	39	26	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Motor vehicles & parts	2 115	●	●	7%	138	44	65	29
Chemicals	577	●	●	9%	54	16	20	18
Plastics & rubber	360	●	●	8%	28	8	9	10
Machinery	271	●	●	10%	26	10	10	6
Beauty products & perfumes	114	●	●	9%	10	4	4	3
Other subsectors	906	●	●	7%	66	24	26	17
Total	4 342	73%	20%	7%	322	106	134	82

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Armenia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 13 574 \$ million
Industry: 4 534 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 458	200		8%
Industrial imports	3 948	169		4%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	191			5%	9	0	9	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	99			4%	3	0	3	1
Apparel	208	●	●	1%	2	1	1	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	80			0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	23	●	●	1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 857	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	2 458	74%	45%	1%	15	1	14	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Apparel	38	●	●	8%	3	1	2	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	19			7%	1	1	1	<0.5
Ferrous metals	25			3%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Jewelry & precious metal articles	21	●	●	3%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Precious metals	16	●	●	3%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	46	●	●	5%	3	1	1	<0.5
Total	165	74%	45%	5%	9	4	4	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 485 841 \$ million
 Industry: 466 554 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	282 257		8 024	3%
Industrial imports	197 968		11 389	6%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	10 226			2% ■	169	116	37	16
Machinery	5 097			1% ■	59	15	25	19
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	3 291			1% ■	49	11	21	17
Electronic equipment	2 486			2% ■	39	21	10	8
Chemicals	11 246			0% ■	37	16	9	11
Other subsectors	249 911			0% ■	244	99	64	81
Total	282 257			0%	596	278	166	152

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	1 366			11% ■	152	67	53	32
Chemicals	1 261			10% ■	132	56	48	29
Motor vehicles & parts	1 149			10% ■	119	46	46	27
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	866			12% ■	102	38	39	25
Precious metals	866			10% ■	90	46	29	16
Other subsectors	4 099			10% ■	413	184	137	91
Total	9 608			10%	1 008	437	352	219

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Austria

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 470 579 \$ million
 Industry: 171 761 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	166 391	32 641		20%
Industrial imports	169 487	28 358		17%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	34 309			3% ■	935	101	781	52
Ferrous metals	8 483			7% ■	585	23	535	27
Motor vehicles & parts	24 726			2% ■	505	17	469	19
Plastics & rubber	8 134			6% ■	453	16	416	22
Metal products	8 306			4% ■	353	27	308	18
Other subsectors	82 434			2% ■	1 743	147	1 514	83
Total	166 391			3%	4 574	331	4 023	220

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	7 501			15% ■	1 123	43	1 061	19
Motor vehicles & parts	6 329			15% ■	949	22	914	13
Plastics & rubber	1 962			15% ■	303	5	295	3
Electronic equipment	1 961			15% ■	288	25	257	5
Metal products	1 283			15% ■	194	5	184	5
Other subsectors	8 551			15% ■	1 291	38	1 222	31
Total	27 587			15%	4 147	138	3 935	74

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **48 791 \$ million**
 Industry: **29 177 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	18 076		166	1%
Industrial imports	11 446		216	2%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	171	●	●	1%	2	1	1	<0.5
Machinery	59	●	●	2%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	99	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	14			3%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	151			0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	17 581	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Total	18 076	92%	32%	0%	6	1	4	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Plastics & rubber	64	●	●	6%	4	3	1	<0.5
Machinery	20	●	●	7%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Chemicals	20	●	●	6%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	15			5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Cotton (fabric)	12	●	●	5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	42	●	●	6%	3	1	1	<0.5
Total	174	92%	32%	6%	11	5	5	1

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Barbados

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 5 184 \$ million
Industry: 1 314 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	398	35	9%
Industrial imports	1 239	53	4%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Boats & parts	75			3%	2	0	2	0
Electronic equipment	12			10%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	40			2%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Textile products not elsewhere classified	1	●	●	8%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5
Paper products	14	●	●	1%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	255	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	398	70%	43%	1%	5	1	3	1

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Boats & parts	24			8%	<0.5	1	1
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	10			12%	<0.5	<0.5	1
Electronic equipment	4			11%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	4	●	●	9%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Paper products	4	●	●	9%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	16	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	1
Total	61	70%	43%	9%	6	1	4

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 559 802 \$ million
 Industry: 170 740 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	363 640	56 376		16%
Industrial imports	379 448	50 821		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	31 751			6% ■	2 060	66	1 911	83
Chemicals	42 957			4% ■	1 759	56	1 594	109
Ferrous metals	15 160			6% ■	901	20	853	28
Machinery	29 090			2% ■	702	37	630	35
Motor vehicles & parts	48 589			1% ■	399	6	377	16
Other subsectors	196 092			1% ■	2 392	101	2 198	93
Total	363 640			2%	8 212	286	7 563	363

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	12 479			14% ■	1 730	112	1 533	85
Plastics & rubber	7 602			14% ■	1 040	74	781	185
Chemicals	6 454			14% ■	906	66	705	135
Machinery	6 159			14% ■	876	79	735	62
Electronic equipment	1 947			15% ■	285	40	229	16
Other subsectors	14 114			14% ■	1 912	192	1 518	201
Total	48 755			14%	6 748	564	5 500	684

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Belize

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 1 939 \$ million
Industry: 475 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	63	6	6	9%
Industrial imports	890	18	18	2%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Wood & vegetable material	2			8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5		
Beauty products & perfumes	4	●	●	3%	<0.5	0	<0.5		
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	5			2%	<0.5	0	<0.5		
Ferrous metals	<0.5			16%	<0.5	0	<0.5		
Machinery	2	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5		
Other subsectors	50	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5		
Total	63	86%	44%	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5		

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Boats & parts	2			8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	1			11%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	1	●	●	10%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Wood products	1	●	●	9%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Beauty products & perfumes	1	●	●	6%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	4	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	10	86%	44%	8%	1	<0.5	1

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **11 258 \$ million**
 Industry: **3 468 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 113		43	4%
Industrial imports	3 805		46	1%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	63			5%	3	3	<0.5	0
Cotton (fabric)	421	●	●	0%	1	1	<0.5	0
Skins, leather & products thereof	2	●	●	12%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	0
Wood & vegetable material	33			0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	0
Ferrous metals	10			1%	<0.5	0	<0.5	0
Other subsectors	584	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	1 113	82%	22%	0%	5	4	<0.5	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Cotton (fabric)	100	●	●	1%	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	2	●	●	11%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Mineral products	6			3%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Boats & parts	1			12%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	12			1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	9	●	●	7%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	131	82%	22%	2%	3	2	1	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Bosnia and Herzegovina

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 21 107 \$ million
Industry: 8 232 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	6 369	1 143		18%
Industrial imports	8 802	1 007		11%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	870	●	●	3%	28	<0.5	28	<0.5
Metal products	585	●	●	5%	27	<0.5	26	1
Wood & vegetable material	343	●	●	5%	18	2	16	<0.5
Mineral products	388	●	●	4%	17	0	17	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	295	●	●	4%	13	<0.5	12	<0.5
Other subsectors	3 887	●	●	2%	61	2	58	1
Total	6 369	55%	40%	3%	163	4	157	2

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	213	●	●	13%	27	3	24	<0.5
Footwear	95		●	11%	11	1	9	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	80	●	●	13%	11	1	10	<0.5
Metal products	87	●	●	11%	10	1	9	<0.5
Wood products	80	●	●	12%	10	1	9	<0.5
Other subsectors	506	●	●	12%	59	5	54	<0.5
Total	1 061	55%	40%	12%	128	11	116	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 1 922 712 \$ million
Industry: 642 186 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	154 918	11 666		8%
Industrial imports	161 756	17 989		11%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	11 540	●	●	3%	336	72	132	132
Chemicals	7 831	●	●	2%	173	26	56	91
Machinery	10 177	●	●	2%	155	11	76	68
Plastics & rubber	4 481	●	●	2%	92	10	35	48
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	1 928	●	●	3%	61	6	19	36
Other subsectors	118 961	●	●	0%	344	62	148	133
Total	154 918	77%	25%	1%	1 161	187	465	508

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	2 449	●	●	12%	295	116	120	59
Motor vehicles & parts	2 548	●	●	11%	277	101	127	48
Chemicals	1 277	●	●	12%	150	39	61	51
Plastics & rubber	1 129	●	●	11%	126	35	39	52
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	917	●	●	12%	113	28	57	28
Other subsectors	5 260	●	●	10%	540	206	207	127
Total	13 579	77%	25%	11%	1 501	525	612	364

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Bulgaria

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: **68 468 \$ million**
 Industry: **25 196 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	28 885	5 258		18%
Industrial imports	33 929	4 315		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	5 057	●	●	3%	163	6	153	3
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	3 104			5%	145	3	139	4
Plastics & rubber	1 315	●	●	4%	59	1	57	<0.5
Mineral products	482	●	●	11%	51	<0.5	51	1
Metal products	676	●	●	6%	38	1	37	1
Other subsectors	18 250	●	●	1%	251	14	229	8
Total	28 885	82%	45%	2%	707	25	666	16

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	1 206	●	●	13%	154	16	135	3
Apparel	339	●	●	12%	42	4	38	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	293	●	●	12%	36	4	32	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	299	●	●	12%	36	2	34	<0.5
Electronic equipment	251			14%	34	4	29	1
Other subsectors	1 628	●	●	12%	188	16	170	2
Total	4 016	82%	45%	12%	490	46	438	6

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 15 162 \$ million
Industry: 4 306 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 899	12	0%
Industrial imports	2 484	33	1%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Cotton (fabric)	143	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5	0
Wood & vegetable material	<0.5			16%	<0.5	0	<0.5	0
Trains & parts	<0.5			16%	<0.5	0	<0.5	0
Machinery	14	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Metal products	2	●	●	1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 740	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	2 899	74%	11%	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Cotton (fabric)	23	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	4	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	3			9%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	3	●	●	5%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Precious metals	2	●	●	7%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	5	●	●	4%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	39	74%	11%	4%	2	<0.5	1	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



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
Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Canada

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 771 693 \$ million
Industry: 558 792 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	404 658	41 234		10%
Industrial imports	410 702	52 408		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	16 202			6% ■	917	24	30	863
Chemicals	11 759			6% ■	649	27	38	584
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	14 690			4% ■	645	28	73	544
Machinery	29 830			2% ■	594	41	82	470
Motor vehicles & parts	61 778			1% ■	551	5	12	534
Other subsectors	270 399			1% ■	2 801	146	330	2 325
Total	404 658			2%	6 156	272	564	5 320

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	17 852			14% ■	2 427	298	282	1 848
Machinery	7 210			14% ■	1 006	150	153	703
Plastics & rubber	3 925			15% ■	586	56	57	473
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	3 390			14% ■	484	49	151	284
Chemicals	2 041			15% ■	306	28	33	245
Other subsectors	14 861			14% ■	2 099	330	291	1 478
Total	49 280			14%	6 909	912	966	5 031

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 306 809 \$ million
 Industry: 116 894 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	53 062		3 070	6%
Industrial imports	58 728		2 866	5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	15 165	●	●	1%	98	37	28	33
Chemicals	2 922	●	●	3%	78	18	31	29
Wood & vegetable material	2 410	●	●	1%	15	4	3	8
Paper products	3 382	●	●	0%	15	5	4	7
Fertilizers	409	●	●	4%	15	2	6	7
Other subsectors	28 773	●	●	0%	36	2	7	27
Total	53 062	51%	20%	0%	257	68	77	112

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Chemicals	367	●	●	12%	43	12	15	15
Paper products	314	●	●	10%	33	12	12	9
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	549	●	●	5%	25	11	8	6
Plastics & rubber	174	●	●	11%	19	7	7	5
Machinery	156	●	●	12%	18	7	7	4
Other subsectors	698	●	●	11%	76	31	27	18
Total	2 257	51%	20%	9%	214	80	75	58

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

China

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 542 686	329 804		13%
Industrial imports	1 581 986	251 666		16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	419 419	●	●	1%	4 762	3 203	1 559
Electronic equipment	787 682	●	●	0%	3 234	2 319	915
Metal products	100 290	●	●	2%	1 705	1 063	642
Plastics & rubber	108 287	●	●	1%	1 592	971	621
Chemicals	101 992	●	●	1%	1 469	929	540
Other subsectors	1 025 015	●	●	1%	7 465	4 839	2 625
Total	2 542 686	54%	35%	1%	20 227	13 325	6 902

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Electronic equipment	80 092	●	●	4%	3 370	2 401	969
Machinery	51 041	●	●	6%	3 152	2 441	711
Miscellaneous manufactured products	18 772	●	●	6%	1 072	779	294
Motor vehicles & parts	10 462	●	●	8%	815	672	144
Plastics & rubber	16 749	●	●	5%	757	479	278
Other subsectors	72 827	●	●	6%	4 123	3 021	1 102
Total	249 944	54%	35%	5%	13 288	9 792	3 497

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **62 422 \$ million**
 Industry: **16 604 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	8 292	733	9%
Industrial imports	13 251	1 534	12%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	4 399	●	●	0%	16	3	3	10
Plastics & rubber	676	●	●	2%	16	<0.5	3	12
Electronic equipment	308			4%	13	8	2	4
Machinery	581	●	●	2%	11	1	1	8
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	66	●	●	4%	3	<0.5	1	2
Other subsectors	2 262	●	●	1%	15	2	4	10
Total	8 292	78%	30%	1%	74	13	14	46

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	644	●	●	12%	75	15	14	46
Machinery	131	●	●	11%	14	4	2	9
Plastics & rubber	135	●	●	10%	13	3	2	9
Electronic equipment	65			12%	8	2	1	5
Chemicals	62	●	●	9%	6	1	1	3
Other subsectors	253	●	●	8%	21	5	3	12
Total	1 291	78%	30%	11%	137	30	24	83

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Croatia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **63 875 \$ million**
 Industry: **24 272 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	14 435	2 624		18%
Industrial imports	25 993	2 538		10%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	2 168	●	●	3%	71	2	66	3
Mineral products	751	●	●	6%	45	<0.5	44	1
Wood & vegetable material	737	●	●	5%	34	2	32	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	553	●	●	5%	28	<0.5	28	<0.5
Metal products	617	●	●	4%	28	<0.5	27	1
Other subsectors	9 608	●	●	2%	160	7	150	3
Total	14 435	62%	39%	3%	366	11	346	8

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	567	●	●	14%	82	5	76	1
Motor vehicles & parts	294	●	●	14%	42	2	40	<0.5
Boats & parts	166	●	●	15%	24	1	23	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	145	●	●	14%	21	1	20	<0.5
Apparel	132	●	●	14%	18	2	17	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 213	●	●	13%	158	9	147	1
Total	2 517	62%	39%	14%	346	20	322	3

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **26 258 \$ million**
 Industry: **6 774 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	4 116	147		4%
Industrial imports	9 810	453		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Chemicals	131	●	●	3%	4	<0.5	4	<0.5
Electronic equipment	189			1%	3	<0.5	2	1
Machinery	172	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	35			4%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Mineral products	50	●	●	2%	1	0	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	3 538	●	●	0%	7	<0.5	7	<0.5
Total	4 116	85%	50%	0%	18	<0.5	17	1

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Boats & parts	215	●	●	12%	26	2	24	1
Electronic equipment	44			13%	6	1	5	<0.5
Machinery	40	●	●	13%	5	1	4	<0.5
Chemicals	25	●	●	11%	3	<0.5	2	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	18			13%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Other subsectors	148	●	●	9%	14	2	12	<0.5
Total	491	85%	50%	11%	56	6	49	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Czechia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 255 876 \$ million
Industry: 107 980 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	183 630		36 898	20%
Industrial imports		164 034	33 838	21%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	38 558	●	●	3%	1 256	87	1 135	34	
Motor vehicles & parts	41 363	●	●	3%	1 049	26	1 016	8	
Plastics & rubber	10 047	●	●	5%	518	11	486	21	
Electronic equipment	28 815			2%	506	44	447	15	
Metal products	8 754	●	●	5%	439	15	417	8	
Other subsectors	56 092	●	●	3%	1 822	47	1 711	64	
Total	183 630	83%	38%	3%	5 590	230	5 210	150	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Motor vehicles & parts	9 943	●	●	14%	1 417	76	1 319	22
Machinery	8 114	●	●	14%	1 170	110	1 029	31
Electronic equipment	5 411			13%	730	217	485	28
Plastics & rubber	1 942	●	●	15%	290	13	270	6
Miscellaneous manufactured products	1 629	●	●	15%	239	20	215	5
Other subsectors	6 409	●	●	15%	933	68	835	29
Total	33 449	83%	38%	14%	4 778	504	4 153	121

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 370 468 \$ million
 Industry: 127 441 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	96 281	12 938		13%
Industrial imports	85 100	12 525		15%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	19 503			3% ■	541	56	436	49
Metal products	4 013			4% ■	155	5	146	4
Plastics & rubber	2 981			5% ■	143	5	131	8
Chemicals	4 821			3% ■	133	13	105	14
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	4 069			2% ■	90	15	56	19
Other subsectors	60 895			1% ■	673	49	582	42
Total	96 281			2%	1 736	144	1 456	136

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	3 871			15% ■	573	64	494	15
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	930			15% ■	138	15	115	8
Motor vehicles & parts	810			15% ■	121	9	110	2
Electronic equipment	806			15% ■	119	16	98	5
Chemicals	715			15% ■	104	7	94	3
Other subsectors	4 703			14% ■	670	58	594	19
Total	11 835			15%	1 725	169	1 505	51

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Ecuador

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 110 349 \$ million
Industry: 43 477 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	12 422	373		3%
Industrial imports	18 374	893		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Wood & vegetable material	392	●	●	5%	19	10	4	5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	112			7%	8	<0.5	<0.5	8
Wood products	127	●	●	2%	3	2	<0.5	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	172	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	1	1
Machinery	123	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	1	1
Other subsectors	11 496	●	●	0%	5	1	3	1
Total	12 422	64%	30%	0%	38	13	9	16

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	41	●	●	10%	4	2	1	1
Plastics & rubber	48	●	●	9%	4	2	1	2
Miscellaneous manufactured products	33	●	●	11%	4	2	1	1
Wood & vegetable material	45	●	●	7%	3	1	1	1
Wood products	29	●	●	10%	3	2	1	1
Other subsectors	129	●	●	9%	11	5	3	3
Total	324	64%	30%	9%	29	13	8	8

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	4 142	344		8%
Industrial imports	8 811	641		7%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	133			6%	7	4	3	1
Machinery	87	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Plastics & rubber	369	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Apparel	1 715	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Jewelry & precious metal articles	8	●	●	7%	1	0	<0.5	1
Other subsectors	1 830	●	●	0%	4	<0.5	<0.5	3
Total	4 142	58%	40%	0%	15	4	3	8

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Apparel	254	●	●	7%	17	6	2	9
Plastics & rubber	91	●	●	7%	6	2	1	3
Paper products	70	●	●	5%	4	1	1	2
Electronic equipment	40			8%	3	1	<0.5	2
Machinery	28	●	●	9%	2	1	<0.5	1
Other subsectors	164	●	●	7%	11	3	2	5
Total	646	58%	40%	7%	44	14	7	23

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Estonia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **32 589 \$ million**
 Industry: **11 993 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	14 270	2 161		15%
Industrial imports	17 049	2 272		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	2 293	●	●	3%	67	4	56	7
Wood & vegetable material	1 229	●	●	4%	45	1	42	1
Metal products	548	●	●	5%	27	1	25	1
Chemicals	452	●	●	5%	23	<0.5	18	5
Plastics & rubber	463	●	●	4%	20	<0.5	20	<0.5
Other subsectors	9 285	●	●	1%	129	6	119	5
Total	14 270	78%	37%	2%	311	12	280	19

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	536	●	●	15%	79	6	72	1
Motor vehicles & parts	300	●	●	15%	45	3	42	1
Electronic equipment	243			15%	36	5	31	1
Miscellaneous manufactured products	195	●	●	14%	28	2	26	<0.5
Wood products	129	●	●	14%	18	1	16	<0.5
Other subsectors	843	●	●	14%	114	6	105	3
Total	2 246	78%	37%	14%	320	22	293	5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 4 832 \$ million
Industry: 1 802 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 452		67	5%
Industrial imports	1 456		148	10%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	36	●	●	0%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	6			1%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Chemicals	283	●	●	0%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Plastics & rubber	9	●	●	0%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Miscellaneous manufactured products	13	●	●	0%		<0.5	0	<0.5	
Other subsectors	1 105	●	●	0%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Total	1 452	81%	37%	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Apparel	36	●	●	2%		1	1	<0.5
Beauty products & perfumes	49			1%		1	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	43	●	●	1%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	10	●	●	1%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Paper products	2	●	●	1%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	24	●	●	1%		<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	164	81%	37%	1%	2	1	1	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Finland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 284 284 \$ million
Industry: 109 734 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	77 337	11 536		15%
Industrial imports	68 874	10 009		15%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	13 530			3% ■	339	67	234	38
Ferrous metals	5 726			4% ■	234	12	217	5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	3 257			6% ■	195	25	142	29
Paper products	11 918			1% ■	138	10	107	21
Plastics & rubber	2 826			4% ■	117	4	106	7
Other subsectors	40 079			1% ■	467	61	370	36
Total	77 337			2%	1 490	180	1 175	135

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	2 814			15% ■	419	32	376	11
Motor vehicles & parts	1 555			15% ■	234	12	218	4
Paper products	997			13% ■	134	7	123	4
Boats & parts	665			13% ■	88	5	82	2
Plastics & rubber	595			14% ■	84	3	78	2
Other subsectors	3 363			13% ■	452	30	406	16
Total	9 989			14%	1 410	88	1 283	39

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 2 862 950 \$ million
 Industry: 793 037 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	505 143		77 105	15%
Industrial imports	593 763		92 503	16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	65 250			3% ■	1 638	197	1 305	135
Plastics & rubber	25 817			5% ■	1 394	71	1 227	96
Chemicals	32 013			4% ■	1 345	84	1 152	108
Motor vehicles & parts	61 819			1% ■	894	18	868	8
Ferrous metals	14 083			6% ■	783	24	721	38
Other subsectors	306 162			1% ■	4 228	366	3 336	526
Total	505 143			2%	10 281	759	8 609	912

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	17 720			14% ■	2 475	173	2 215	87
Machinery	15 146			14% ■	2 122	210	1 789	124
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	11 782			12% ■	1 443	129	1 072	243
Plastics & rubber	6 206			15% ■	909	52	816	40
Chemicals	5 715			14% ■	819	50	706	64
Other subsectors	30 262			14% ■	4 185	437	3 498	251
Total	86 830			14%	11 954	1 050	10 095	809

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Georgia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **18 829 \$ million**
 Industry: **6 157 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 379	230		10%
Industrial imports	8 459	392		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Ferrous metals	358	●	●	2%	9	<0.5	2	7	
Fertilizers	100	●	●	4%	4	0	4	<0.5	
Chemicals	76	●	●	3%	2	<0.5	1	1	
Apparel	136	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	27	●	●	3%	1	1	<0.5	<0.5	
Other subsectors	1 681	●	●	0%	4	<0.5	3	<0.5	
Total	2 379	75%	31%	1%	20	1	11	8	

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States		
Motor vehicles & parts	125			8%	10	4	5	1	
Apparel	32	●	●	7%	2	1	1	<0.5	
Machinery	26	●	●	8%	2	1	1	<0.5	
Ferrous metals	40	●	●	4%	2	1	1	<0.5	
Chemicals	15	●	●	7%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5	
Other subsectors	108	●	●	5%	6	2	3	<0.5	
Total	347	75%	31%	6%	23	10	12	1	

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 4 039 098 \$ million
 Industry: 1 502 544 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 384 451	236 689		17%
Industrial imports	1 145 006	220 412		19%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	288 715			2% ■	6 899	1 640	4 572	687
Plastics & rubber	80 415			6% ■	4 491	362	3 731	398
Motor vehicles & parts	271 588			1% ■	3 260	459	2 609	192
Chemicals	85 581			4% ■	3 247	369	2 512	367
Metal products	46 445			5% ■	2 093	314	1 626	153
Other subsectors	611 706			2% ■	11 112	1 287	8 864	961
Total	1 384 451			2%	31 102	4 430	23 915	2 757

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	61 759			14% ■	8 387	664	7 410	312
Machinery	53 704			13% ■	7 224	927	5 844	454
Plastics & rubber	15 402			14% ■	2 133	182	1 823	128
Electronic equipment	15 198			12% ■	1 879	505	1 243	131
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	14 574			13% ■	1 839	297	1 294	249
Other subsectors	56 391			14% ■	7 634	821	6 224	589
Total	217 029			13%	29 096	3 395	23 837	1 864

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Greece

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 225 949 \$ million
Industry: 63 040 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	30 276	2 888		10%
Industrial imports	57 427	3 391		6%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	2 291	●	●	2%	57	<0.5	55	2
Ferrous metals	956	●	●	6%	56	<0.5	44	12
Machinery	1 623	●	●	3%	47	3	43	1
Plastics & rubber	1 321	●	●	3%	41	<0.5	40	2
Chemicals	959	●	●	3%	30	1	28	1
Other subsectors	23 127	●	●	1%	146	3	131	12
Total	30 276	64%	29%	1%	377	8	340	29

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	442	●	●	14%	61	9	50	1
Plastics & rubber	368	●	●	13%	49	4	43	1
Electronic equipment	270			15%	41	7	32	1
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	315	●	●	12%	36	3	33	<0.5
Chemicals	192	●	●	13%	26	2	23	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 419	●	●	13%	188	29	155	3
Total	3 006	64%	29%	13%	400	55	337	7

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: **82 720 \$ million**
 Industry: **22 417 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	5 572		728	13%
Industrial imports	15 959		1 212	8%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	490			3%	12	2	9	1
Paper products	280	●	●	3%	8	<0.5	1	7
Natural latex & rubber	149			2%	3	<0.5	1	1
Plastics & rubber	352	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	<0.5	2
Wood & vegetable material	73			3%	2	<0.5	<0.5	1
Other subsectors	4 229	●	●	0%	6	<0.5	1	5
Total	5 572	60%	31%	1%	33	2	12	18

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Apparel	271	●	●	8%	23	12	3	8
Plastics & rubber	97	●	●	8%	8	3	2	4
Chemicals	93	●	●	7%	7	2	2	3
Paper products	56	●	●	7%	4	1	1	2
Machinery	39	●	●	10%	4	1	1	2
Other subsectors	358	●	●	7%	23	10	5	9
Total	913	60%	31%	8%	69	29	12	28

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Hong Kong SAR

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 364 639 \$ million
 Industry: 41 933 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	85 987	8 444		10%
Industrial imports	563 375	14 969		3%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	25 095			1%	133	64	63	6
Plastics & rubber	2 136			3%	67	55	10	3
Machinery	5 567			1%	65	14	45	6
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	3 567			1%	39	17	20	2
Jewelry & precious metal articles	11 402			0%	28	6	8	14
Other subsectors	38 220			0%	164	76	71	16
Total	85 987			1%	495	231	217	47

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	7 234			11%	827	672	75	79
Machinery	1 516			11%	170	128	28	15
Jewelry & precious metal articles	1 538			9%	140	92	31	17
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	812			12%	96	71	16	10
Plastics & rubber	597			10%	61	41	10	10
Other subsectors	3 159			11%	357	244	77	36
Total	14 855			11%	1 651	1 248	237	166

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 168 570 \$ million
 Industry: 68 271 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	113 599		20 398	18%
Industrial imports	112 561		21 343	19%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	24 741	●	●	3%	841	85	714	41
Motor vehicles & parts	27 044	●	●	2%	575	17	549	9
Electronic equipment	15 740			3%	446	48	370	28
Plastics & rubber	7 186	●	●	5%	332	13	309	10
Chemicals	3 696	●	●	4%	130	3	120	8
Other subsectors	35 192	●	●	2%	700	33	649	18
Total	113 599	80%	50%	3%	3 023	199	2 710	114

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	6 432	●	●	14%	923	45	865	14
Machinery	5 241	●	●	15%	768	59	695	14
Electronic equipment	3 395			14%	470	89	370	11
Plastics & rubber	1 435	●	●	15%	210	8	200	2
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	901			14%	130	16	110	4
Other subsectors	3 324	●	●	14%	476	28	441	7
Total	20 727	80%	50%	14%	2 977	245	2 680	52

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Iceland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: **26 857 \$ million**
 Industry: **8 379 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 827	381		13%
Industrial imports	5 420	308		6%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	1 885			2%	30	1	28	<0.5
Ferrous metals	124			9%	11	<0.5	9	2
Machinery	177			2%	4	<0.5	4	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	159			1%	2	<0.5	1	1
Chemicals	45			3%	1	<0.5	1	1
Other subsectors	436			1%	4	<0.5	3	1
Total	2 827			2%	52	2	46	5

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	317			4%	11	1	10	<0.5
Machinery	40			14%	5	<0.5	5	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	35			14%	5	1	4	<0.5
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	21			15%	3	<0.5	2	1
Ferrous metals	16			10%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Other subsectors	39			12%	5	<0.5	4	<0.5
Total	468			7%	31	2	26	2

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	292 922	35 699	12%
Industrial imports	431 384	37 992	9%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Chemicals	28 583	●	●	3%	813	192	352	269
Machinery	25 966	●	●	2%	551	131	269	151
Ferrous metals	12 082	●	●	3%	341	36	217	89
Plastics & rubber	11 026	●	●	3%	308	39	180	89
Metal products	7 719	●	●	2%	174	9	102	63
Other subsectors	207 546	●	●	1%	1 079	190	582	308
Total	292 922	73%	14%	1%	3 267	597	1 702	968

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	6 016	●	●	10%	593	309	227	57
Chemicals	4 392	●	●	10%	448	255	126	67
Motor vehicles & parts	4 493	●	●	9%	419	211	166	42
Plastics & rubber	3 099	●	●	8%	255	139	77	38
Apparel	1 811	●	●	11%	192	140	41	11
Other subsectors	16 894	●	●	9%	1 440	768	486	187
Total	36 704	73%	14%	9%	3 347	1 821	1 123	402

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Ireland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 410 742 \$ million
Industry: 177 440 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	173 941	7 841	5%
Industrial imports	82 032	11 412	14%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	18 286			1% ■	180	45	115	20
Plastics & rubber	1 952			8% ■	152	3	112	37
Chemicals	37 286			0% ■	150	5	106	39
Machinery	6 535			2% ■	135	15	111	9
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	18 026			1% ■	119	16	56	48
Other subsectors	91 857			0% ■	345	15	276	54
Total	173 941			1%	1 081	98	776	207

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	2 236			15% ■	333	20	267	46
Electronic equipment	2 096			14% ■	295	28	232	35
Chemicals	2 505			9% ■	220	8	183	28
Machinery	1 322			15% ■	195	13	166	16
Beauty products & perfumes	674			15% ■	99	4	82	13
Other subsectors	3 230			14% ■	442	23	349	70
Total	12 064			13%	1 584	97	1 279	209

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 390 270 \$ million
 Industry: 113 959 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	58 957	7 198		12%
Industrial imports	69 945	7 025		10%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Chemicals	6 518	●	●	3%	165	20	85	61
Plastics & rubber	3 034	●	●	4%	119	10	74	36
Machinery	5 083	●	●	2%	109	18	49	43
Electronic equipment	7 511	●	●	1%	108	31	34	43
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	5 978	●	●	2%	99	26	31	42
Other subsectors	30 833	●	●	1%	267	35	141	91
Total	58 957	71%	41%	1%	868	139	413	316

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	1 278	●	●	13%	163	50	69	45
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	1 188	●	●	13%	152	35	75	41
Machinery	1 079	●	●	12%	130	36	66	28
Chemicals	722	●	●	12%	84	22	44	18
Plastics & rubber	675	●	●	11%	76	18	45	13
Other subsectors	2 051	●	●	12%	245	57	124	64
Total	6 992	71%	41%	12%	851	218	422	211

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 2 126 619 \$ million
 Industry: 674 138 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	495 939	84 198	17%
Industrial imports	436 313	77 819	18%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	114 283	●	●	2%	2 408	287	1 870	251
Plastics & rubber	26 441	●	●	5%	1 390	73	1 236	82
Ferrous metals	20 340	●	●	5%	1 062	29	958	74
Motor vehicles & parts	45 592	●	●	2%	966	22	909	34
Chemicals	20 033	●	●	4%	852	63	704	84
Other subsectors	269 251	●	●	2%	4 241	637	3 235	369
Total	495 939	68%	27%	2%	10 919	1 112	8 912	894

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	22 136	●	●	14%	3 033	438	2 473	123
Motor vehicles & parts	10 901	●	●	13%	1 447	160	1 242	45
Plastics & rubber	5 833	●	●	14%	789	76	684	30
Chemicals	3 505	●	●	14%	477	45	409	23
Apparel	3 520	●	●	12%	410	103	299	8
Other subsectors	29 302	●	●	13%	3 814	504	3 138	172
Total	75 199	68%	27%	13%	9 970	1 326	8 245	400

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 5 091 059 \$ million
 Industry: 1 522 227 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	752 208	123 898		16%
Industrial imports	586 724	94 842		16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	168 307			2%	3 231	1 708	812	711
Plastics & rubber	38 928			4%	1 587	930	322	335
Electronic equipment	93 478			1%	1 383	927	250	206
Chemicals	51 980			2%	1 279	721	264	294
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	44 894			2%	852	394	263	195
Other subsectors	354 621			1%	3 705	2 145	729	831
Total	752 208			2%	12 036	6 826	2 639	2 572

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Motor vehicles & parts	25 002			9%	2 207	1 314	565	327
Machinery	23 211			9%	2 198	1 300	521	377
Electronic equipment	13 627			9%	1 284	910	180	194
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	7 977			11%	876	414	248	214
Chemicals	6 341			10%	650	298	174	177
Other subsectors	18 646			9%	1 671	834	449	388
Total	94 804			9%	8 886	5 070	2 138	1 677

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Kazakhstan

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 190 635 \$ million
Industry: 77 207 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	50 286	2 370	5%
Industrial imports	37 318	1 461	4%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	4 454	●	●	2%	109	83	18
Ferrous metals	3 448	●	●	2%	60	26	14
Chemicals	2 490	●	●	1%	31	9	15
Precious metals	49	●	●	15%	8	0	8
Mineral products	183	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	2
Other subsectors	39 661	●	●	0%	9	4	5
Total	50 286	81%	28%	0%	219	123	68

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Chemicals	285	●	●	6%	18	8	1
Ferrous metals	319	●	●	5%	17	10	1
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	256	●	●	4%	11	6	1
Machinery	115	●	●	8%	9	5	1
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	54	●	●	9%	5	1	1
Other subsectors	296	●	●	7%	21	12	1
Total	1 325	81%	28%	6%	80	42	6

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **8 609 \$ million**
 Industry: **3 289 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 679		64	4%
Industrial imports	10 201		129	1%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	9			13% ■	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	17	●	●	3% ■	1	1	<0.5	0
Wool & animal hair (fabric)	3	●	●	6% ■	<0.5	<0.5	0	<0.5
Precious metals	796			0% ■	<0.5	0	<0.5	0
Cotton (fabric)	31	●	●	0% ■	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	0
Other subsectors	821	●	●	0% ■	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	1 679	74%	33%	0%	3	2	1	<0.5

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Precious metals	172			2% ■	3	3	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	16	●	●	8% ■	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Apparel	11	●	●	7% ■	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	8			8% ■	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	11	●	●	5% ■	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	48	●	●	5% ■	3	2	<0.5	<0.5
Total	267	74%	33%	3%	9	7	2	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 35 769 \$ million
Industry: 11 518 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	12 285	1 705	14%
Industrial imports	17 694	1 969	11%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Wood & vegetable material	2 091	●	●	2%	52	1	49	2
Ferrous metals	449			6%	25	<0.5	25	<0.5
Machinery	1 163	●	●	2%	19	1	18	1
Motor vehicles & parts	697	●	●	2%	17	<0.5	17	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	418	●	●	4%	17	<0.5	17	<0.5
Other subsectors	7 467	●	●	2%	113	3	102	8
Total	12 285	70%	50%	2%	244	5	229	11

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	279	●	●	14%	39	4	34	1
Electronic equipment	226			15%	33	4	28	2
Motor vehicles & parts	222	●	●	14%	31	3	28	<0.5
Wood & vegetable material	220	●	●	12%	26	1	26	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	107	●	●	13%	14	1	13	<0.5
Other subsectors	769	●	●	13%	97	8	86	2
Total	1 824	70%	50%	13%	241	20	215	6

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	25 864	3 872		15%
Industrial imports	29 898	3 877		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	1 845			7%	124	<0.5	124	1
Machinery	2 843			3%	82	2	79	1
Fertilizers	1 081			4%	44	<0.5	43	2
Mineral products	385			9%	33	<0.5	33	<0.5
Wood & vegetable material	635			5%	31	<0.5	31	<0.5
Other subsectors	19 074			1%	215	14	194	7
Total	25 864	57%	48%	2%	529	16	502	11

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	679			14%	97	8	87	2
Plastics & rubber	516			12%	64	2	60	1
Motor vehicles & parts	422			14%	60	6	53	1
Wood products	342			13%	45	3	42	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	227			14%	31	3	28	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 478			12%	184	16	164	4
Total	3 665	57%	48%	13%	480	39	433	8

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Luxembourg

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 73 794 \$ million
Industry: 15 792 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	15 890	4 594	29%
Industrial imports	23 709	2 186	9%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	2 829			9%	253	3	231	20
Plastics & rubber	2 222			6%	141	3	135	3
Machinery	2 040			2%	49	3	44	1
Synthetic textile fabric	504			9%	44	7	34	3
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	752			5%	38	5	31	2
Other subsectors	7 543			2%	164	4	155	5
Total	15 890			4%	688	24	630	33

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	436			15%	66	1	62	3
Plastics & rubber	398			15%	59	<0.5	57	2
Motor vehicles & parts	325			16%	52	1	50	1
Electronic equipment	228			15%	35	2	31	2
Ferrous metals	118			15%	18	<0.5	17	<0.5
Other subsectors	704			15%	104	1	97	5
Total	2 208			15%	333	6	314	13

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 53 420 \$ million
 Industry: 2 137 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 569		101	6%
Industrial imports	8 448		186	2%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	50			4% ■	2	2	<0.5	0
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	277			0% ■	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	46			1% ■	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Apparel	181			0% ■	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Metal products	16			3% ■	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	999			0% ■	3	1	2	1
Total	1 569			0%	8	3	4	1

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	46			7% ■	3	2	1	<0.5
Apparel	35			7% ■	2	1	1	<0.5
Electronic equipment	28			8% ■	2	2	<0.5	<0.5
Jewelry & precious metal articles	82			2% ■	2	1	1	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	16			10% ■	2	1	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	113			6% ■	7	5	1	<0.5
Total	320			6%	18	12	5	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Madagascar

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 14 815 \$ million
Industry: 4 207 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 919	404		21%
Industrial imports	3 201	198		6%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	578			2%	13	6	3	4
Apparel	649	●	●	0%	3	<0.5	2	<0.5
Jewelry & precious metal articles	80	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Synthetic textile fabric	8	●	●	12%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Chemicals	13	●	●	6%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	591	●	●	1%	5	1	4	<0.5
Total	1 919	73%	48%	1%	23	8	10	5

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Apparel	98	●	●	10%	10	7	3	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	72			2%	2	1	1	<0.5
Beauty products & perfumes	11	●	●	8%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	4			10%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Wood products	4	●	●	9%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	49	●	●	6%	3	1	1	<0.5
Total	238	73%	48%	7%	16	10	5	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	268 791	39 256		15%
Industrial imports	193 910	33 267		17%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Electronic equipment	114 358	●		1%	1 455	681	412	362
Plastics & rubber	15 785	●		2%	385	229	108	48
Machinery	26 525	●		1%	328	153	98	76
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	5 880	●		3%	183	143	17	24
Chemicals	11 480	●		2%	182	106	40	36
Other subsectors	94 763	●		1%	633	260	226	147
Total	268 791	51%		1%	3 167	1 572	902	693

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Electronic equipment	15 255	●		8%	1 232	782	261	189
Machinery	5 534	●		8%	458	304	98	57
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	2 285			9%	206	102	55	49
Plastics & rubber	2 952	●		7%	202	125	40	37
Chemicals	1 759	●		7%	123	77	27	19
Other subsectors	5 070	●		8%	395	259	91	44
Total	32 856	51%		8%	2 617	1 649	572	396

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Malta

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 15 505 \$ million
Industry: 3 706 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	4 382	337		8%
Industrial imports	17 045	436		3%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	361	●	●	2%	9	1	8	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	167	●	●	5%	8	2	5	1
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	186			4%	7	<0.5	7	<0.5
Electronic equipment	798			1%	4	2	2	1
Paper products	192	●	●	2%	3	<0.5	3	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 678	●	●	1%	14	1	12	1
Total	4 382	81%	20%	1%	45	5	36	3

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	104			13%	13	2	11	<0.5
Machinery	86	●	●	13%	11	2	9	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	48	●	●	14%	7	1	6	<0.5
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	32			14%	4	<0.5	4	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	33	●	●	13%	4	<0.5	4	<0.5
Other subsectors	187	●	●	11%	20	2	18	<0.5
Total	491	81%	20%	12%	60	7	52	1

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 14 951 \$ million
Industry: 4 425 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 448	124		9%
Industrial imports	4 285	238		6%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	12			12%	2	1	<0.5	0
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	77			1%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Apparel	587	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	50	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Chemicals	37	●	●	2%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	684	●	●	1%	4	<0.5	4	<0.5
Total	1 448	88%	47%	1%	9	2	6	1

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Apparel	100	●	●	8%	8	5	2	<0.5
Machinery	19	●	●	10%	2	1	1	<0.5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	16			10%	2	1	1	<0.5
Jewelry & precious metal articles	30	●	●	4%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	15	●	●	7%	1	1	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	78	●	●	8%	6	3	3	<0.5
Total	258	88%	47%	8%	20	11	9	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Mexico

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 240 174 \$ million
Industry: 457 624 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	464 368	37 362	8%
Industrial imports	423 028	75 735	18%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	75 993	●	●	2%	1 813	63	85	1 666
Motor vehicles & parts	128 091	●	●	1%	936	36	43	857
Electronic equipment	72 992			1%	697	103	79	514
Plastics & rubber	11 254	●	●	4%	482	17	31	434
Metal products	8 194	●	●	3%	279	7	7	265
Other subsectors	167 844	●	●	1%	1 236	47	100	1 089
Total	464 368	71%	23%	1%	5 442	272	345	4 825

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	27 575	●	●	14%	3 762	643	529	2 591
Machinery	16 103	●	●	14%	2 216	481	310	1 426
Electronic equipment	13 598			12%	1 673	637	167	870
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	4 621	●	●	14%	647	156	111	379
Plastics & rubber	2 642	●	●	14%	381	53	48	279
Other subsectors	9 222	●	●	14%	1 278	247	189	842
Total	73 762	71%	23%	13%	9 957	2 216	1 353	6 387

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 122 599 \$ million
Industry: 46 587 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	24 651		4 183	17%
Industrial imports	42 883		4 677	11%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	4 944	●	●	7%	338	2	333	2
Fertilizers	3 037	●	●	3%	81	2	30	49
Apparel	4 159	●	●	1%	35	8	26	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	3 982	●	●	1%	22	<0.5	20	3
Electronic equipment	872			3%	22	4	14	5
Other subsectors	7 657	●	●	1%	95	2	87	6
Total	24 651	59%	68%	2%	594	18	510	65


All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector


MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Machinery	1 235	●	●	14%	172	28	140	4
Motor vehicles & parts	1 155	●	●	13%	154	23	127	3
Apparel	696	●	●	13%	87	23	62	2
Electronic equipment	233			13%	31	9	21	1
Fertilizers	396	●	●	6%	24	3	20	1
Other subsectors	869	●	●	13%	110	18	89	3
Total	4 584	59%	68%	13%	578	104	459	14

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Mozambique

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 15 289 \$ million
Industry: 5 229 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	5 767	489		8%
Industrial imports	10 164	348		3%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	1 327			2%	26	<0.5	26	0
Wood & vegetable material	285			1%	2	2	<0.5	0
Jewelry & precious metal articles	164			1%	2	<0.5	<0.5	1
Ferrous metals	17			2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	24			1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	3 949			0%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Total	5 767	86%	25%	1%	32	3	27	2

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	225			3%	6	3	1	<0.5
Machinery	8			7%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Mineral products	10			5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	7			7%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Fertilizers	7			4%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	62			3%	2	1	1	<0.5
Total	319	86%	25%	3%	9	5	4	<0.5

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 14 547 \$ million
Industry: 5 135 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	4 361		551	13%
Industrial imports	6 387		319	5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	1 289	●	●	3%	44	12	32	<0.5
Chemicals	292	●	●	1%	2	2	<0.5	<0.5
Wood products	52	●	●	3%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Boats & parts	179	●	●	1%	1	0	1	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	16	●	●	6%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 534	●	●	0%	3	<0.5	2	1
Total	4 361	82%	25%	1%	53	15	38	1

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Boats & parts	47	●	●	4%	2	1	1	<0.5
Chemicals	40	●	●	2%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Machinery	26	●	●	3%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	119	●	●	1%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	20	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	84	●	●	2%	2	1	1	<0.5
Total	336	82%	25%	2%	7	3	3	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Netherlands

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: **946 463 \$ million**
 Industry: **265 956 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	546 437		73 486	13%
Industrial imports		575 272	75 952	13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	29 441			6% ■	1 858	77	1 703	78
Chemicals	45 160			4% ■	1 837	52	1 662	124
Machinery	64 652			2% ■	1 393	114	1 196	83
Electronic equipment	84 470			1% ■	1 194	35	1 134	25
Ferrous metals	11 018			7% ■	754	9	718	27
Other subsectors	311 696			1% ■	3 707	136	3 412	160
Total	546 437			2%	10 744	423	9 825	496

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	15 596			12% ■	1 928	716	1 050	162
Machinery	13 217			13% ■	1 723	306	1 280	138
Motor vehicles & parts	7 061			14% ■	956	108	792	56
Chemicals	7 135			13% ■	943	120	718	106
Plastics & rubber	6 882			14% ■	938	103	721	114
Other subsectors	21 518			13% ■	2 749	483	1 988	278
Total	71 410			13%	9 237	1 835	6 549	853

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 213 017 \$ million
 Industry: 58 367 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	14 065	1 688		12%
Industrial imports	34 861	2 401		7%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	1 317			2% ■	23	6	11
Chemicals	1 017			2% ■	21	8	8
Wood & vegetable material	3 561			1% ■	21	19	1
Wool & animal hair (fabric)	367			3% ■	10	4	1
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	588			2% ■	9	5	3
Other subsectors	7 215			1% ■	51	24	11
Total	14 065			1%	135	63	34

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Machinery	362			9% ■	33	14	6
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	167			9% ■	15	6	4
Chemicals	160			8% ■	13	5	3
Wood & vegetable material	160			6% ■	10	5	2
Paper products	137			7% ■	9	3	2
Other subsectors	729			7% ■	51	22	11
Total	1 715			8%	130	54	28

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



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
Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Nigeria

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 413 154 \$ million
Industry: 111 552 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	59 810	358		1%
Industrial imports	43 821	381		1%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Skins, leather & products thereof	165	●	●	11%	18	2	16	<0.5	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	237	●	●	3%	8	6	2	<0.5	
Natural latex & rubber	69			5%	3	<0.5	3	0	
Wood products	93	●	●	3%	3	<0.5	2	<0.5	
Miscellaneous manufactured products	34	●	●	3%	1	1	<0.5	<0.5	
Other subsectors	59 212	●	●	0%	4	1	2	1	
Total	59 810	88%	18%	0%	36	10	25	1	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Boats & parts	64	●	●	12%	7	5	2	1
Skins, leather & products thereof	28	●	●	10%	3	2	1	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	23	●	●	10%	2	1	1	<0.5
Natural latex & rubber	22			10%	2	1	1	<0.5
Wood products	17	●	●	12%	2	1	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	130	●	●	9%	12	7	4	1
Total	284	88%	18%	10%	29	18	8	2

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **13 380 \$ million**
 Industry: **5 071 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	7 142	1 218		17%
Industrial imports	8 233	989		12%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	2 065	●	●	5%	93	<0.5	92	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	549	●		6%	32	<0.5	25	7
Ferrous metals	618			3%	19	1	17	1
Mineral products	132			9%	12	<0.5	12	<0.5
Chemicals	1 654	●	●	1%	9	<0.5	9	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 124	●	●	1%	19	<0.5	18	1
Total	7 142	60%	74%	3%	186	2	174	10

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	455	●	●	11%	52	5	46	1
Chemicals	239	●	●	8%	19	2	17	1
Motor vehicles & parts	126	●		12%	15	1	13	<0.5
Apparel	98	●	●	10%	10	1	9	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	57	●	●	11%	6	1	6	<0.5
Other subsectors	214	●	●	7%	15	1	14	<0.5
Total	1 190	60%	74%	10%	117	11	104	2

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

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Norway

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	87 787	7 425		8%
Industrial imports	77 245	6 172		8%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	6 530			3%	195	13	161	21
Machinery	5 184			2%	124	23	91	10
Ferrous metals	1 499			7%	112	3	99	10
Chemicals	3 694			3%	102	13	81	8
Mineral products	736			13%	99	<0.5	97	2
Other subsectors	70 144			1%	374	25	306	44
Total	87 787			1%	1 006	77	835	94

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	1 292			15%	194	15	167	12
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	922			11%	105	4	99	2
Boats & parts	517			15%	76	4	68	4
Chemicals	574			12%	70	3	61	5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	352			15%	52	5	42	5
Other subsectors	1 981			15%	297	21	254	22
Total	5 638			14%	793	53	691	49

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **41 288 \$ million**
 Industry: **17 300 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	2 155	1 210		56%
Industrial imports	9 708	462		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Wood products	46	●	●	3%	2	<0.5	1	<0.5
Ferrous metals	15			9%	1	0	<0.5	1
Skins, leather & products thereof	70	●	●	2%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Machinery	289	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	1
Wood & vegetable material	22			2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 714	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Total	2 155	51%	21%	0%	6	<0.5	3	3

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	93	●	●	7%	6	3	2	2
Mineral products	25			5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Plastics & rubber	27	●	●	4%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Chemicals	12	●	●	6%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Home textiles	13			6%	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	92	●	●	5%	4	2	1	1
Total	261	51%	21%	6%	14	7	4	3

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Peru

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 230 754 \$ million
Industry: 90 686 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	36 062	1 742		5%
Industrial imports	35 611	1 636		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	3 193			4% ■	116	8	47	61
Chemicals	679	●	●	2% ■	15	3	9	4
Wood & vegetable material	137	●	●	6% ■	9	6	2	<0.5
Wool & animal hair (fabric)	186	●	●	4% ■	7	3	3	1
Plastics & rubber	595	●	●	1% ■	5	<0.5	1	4
Other subsectors	31 271	●	●	0% ■	16	1	6	9
Total	36 062	68%	32%	0%	168	20	67	80

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Plastics & rubber	165	●	●	10% ■	16	7	4	6
Apparel	165	●	●	9% ■	16	11	3	2
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	118			10% ■	12	6	3	2
Chemicals	112	●	●	10% ■	11	4	3	3
Machinery	92	●	●	11% ■	10	5	3	3
Other subsectors	318	●	●	10% ■	31	14	8	9
Total	969	68%	32%	10%	96	47	24	25

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 356 551 \$ million
 Industry: 110 531 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	76 259		14 522	19%
Industrial imports	106 646		12 951	12%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	42 955	●		2%	████████████████████	727	476	155	95
Machinery	11 501	●		3%	██████████	323	119	85	118
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	2 910	●		2%	██	49	19	12	18
Chemicals	1 053	●	●	3%	█	35	14	11	10
Miscellaneous manufactured products	1 369	●		1%	█	17	6	4	7
Other subsectors	16 471	●	●	1%	██	96	39	32	24
Total	76 259	55%	17%	2%		1 246	673	300	273

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	7 301	●		7%	████████████████████	515	333	98	85
Machinery	2 868	●		7%	██████████	203	147	34	22
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	692	●		7%	██	51	32	11	8
Miscellaneous manufactured products	355	●		8%	█	28	23	3	2
Plastics & rubber	367	●		6%	██	23	17	3	2
Other subsectors	1 969	●	●	7%	██████████	143	104	26	13
Total	13 551	55%	17%	7%		963	657	175	132

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Poland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	219 096	41 234		19%
Industrial imports	240 356	42 125		18%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Machinery	37 761	●	●	3%	1 112	59	977	76	
Motor vehicles & parts	32 838	●	●	3%	1 104	18	1 072	14	
Plastics & rubber	16 111	●	●	5%	812	23	776	13	
Metal products	11 394	●	●	4%	480	12	461	8	
Ferrous metals	5 295			8%	428	1	423	4	
Other subsectors	115 696	●	●	2%	2 222	59	2 081	83	
Total	219 096	68%	43%	3%	6 159	172	5 790	197	

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	8 845	●	●	14%	1 242	172	1 030	40
Motor vehicles & parts	8 680	●	●	14%	1 223	119	1 077	28
Plastics & rubber	3 613	●	●	14%	511	42	459	11
Electronic equipment	3 598			14%	496	147	332	17
Miscellaneous manufactured products	2 192	●	●	14%	306	42	257	7
Other subsectors	13 729	●	●	14%	1 884	231	1 593	61
Total	40 656	68%	43%	14%	5 663	753	4 746	164

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 250 178 \$ million
 Industry: 81 808 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	60 018	10 289		17%
Industrial imports	77 408	11 133		14%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Machinery	7 090	●	●	3%	191	13	171	8	
Plastics & rubber	4 407	●	●	4%	182	2	177	4	
Motor vehicles & parts	9 521	●	●	2%	151	20	130	1	
Metal products	2 455	●	●	5%	133	3	124	6	
Chemicals	1 993	●	●	6%	126	4	117	4	
Other subsectors	34 551	●	●	2%	741	36	662	42	
Total	60 018	70%	36%	3%	1 524	78	1 380	66	


All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector


MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	2 721	●	●	15%	405	18	384	4
Machinery	1 661	●	●	15%	250	16	231	4
Plastics & rubber	1 013	●	●	15%	148	7	139	3
Apparel	693	●	●	13%	91	8	82	1
Electronic equipment	592	●	●	15%	90	8	80	1
Other subsectors	4 077	●	●	15%	595	35	550	10
Total	10 757	70%	36%	15%	1 579	91	1 465	23

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Republic of Korea

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 1 681 133 \$ million
Industry: 746 423 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	572 486		80 472	14%
Industrial imports	450 756		70 155	16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	41 646			4%	1 616	892	401	322
Electronic equipment	161 239			1%	1 356	1 075	166	116
Machinery	84 475			1%	1 219	725	261	232
Chemicals	35 276			2%	863	566	113	183
Ferrous metals	26 635			3%	724	381	157	187
Other subsectors	223 214			1%	1 919	1 070	424	425
Total	572 486			1%	7 696	4 709	1 522	1 465

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	18 576			10%	1 793	1 201	342	250
Machinery	13 594			11%	1 443	810	400	234
Motor vehicles & parts	11 077			11%	1 197	710	335	151
Plastics & rubber	7 308			9%	667	319	157	191
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	4 118			10%	432	201	133	97
Other subsectors	15 377			10%	1 498	842	381	275
Total	70 050			10%	7 030	4 083	1 749	1 198

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 253 719 \$ million
 Industry: 98 697 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	73 180	13 697	19%	
Industrial imports	87 674	14 675	17%	

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	18 987	●	●	4%	813	43	754	17
Motor vehicles & parts	14 543	●	●	2%	335	5	327	3
Plastics & rubber	4 239	●	●	3%	143	4	135	4
Ferrous metals	2 600			5%	129	2	110	17
Metal products	2 092	●	●	4%	92	3	86	2
Other subsectors	30 720	●	●	2%	505	45	450	10
Total	73 180	75%	43%	3%	2 017	103	1 861	53

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	4 408	●	●	14%	633	54	570	9
Motor vehicles & parts	3 924	●	●	13%	521	34	482	5
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	777			15%	117	15	100	2
Plastics & rubber	841	●	●	14%	115	6	108	1
Electronic equipment	612			15%	94	11	81	2
Other subsectors	3 514	●	●	14%	491	32	454	5
Total	14 076	75%	43%	14%	1 971	152	1 794	25

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Russian Federation

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 709 035 \$ million
Industry: 733 176 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	401 769	18 412		5%
Industrial imports	208 852	15 591		7%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	20 536	●		2%	459	72	332	55
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	16 755	●		2%	311	99	172	39
Plastics & rubber	6 363	●	●	3%	178	46	108	24
Chemicals	10 541	●	●	2%	163	27	121	14
Fertilizers	9 194	●	●	2%	145	16	78	51
Other subsectors	338 381	●	●	0%	524	143	331	51
Total	401 769	56%	44%	0%	1 779	404	1 142	234

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	2 162	●	●	12%	257	89	156	12
Chemicals	1 813	●	●	12%	225	53	162	10
Plastics & rubber	1 616	●	●	12%	188	63	116	10
Motor vehicles & parts	1 483	●	●	11%	165	49	107	8
Ferrous metals	1 093	●		12%	128	49	75	5
Other subsectors	5 944	●	●	11%	668	223	413	33
Total	14 111	56%	44%	12%	1 632	526	1 028	78

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 802 864 \$ million
Industry: 398 221 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	355 153	8 014		2%
Industrial imports	122 834	6 485		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3				to the United States	
Plastics & rubber	22 304			1%	■	266	159	102	5
Chemicals	16 084			2%	■	254	139	97	18
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	1 942			1%	■	22	1	6	14
Synthetic textile fabric	301			3%	■	9	3	4	2
Fertilizers	2 021			0%	■	7	<0.5	<0.5	7
Other subsectors	312 499			0%	■	20	5	9	6
Total	355 153			0%		577	308	218	51

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3				from the United States	
Plastics & rubber	3 365			9%	■	308	108	148	52
Chemicals	1 545			9%	■	146	38	75	33
Machinery	343			8%	■	27	10	13	4
Paper products	162			10%	■	16	8	6	2
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	185			7%	■	13	4	8	2
Other subsectors	877			9%	■	75	29	36	10
Total	6 476			9%		586	197	286	103

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



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
Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Senegal

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **25 817 \$ million**
 Industry: **8 416 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	3 025	64		2%
Industrial imports	9 399	201		2%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States		
Miscellaneous manufactured products	51	●	●	4%	2	<0.5	1	<0.5	
Synthetic textile fabric	17	●	●	7%	1	0	1	1	
Skins, leather & products thereof	6	●	●	12%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	17	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Machinery	49	●	●	1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	
Other subsectors	2 884	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5	
Total	3 025	82%	9%	0%	6	1	4	1	

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States		
Chemicals	66	●	●	7%	4	2	2	<0.5	
Machinery	15	●	●	11%	2	1	1	<0.5	
Miscellaneous manufactured products	13	●	●	10%	1	1	1	<0.5	
Beauty products & perfumes	14	●	●	9%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5	
Motor vehicles & parts	10			12%	1	1	1	<0.5	
Other subsectors	80	●	●	7%	6	2	3	<0.5	
Total	198	82%	9%	8%	15	6	8	1	

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **53 638 \$ million**
 Industry: **23 064 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	16 734	3 821		23%
Industrial imports	24 321	3 238		13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	4 077	●	●	6%	██████████	233	4	226	4
Plastics & rubber	1 855	●	●	4%	██████	78	<0.5	76	1
Ferrous metals	957			5%	████	45	<0.5	44	1
Mineral products	483	●	●	8%	████	37	<0.5	37	<0.5
Metal products	618	●	●	4%	███	26	<0.5	25	<0.5
Other subsectors	8 743	●	●	2%	██████████	140	5	132	3
Total	16 734	70%	54%	3%		559	9	541	9

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	1 099	●	●	14%	██████████	151	17	132	2
Plastics & rubber	405	●	●	13%	██████	53	5	47	1
Motor vehicles & parts	305	●	●	13%	████	41	4	37	<0.5
Chemicals	133	●	●	13%	███	17	1	16	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	129	●	●	13%	███	17	2	15	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 029	●	●	12%	██████████	123	12	110	2
Total	3 100	70%	54%	13%		403	41	355	6

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Singapore

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 373 267 \$ million
Industry: 114 220 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	322 497	33 714		10%
Industrial imports	318 066	37 969		12%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	94 613			1%	554	315	152	87
Chemicals	21 377			2%	345	287	33	25
Plastics & rubber	14 302			2%	324	259	37	29
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	14 392			2%	278	21	97	160
Machinery	35 133			1%	266	137	61	67
Other subsectors	142 680			0%	525	237	176	112
Total	322 497			1%	2 292	1 255	557	480

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	14 618			8%	1 200	671	305	224
Machinery	6 563			9%	569	244	187	138
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	3 540			10%	345	119	116	109
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	2 863			12%	335	42	144	149
Chemicals	2 825			9%	260	82	88	90
Other subsectors	7 457			8%	613	229	210	174
Total	37 867			9%	3 321	1 387	1 050	884

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 110 199 \$ million
Industry: 44 961 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	86 431	13 328		15%
Industrial imports	83 139	16 040		19%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3		to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	14 064	●	●	4%	██████████	555	34	504	17
Motor vehicles & parts	32 209	●	●	1%	██████████	353	8	343	3
Ferrous metals	3 612			7%	██████████	252	<0.5	250	2
Plastics & rubber	4 728	●	●	4%	██████████	193	2	188	3
Electronic equipment	10 165			1%	██████████	135	4	127	5
Other subsectors	21 653	●	●	3%	██████████	579	10	563	5
Total	86 431	75%	31%	2%		2 068	58	1 975	36

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020					
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3		from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	7 296	●	●	15%	██████████	1 085	32	1 049	4
Machinery	2 887	●	●	15%	██████████	433	23	407	3
Electronic equipment	2 015			14%	██████████	286	26	257	2
Plastics & rubber	834	●	●	15%	██████████	127	2	124	1
Metal products	2 521	●	●	15%	██████████	62	2	59	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 217	●	●	15%	██████████	376	10	364	2
Total	15 956	75%	31%	15%		2 369	96	2 260	12

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Slovenia

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 56 283 \$ million
Industry: 23 358 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	39 277	6 529		17%
Industrial imports	40 863	6 666		16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	7 270	●	●	3%	208	16	186	6
Plastics & rubber	2 350	●	●	5%	125	2	117	6
Ferrous metals	1 405	●	●	7%	99	2	89	8
Motor vehicles & parts	7 691	●	●	1%	80	3	77	1
Metal products	1 612	●	●	4%	68	2	65	1
Other subsectors	18 948	●	●	2%	348	7	329	12
Total	39 277	60%	38%	2%	928	32	863	33

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	2 019	●	●	13%	264	17	246	2
Machinery	1 630	●	●	14%	222	25	195	2
Plastics & rubber	539	●	●	13%	69	5	63	1
Miscellaneous manufactured products	268	●	●	14%	37	4	33	<0.5
Metal products	235	●	●	14%	32	2	29	<0.5
Other subsectors	2 217	●	●	12%	263	26	233	4
Total	6 908	60%	38%	13%	888	80	798	10

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 375 293 \$ million
 Industry: 138 858 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	100 072	6 588		7%
Industrial imports	79 290	9 589		12%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3				
Ferrous metals	6 027			3%	155	27	88	40
Chemicals	4 327	●	●	3%	111	9	52	50
Precious metals	10 741	●	●	1%	71	35	20	16
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	2 857			2%	71	25	32	15
Motor vehicles & parts	12 434	●	●	0%	29	2	24	3
Other subsectors	63 686	●	●	0%	150	19	90	40
Total	100 072	72%	25%	1%	588	117	306	164

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3				
Motor vehicles & parts	3 204	●	●	11%	353	110	205	38
Machinery	1 276	●	●	12%	153	60	79	14
Chemicals	757	●	●	12%	89	26	51	12
Precious metals	556	●	●	11%	60	25	31	4
Plastics & rubber	470	●	●	11%	51	18	27	5
Other subsectors	2 678	●	●	10%	274	111	138	24
Total	8 941	72%	25%	11%	980	351	532	98

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Spain

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 1 472 280 \$ million
 Industry: 431 378 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	273 502	40 654		15%
Industrial imports	332 489	47 614		14%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	32 760			3% ■	898	52	732	114
Plastics & rubber	16 811			5% ■	803	36	717	50
Chemicals	16 663			4% ■	592	37	511	45
Motor vehicles & parts	57 979			1% ■	535	15	511	9
Ferrous metals	9 493			6% ■	529	7	494	28
Other subsectors	139 797			1% ■	2 028	117	1 808	103
Total	273 502			2%	5 385	264	4 772	348


All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector


MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	15 111			13% ■	2 035	169	1 820	46
Machinery	7 043			14% ■	1 012	138	843	30
Plastics & rubber	3 881			13% ■	522	55	447	20
Chemicals	2 894			14% ■	401	47	339	15
Apparel	1 853			12% ■	218	50	164	4
Other subsectors	13 835			14% ■	1 917	237	1 599	81
Total	44 618			14%	6 104	696	5 211	197

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.

PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 572 766 \$ million
 Industry: 196 459 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	154 156	23 404		15%
Industrial imports	140 281	23 005		16%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	26 047	●	●	2%	557	90	402	65
Ferrous metals	7 688			7%	511	61	404	47
Motor vehicles & parts	26 737	●	●	1%	349	36	302	10
Plastics & rubber	6 230	●	●	5%	300	28	232	39
Chemicals	6 049	●	●	4%	230	14	194	23
Other subsectors	81 405	●	●	1%	1 100	119	886	95
Total	154 156	69%	26%	2%	3 047	347	2 420	280

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	6 698	●	●	15%	973	56	898	20
Machinery	5 419	●	●	14%	784	69	687	28
Electronic equipment	1 667			15%	243	31	202	11
Plastics & rubber	1 267	●	●	14%	182	8	169	5
Paper products	1 274	●	●	14%	180	13	159	8
Other subsectors	6 216	●	●	13%	835	67	736	32
Total	22 541	69%	26%	14%	3 197	243	2 851	103

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Switzerland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

■ Agriculture
■ Industry
■ Services



Total GDP: 723 969 \$ million
Industry: 199 816 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	307 760	25 537		8%
Industrial imports	261 756	26 295		10%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Machinery	31 481			3%	869	142	645	82
Chemicals	21 654			2%	413	33	322	58
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	41 354			1%	406	59	273	74
Plastics & rubber	5 400			7%	392	22	341	29
Metal products	4 946			5%	249	21	205	23
Other subsectors	202 924			1%	1 259	109	1 053	97
Total	307 760			1%	3 588	386	2 838	364

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Machinery	6 044			15%	918	52	827	39
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	5 877			15%	868	72	739	57
Chemicals	2 097			14%	289	25	240	23
Plastics & rubber	1 151			15%	177	9	160	8
Precious metals	1 035			14%	148	9	133	6
Other subsectors	9 680			14%	1 351	97	1 181	82
Total	25 885			14%	3 750	254	3 280	215

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: **8 203 \$ million**
 Industry: **3 191 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	954		92	10%
Industrial imports	3 033		40	1%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	179			2%	4	0	4	<0.5
Cotton (fabric)	153	●	●	0%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	7	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	0	0
Machinery	4	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Precious metals	<0.5			16%	<0.5	<0.5	0	0
Other subsectors	610	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	954	71%	45%	0%	5	1	4	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	16			9%	1	1	<0.5	<0.5
Cotton (fabric)	25	●	●	2%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Mineral products	5	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Apparel	5	●	●	8%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	3	●	●	11%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	7	●	●	7%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	61	71%	45%	6%	4	3	<0.5	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Thailand

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	227 916	44 592		20%
Industrial imports	204 010	39 627		19%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Electronic equipment	53 336	●		3%	1 553	1 024	284	245
Plastics & rubber	25 403	●		2%	551	303	129	120
Machinery	31 956	●		2%	544	202	210	132
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	7 494			3%	204	147	34	24
Chemicals	9 152	●		2%	139	100	15	24
Other subsectors	100 575	●		1%	753	322	266	166
Total	227 916	64%		2%	3 745	2 098	937	711

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Electronic equipment	9 746	●		8%	776	558	104	115
Machinery	6 967	●		7%	510	341	113	56
Motor vehicles & parts	7 276	●		7%	495	300	125	70
Plastics & rubber	4 974	●		6%	322	199	73	50
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	1 408			8%	113	68	30	16
Other subsectors	8 152	●		7%	579	364	141	74
Total	38 523	64%		7%	2 795	1 829	586	380

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 792 205 \$ million
Industry: 314 505 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value		Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	166 353		20 588	12%
Industrial imports	191 857		25 059	13%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	29 934	●	●	2%	495	2	477	16
Machinery	22 464	●	●	2%	349	13	316	20
Plastics & rubber	9 581	●	●	3%	277	6	244	27
Ferrous metals	11 613	●	●	2%	237	2	220	16
Metal products	7 366	●	●	3%	215	9	189	17
Other subsectors	85 395	●	●	1%	975	64	809	102
Total	166 353	69%	28%	2%	2 548	96	2 255	197

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Motor vehicles & parts	6 908	●	●	12%	836	141	657	37
Machinery	4 787	●	●	13%	601	146	420	35
Apparel	2 267	●	●	11%	239	81	152	6
Plastics & rubber	2 002	●	●	11%	220	47	159	15
Metal products	955	●	●	11%	108	26	76	6
Other subsectors	7 422	●	●	11%	821	182	579	60
Total	24 343	69%	28%	12%	2 824	623	2 043	159

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019



Total GDP: 2 946 003 \$ million
Industry: 824 881 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	423 191	51 282		12%
Industrial imports	629 281	66 873		11%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	50 987			2%	1 143	118	200
Plastics & rubber	14 367			6%	816	51	97
Chemicals	26 477			3%	789	44	96
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	35 310			1%	422	9	123
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	19 642			2%	415	44	103
Other subsectors	276 407			1%	2 984	260	409
Total	423 191			2%	6 570	526	1 027

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Motor vehicles & parts	15 411			13%	2 080	234	159
Machinery	11 817			14%	1 614	238	192
Aircrafts, spacecrafts & parts	5 956			12%	723	78	229
Electronic equipment	4 551			14%	621	128	80
Chemicals	4 320			14%	603	71	55
Other subsectors	22 882			13%	3 060	469	312
Total	64 938			13%	8 701	1 218	1 027

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 21 390 245 \$ million
 Industry: 4 620 293 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade	Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	1 485 087	189 983	13%
Industrial imports	2 310 818	229 470	10%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States
Machinery	205 441			1% ■	2 131	722	1 409
Plastics & rubber	79 728			2% ■	1 529	569	960
Chemicals	96 853			1% ■	1 441	495	946
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	94 584			1% ■	1 030	317	713
Electronic equipment	128 106			1% ■	914	422	492
Other subsectors	880 375			0% ■	3 432	1 009	2 424
Total	1 485 087			1%	10 478	3 534	6 944

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Machinery	47 215			7% ■	3 267	1 494	1 773
Motor vehicles & parts	42 127			6% ■	2 431	1 161	1 270
Electronic equipment	26 613			7% ■	1 743	1 028	715
Optical products, watches & medical instruments	20 568			8% ■	1 617	673	944
Plastics & rubber	18 022			6% ■	1 156	449	707
Other subsectors	66 294			7% ■	4 664	1 845	2 819
Total	220 839			7%	14 879	6 651	8 228

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Uruguay

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 60 775 \$ million
Industry: 20 177 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	4 061		483	12%
Industrial imports	8 508		560	7%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Wool & animal hair (fabric)	197	●	●	4%	8	6	1	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	197	●	●	2%	4	2	1	1
Wood & vegetable material	1 014			0%	3	1	1	1
Paper products	913	●	●	0%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Chemicals	207	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	2	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 532	●	●	0%	3	<0.5	2	1
Total	4 061	74%	31%	1%	21	10	9	2

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
PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Paper products	101	●	●	5%	5	2	2	1
Plastics & rubber	59	●	●	6%	4	1	2	1
Motor vehicles & parts	53			7%	4	2	2	1
Chemicals	40	●	●	6%	3	1	1	1
Machinery	27	●	●	8%	2	1	1	<0.5
Other subsectors	209	●	●	6%	12	5	4	3
Total	488	74%	31%	6%	28	11	11	6

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
PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples




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Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: **27 578 \$ million**
 Industry: **11 831 \$ million**

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	8 309	768		9%
Industrial imports	5 843	271		5%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	6 535	●	●	1%	68	57	11	<0.5
Jewelry & precious metal articles	234	●	●	1%	2	<0.5	<0.5	2
Ferrous metals	79	●	●	2%	2	0	2	<0.5
Wood & vegetable material	47	●	●	1%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	0
Machinery	124	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	1 290	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	8 309	99%	13%	1%	72	57	13	2

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States	
Metals (except ferrous and precious)	211	●	●	2%	4	3	1	<0.5
Machinery	35	●	●	7%	2	2	1	<0.5
Chemicals	46	●	●	3%	1	1	1	<0.5
Metal products	10	●	●	5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Motor vehicles & parts	10	●	●	5%	1	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	89	●	●	3%	2	1	1	<0.5
Total	402	99%	13%	3%	11	7	3	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.


Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Zimbabwe

Industry snapshot, 2019

GDP COMPOSITION, 2019

- Agriculture
- Industry
- Services



Total GDP: 28 930 \$ million
Industry: 12 238 \$ million

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS, 2019

	Total trade		Supply chain trade	
	Value	Value	Value	Share in total
Industrial exports	3 862	81		2%
Industrial imports	3 751	120		3%

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise.

Annual projections, 2020: International supply chain disruption by COVID-19

PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN EXPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Exports of industrial inputs, 2020				
	Export	SME presence	Women employment	Total export loss to the G3	to China	to the European Union	to the United States	
Ferrous metals	316	●	●	2%	6	2	3	1
Skins, leather & products thereof	48	●	●	3%	1	<0.5	1	<0.5
Cotton (fabric)	50	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	0
Jewelry & precious metal articles	15	●	●	1%	<0.5	0	<0.5	<0.5
Miscellaneous manufactured products	6	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	3 427	●	●	0%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Total	3 862	57%	13%	0%	8	2	5	1

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED SUPPLY CHAIN IMPORT LOSS, by sector

MOST AFFECTED SECTORS	SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS, 2019			EXPECTED LOSS: Imports of industrial inputs, 2020			
	Required imported inputs	SME presence	Women employment	Total import loss from the G3	from China	from the European Union	from the United States
Ferrous metals	44	●	●	3%	1	1	<0.5
Machinery	6	●	●	4%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Skins, leather & products thereof	8	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Paper products	6	●	●	2%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Apparel	3	●	●	4%	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Other subsectors	44	●	●	2%	1	1	<0.5
Total	112	57%	13%	2%	3	2	<0.5

All figures are in \$ million, unless specified otherwise. Green dot: share above the average. Red dot: share below the average. Blank cells: data is not available or not applicable.


PROJECTED EXPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



PROJECTED IMPORT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL INPUTS

Examples



Note: The supply chain disruption scenario assumes a two-month long complete shutdown of industrial production in the G3, including China, the European Union, and the United States in 2020. Percentages indicate the share of the expected loss of supply chain exports (imports) with the G3 in 2020 in the total annual exports to (imports from) all partner countries, as measured in 2019. Supply chain trade is defined as the flows of inputs used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country. For further detail see Technical Annex.

Data source: ITC Market Analysis Tools for trade statistics (2019), IMF and WBG for GDP (2019), World Bank Enterprise Surveys for SME presences and women employment (2017-2019).

Technical Annex

Technical Annex

Annex 1. Definitions

Competitiveness

This report follows the following definition of competitiveness, elaborated in detail in the first edition of the *SME Competitiveness Outlook* (ITC, 2015):

Competitiveness is the demonstrated ability to design, produce and commercialize an offer, which fully, uniquely and continuously fulfils the needs of targeted market segments, while connecting with and drawing resources from the business ecosystem, and achieving a sustainable return on the resources employed.

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

An internationally harmonized definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises does not exist. For feasibility and comparability reasons, this report classifies companies based on the number of full-time employees:

- Micro: up to 4 employees
- Small: 5 to 19 employees
- Medium: 20 to 99 employees
- Large: 100 or more employees.

Industry

An industry is defined as any product belonging to the following sectors (Table A.1.). For further details on the correspondence between products and sectors, see ITC Export Potential Map online.

TABLE A.1. Industrial sectors

Sector	Subsector
Apparel & textile products	Apparel
	Carpets
	Home textiles
	Textile products not elsewhere classified
Chemicals	Beauty products & perfumes
	Chemicals
	Fertilizers
	Pharmaceutical components

Sector	Subsector
Machinery & electronic equipment	Electronic equipment
	Machinery
Minerals, metals & products thereof	Ferrous metals
	Jewellery & precious metal articles
	Metal products
	Metals (except ferrous and precious)
	Mineral products
	Pearls & (semi-)precious stones
Other manufactured products	Ceramic articles
	Glass articles
	Miscellaneous manufactured products
	Musical instruments & parts
	Optical products, watches & medical instruments
	Skins, leather, product thereof and footwear
Skins, leather & products thereof	
Textile (fabric)	Cotton (fabric)
	Natural fabric (except cotton, silk & animal hair)
	Silk (fabric)
	Synthetic textile fabric
	Textile fabric not elsewhere classified
	Wool & animal hair (fabric)
Vehicles	Aircraft, spacecraft & parts
	Bicycles, carriages & parts
	Boats & parts
	Motor vehicles & parts
	Trains & parts
Wood, paper, rubber, plastics	Natural latex & rubber
	Paper products
	Plastics & rubber
	Wood & vegetable material
	Wood products

Annex 2. Data sources

ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey

On 21 April 2020 the International Trade Centre (ITC) launched a worldwide online survey to assess the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic on global businesses. The analysis of this report is based on data collected between 21 April and 2 June 2020. However, data collection is still ongoing and subsequent analysis of the ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey might not match with data in this report.

The ITC COVID-19 Business Impact Survey collected data on 4467 companies in 132 countries. The sample was spread across different regions (Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania), sectors (primary, manufacturing and services) and size (micro, small, medium and large) and it included both exporting and non-exporting firms. See Annex 4 for the country-specific metadata.

Trade values, export potential and trade policy

Values for monthly and yearly merchandise trade, estimates of export potential and trade policies enacted in response to COVID-19 are sourced from ITC Market Analysis Tools accessible online, and reflect the data available as of 17 May 2020. Monthly data covers January, February and March 2020, except for China where the analysis is based on the data of the first quarter 2020 (see Table A.2. to A.6. for further details).

GDP data and forecasts

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an estimate of 2019 GDP in current US dollars based on the 2018 GDP in current US dollars from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), and projected to 2019 using the nominal growth between

2018 and 2019 in current international dollars from the International Monetary Fund. Output shares by sector are based on 2018 value added by sector from WDI. Output shares correspond to 2015 for Canada and 2010 for Barbados.

SME participation and women employment

The SME presence (measured by the level of participation of SMEs in the sector), and women's employment (measured by the share of female employment in sector) are calculated using the latest available data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys (2007-2019). The indicator is green if the share of SMEs and women employed in the sector are above the respective national trade-weighted averages; the indicator is red otherwise. Blank cells mean the data is not available.


Annex 3. Methodological note for country profiles

Supply chain trade

International supply chain trade is defined as the flow of inputs (expressed in US dollars, in gross terms) used in production located in at least two countries, with produced goods consumed in a third country.

Using a novel approach, the methodology first constructs input-output tables at the product level, including technical coefficients that specify inputs requirements for each input-output pair, as described in ITC (2018) Value Chain Indicator: adding value to national exports and developing cross-country production chains. Then, the methodology estimates the US dollars value of inputs required to produce and export each output for about 4,700 products at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System.

FIGURE A.1. Supply chain trade subject to COVID19 disruptions



Source: Adapted from Solleder et al (2020, forthcoming) "The role of supply chains in COVID-19 related trade disruptions".

The approach assumes that economies with input requirements exceeding the imported inputs source the exceeding amounts locally. In the absence of the detailed production data, the calculations are based on the value of the imported inputs when it is below the value of required inputs, and on the value of the required inputs in case imported inputs exceed the requirements. The distribution of required input import values among supplying partners at country and product level is assumed to follow the distribution of input imports.

The estimation uses yearly trade of 2019 reported to the ITC Trade Map by 85 countries and territories. The analysis of 60 other countries, for which 2019 data is not available, is based on reported trade data of 2018. The calculations for the remaining countries are based on so called "mirror data", i.e. trade statistics constructed using the data reported by partner countries. The direct and mirror data are consolidated in the following way: simple average is used to average the direct and mirror data when both reporting countries are reliable reporters, and when both countries are considered non-reliable reporters. When only one is a reliable reporter, the bilateral trade values are sourced from that reporter.

Assuming that the CIF/FOB ratio is small in the reports of the same bilateral trade flow, the reliability of reported trade is detected as follows. Each country's absolute difference between direct and mirror reports of bilateral trade (for exports and imports separately) of each product and with each partner is assessed. If this difference (weighted by the partner's reliability) accounts for more than half of the country's total exports or imports, the assessed country "loses" its reliable reporter status. The assessment is made recursively through a number of iterations until there are no changes in reliability status.

International supply chain disruption caused by COVID-19

Projected annual reductions of supply chain trade in 2020 is based on the assumption that the world's three major supply chain trade hubs (China, the European Union and the United States – G3, who represent 63% of supply chain imports and 64% of supply chain exports) are experiencing in 2020 the equivalent of a two-month long complete shutdown of all manufacturing production. Based on this assumption, the dollar value of the supply chain disruption is calculated as 17% (two months out of 12) of the supply chain imports and 17% of the supply chain exports. The data for the European Union include the EU27 and the United Kingdom, for consistency across time periods. The intra-EU trade flows are not included in the calculations, unless specified otherwise.

Figure A.1 presents how trade disruptions caused by COVID19 containment measures directly affect partner countries through international supply chains

Africa

TABLE A.2. Africa: Countries and territories covered and data availability

Country	Group	Yearly trade data	Monthly trade data	COVID-19 trade policy measures regulating		ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey: No of responses
				Export	Import	
Algeria		mirror		restrictive	liberalizing	7
Angola	LDC	mirror			liberalizing	1
Benin	LDC	mirror				61

These predictions evaluate the direct shock to inputs (or intermediate goods). The direct shock refers to the first immediate links of the international supply chains and do not take into account the supply chain contagion, i.e. the notion that shock will propagate from partner countries to the partner countries of partner countries and so on. We abstract from other types of shock possibly affecting GVCs, such as quantitative restrictions, domestic quarantine requirements or shrinking aggregate demand and investment. The methodology considers only the industrial sector (agriculture and services are not included). Furthermore, the objective is to signal where the disruption can take place, setting aside sectors that are likely to benefit from the structural changes in demand, such as increased purchases of personal protective equipment or the office equipment for teleworking.

Several other caveats need to be kept in mind. The methodology is forward looking (projecting of what is likely to happen in 2020) and is based on the assumptions about the future, which may not hold. It considers a scenario in which G3 countries resume full industrial production after the first wave of COVID-19 has passed, which may be optimistic if the world plunges into recession or multiple waves of infection. Moreover, the underlying supply chain linkages (inputs required to produce each output) and technical coefficients specifying how much of each input is required are assumed to be identical in all countries. They are calculated using input-output matrices of Mexico, the Philippines and the United States (due to the data availability), which may not correspond to the technical coefficients and the production structure of other countries.

Given the abovementioned caveats and assumptions, the figures for the international supply chain disruption caused by COVID-19 induced factory shutdowns in G3 should be treated as an indication of the order of magnitude of the potential disruption in 2020 rather than as a direct dollar value of the disruption.

Annex 4. Data availability for analysed countries and regions

Country profiles predicting the international supply chain disruption caused by the factory shutdowns in G3 due to COVID-19 are available for all 85 countries and territories for which reported direct trade data for 2019 and GDP value and composition are available. Aggregations for geographic regions, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states are based on directly reported data and mirror statistics (i.e. data imputed from the reports of partner countries) for 219 countries and territories (for further details refer to Tables A.2. to A.6 below).

Botswana	LLDC	2018		restrictive	restrictive	11
Burkina Faso	LDC, LLDC	mirror				1446
Burundi	LDC, LLDC	mirror				
Cabo Verde	SIDS	2018				
Cameroon		mirror			liberalizing	39
Central African Republic	LDC, LLDC	mirror				1
Chad	LDC, LLDC	mirror			liberalizing	5
Comoros	LDC, SIDS	mirror				1
Congo		mirror				6
Côte d'Ivoire		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	273
Democratic Republic of the Congo	LDC	mirror			liberalizing	8
Djibouti	LDC	mirror				
Egypt		2018		restrictive	restrictive	25
Equatorial Guinea		mirror				
Eritrea	LDC	mirror				
Eswatini	LLDC	2019		restrictive		
Ethiopia	LDC, LLDC	mirror				9
Gabon		mirror				19
The Gambia	LDC	mirror				28
Ghana		mirror				26
Guinea	LDC	mirror				43
Guinea-Bissau	LDC, SIDS	mirror				1
Kenya		2018		restrictive	lib. and res.	66
Lesotho	LDC, LLDC	mirror		restrictive		
Liberia	LDC	mirror				2
Libya		mirror		restrictive		
Madagascar	LDC	2019	Q1 2020			70
Malawi	LDC, LLDC	mirror				
Mali	LDC, LLDC	mirror		restrictive		7
Mauritania	LDC	mirror			liberalizing	1
Mauritius	SIDS	2019			lib. and res.	3
Morocco		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	31
Mozambique	LDC	mirror	Q1 2020			5
Namibia		2019		restrictive		
Niger	LDC, LLDC	mirror			liberalizing	3
Nigeria		mirror				83
Rwanda	LDC, LLDC	mirror				7
Sao Tome and Principe	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Senegal	LDC	mirror				32
Seychelles	SIDS	mirror				
Sierra Leone	LDC	mirror				2
Somalia	LDC	mirror				6
South Africa		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	24
South Sudan	LDC, LLDC	mirror				
Sudan	LDC	mirror				
Togo	LDC	mirror			liberalizing	7
Tunisia		mirror				13
Uganda	LDC, LLDC	mirror			restrictive	29

United Republic of Tanzania	LDC	2018				9
Zambia	LDC, LLDC	mirror		liberalizing	liberalizing	15
Zimbabwe	LLDC	mirror		restrictive	liberalizing	16

Notes:

1. Countries and territories indicated in bold are included in the country profiles.
2. Cells are left empty when information is not applicable.
3. LDC stands for least developed country, LLDC – for landlocked developing country, and SIDS – for small island developing States.
4. Mirror indicates that the trade statistics was constructed using the data of partner countries.
5. 'Lib' indicates liberalizing trade policy measures, while 'res' indicates restrictive trade policy measures enacted in response to COVID-19.
6. The ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey and monitoring of the trade related measures are ongoing; the analysis in this report is based on the survey data as of 2 June 2020, and policy data as of 4 May.

Americas

TABLE A.3. Americas: Countries and territories covered and data availability

Country	Group	Yearly trade data	Monthly trade data	COVID-19 trade policy measures regulating		ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey: No of responses
				Export	Import	
Anguilla	SIDS	mirror			liberalizing	
Antigua and Barbuda	SIDS	mirror				
Argentina		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	7
Aruba	SIDS	mirror				
Bahamas	SIDS	mirror			restrictive	
Barbados	SIDS	mirror				
Belize	SIDS	2019			liberalizing	
Bermuda		mirror				
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	LLDC	2018			liberalizing	8
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba	SIDS	mirror				
Brazil		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	43
Canada		2019			liberalizing	4
Cayman Islands		mirror				
Chile		2019			liberalizing	2
Colombia		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	115
Costa Rica		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	20
Cuba	SIDS	mirror				1
Curaçao	SIDS	mirror				
Dominica	SIDS	mirror				
Dominican Republic	SIDS	2018			liberalizing	4
Ecuador		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	11
El Salvador		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	12
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)		mirror				
Greenland		2018				
Grenada	SIDS	mirror				
Guatemala		2019			liberalizing	17
Guyana	SIDS	mirror				
Haiti	LDC, SIDS	mirror				1
Honduras		2018		restrictive		5
Jamaica	SIDS	2018				4

Mexico		2019				25
Montserrat	SIDS	mirror				
Nicaragua		2018				15
Panama		mirror			liberalizing	8
Paraguay	LLDC	2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Peru		2019			liberalizing	65
Saint Kitts and Nevis	SIDS	mirror			liberalizing	
Saint Lucia	SIDS	mirror				5
Saint Pierre and Miquelon		mirror				
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	SIDS	mirror			liberalizing	
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	SIDS	mirror				
Suriname	SIDS	mirror				
Trinidad and Tobago	SIDS	mirror				
Turks and Caicos Islands		mirror				
United States of America		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	10
Uruguay		2019			liberalizing	3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)		mirror				5
Virgin Islands (British)	SIDS	mirror				

Notes:

1. Countries and territories indicated in bold are included in the country profiles.
2. Cells are left empty when information is not applicable.
3. LDC stands for least developed country, LLDC – for landlocked developing country, and SIDS – for small island developing States.
4. Mirror indicates that the trade statistics was constructed using the data of partner countries.
5. 'Lib' indicates liberalizing trade policy measures, while 'res' indicates restrictive trade policy measures enacted in response to COVID-19.
6. The ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey and monitoring of the trade related measures are ongoing; the analysis in this report is based on the survey data as of 2 June 2020, and policy data as of 4 May.

Asia**TABLE A.4.** Asia: Countries and territories covered and data availability

Country	Group	Yearly trade data	Monthly trade data	COVID-19 trade policy measures regulating		ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey: No of responses
				Export	Import	
Afghanistan	LDC, LLDC	mirror				5
Armenia	LLDC	2019		restrictive	liberalizing	1
Azerbaijan	LLDC	2019		restrictive	liberalizing	2
Bahrain		2018	Q1 2020	restrictive		
Bangladesh	LDC	mirror			liberalizing	16
Bhutan	LDC, LLDC	mirror				42
Brunei Darussalam		2018				
Cambodia	LDC	mirror		restrictive		4
China		2019	Jan, Feb 2020	restrictive	lib. and res.	169
Chinese Taipei		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	5
Cyprus		mirror	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea		mirror				
Georgia		2019		restrictive	lib. and res.	2
Hong Kong SAR		mirror				1

India		2019		lib. and res.	liberalizing	72
Indonesia		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	18
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		mirror		restrictive		10
Iraq		mirror				
Israel		2019		restrictive		
Japan		2019	Q1 2020		liberalizing	5
Jordan		mirror			restrictive	26
Kazakhstan	LLDC	2019		restrictive	liberalizing	
Kuwait		mirror		restrictive		
Kyrgyzstan	LLDC	mirror		restrictive	liberalizing	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	LDC, LLDC	mirror			liberalizing	1
Lebanon		mirror		restrictive		2
Macao SAR		mirror				
Malaysia		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	3
Maldives	SIDS	mirror			liberalizing	
Mongolia	LLDC	mirror				4
Myanmar	LDC	mirror		restrictive		343
Nepal	LDC, LLDC	mirror		restrictive		33
Oman		mirror		restrictive		
Pakistan		2018		lib. and res.	liberalizing	11
Philippines		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	461
Qatar		mirror			liberalizing	2
Republic of Korea		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	9
Saudi Arabia		2019		restrictive		3
Singapore	SIDS	2019			liberalizing	
Sri Lanka		mirror			lib. and res.	65
State of Palestine		mirror				38
Syrian Arab Republic		mirror		restrictive		
Tajikistan	LLDC	2019		restrictive		
Thailand		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	6
Timor-Leste	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Turkey		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	97
Turkmenistan	LLDC	mirror				1
United Arab Emirates		2018				8
Uzbekistan	LLDC	2018		restrictive	liberalizing	2
Viet Nam		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	10
Yemen	LDC	mirror				

Notes:

1. Countries and territories indicated in bold are included in the country profiles.
2. Cells are left empty when information is not applicable.
3. LDC stands for least developed country, LLDC – for landlocked developing country, and SIDS – for small island developing States.
4. Mirror indicates that the trade statistics was constructed using the data of partner countries.
5. 'Lib' indicates liberalizing trade policy measures, while 'res' indicates restrictive trade policy measures enacted in response to COVID-19.
6. The ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey and monitoring of the trade related measures are ongoing; the analysis in this report is based on the survey data as of 2 June 2020, and policy data as of 4 May.

Europe

TABLE A.5. Europe: Countries and territories covered and data availability

Country	Group	Yearly trade data	Monthly trade data	COVID-19 trade policy measures regulating		ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey: No of responses
				Export	Import	
Albania		mirror		restrictive		4
Andorra		mirror				
Austria		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Belarus		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	1
Belgium		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina		2019	Q1 2020			2
Bulgaria		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Croatia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Czechia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Denmark		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Estonia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Faroe Islands		mirror				
Finland		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
France		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	9
Germany		2019	Q1 2020	lib. and res.	liberalizing	6
Gibraltar		mirror			liberalizing	
Greece		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	2
Hungary		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	3
Iceland		2019	Q1 2020			
Ireland		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Italy		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	18
Latvia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Lithuania		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Luxembourg		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Malta		mirror	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	2
Montenegro		2018				
Netherlands		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	4
North Macedonia	LLDC	2019		restrictive		1
Norway		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Poland		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	4
Portugal		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	6
Republic of Moldova	LLDC	2018		restrictive		3
Romania		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	3
Russian Federation		2019		restrictive	lib. and res.	5
Serbia		2019		restrictive	liberalizing	2
Slovakia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	
Slovenia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	4
Spain		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	25
Sweden		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	1
Switzerland		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	7

Ukraine		2018		restrictive	liberalizing	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	liberalizing	14

Notes:

1. Countries and territories indicated in bold are included in the country profiles.
2. Cells are left empty when information is not applicable.
3. LDC stands for least developed country, LLDC – for landlocked developing country, and SIDS – for small island developing States.
4. Mirror indicates that the trade statistics was constructed using the data of partner countries.
5. 'Lib' indicates liberalizing trade policy measures, while 'res' indicates restrictive trade policy measures enacted in response to COVID-19.
6. The ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey and monitoring of the trade related measures are ongoing; the analysis in this report is based on the survey data as of 2 June 2020, and policy data as of 4 May.

Oceania

TABLE A.6. Oceania: Countries and territories covered and data availability

Country	Group	Yearly trade data	Monthly trade data	COVID-19 trade policy measures regulating		ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey: No of responses
				Export	Import	
American Samoa	SIDS	mirror				
Australia		2019	Q1 2020	restrictive	restrictive	10
Cook Islands	SIDS	mirror				
Fiji	SIDS	mirror			lib. and res.	2
French Polynesia	SIDS	mirror				
Guam	SIDS	mirror				
Kiribati	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Marshall Islands	SIDS	mirror				
Federated States of Micronesia	SIDS	mirror				
Nauru	SIDS	mirror				
New Caledonia	SIDS	mirror				
New Zealand		2019	Q1 2020		liberalizing	3
Niue	SIDS	mirror				
Norfolk Island		mirror				
Northern Mariana Islands	SIDS	mirror				
Palau	SIDS	mirror				
Papua New Guinea	SIDS	mirror				
Samoa	SIDS	mirror			liberalizing	1
Solomon Islands	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Tokelau		mirror				
Tonga	SIDS	mirror				
Tuvalu	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Vanuatu	LDC, SIDS	mirror				
Wallis and Futuna		mirror				

Notes:

1. Countries and territories indicated in bold are included in the country profiles.
2. Cells are left empty when information is not applicable.
3. LDC stands for least developed country, LLDC – for landlocked developing country, and SIDS – for small island developing States.
4. Mirror indicates that the trade statistics was constructed using the data of partner countries.
5. 'Lib' indicates liberalizing trade policy measures, while 'res' indicates restrictive trade policy measures enacted in response to COVID-19.
6. The ITC COVID-19 Impact Survey and monitoring of the trade related measures are ongoing; the analysis in this report is based on the survey data as of 2 June 2020, and policy data as of 4 May.

Endnotes and References

Endnotes

1. Figures reflect data from all countries that had data available for both periods. For instance, the February 2019 to February 2020 evolution is based on data from 54 countries, representing 65% of world exports (Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malta, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey and the United States). For the change between March 2019 and March 2020, the data are from 35 countries, representing 60% of world exports (Aruba, Australia, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey and the United States).
2. China reports January and February 2020 together and hence Chinese direct data are not used for these two months; instead data from China's trading partners about its exports are used.
3. This value was computed excluding Chinese exports to Bahrain, as continuous data for Bahrain's monthly imports are only available since 2014.
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5. Gopinath et al. (2016)
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7. See country pages in this report.
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Increasing annual investments in small and medium-sized enterprises by \$1 trillion would yield disproportionate dividends in terms of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. These investments also have the potential to deliver healthy returns for investors.

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Digitalization and the rise of the platform economy are rapidly changing the way in which firms do business. A strong business ecosystem is necessary to manage this change. The [SME Competitiveness Outlook 2018](#) tells how to build it.

The report combines data analysis, academic insights, thought leader views and case studies to guide policymakers, businesses, and trade and investment support institutions in designing the business ecosystem that is necessary for small businesses to embrace and benefit from industry 4.0. This year's edition includes 50 country profiles on SME competitiveness, with a focus on strengths and weaknesses of the business ecosystem.

2017: The region: A door to global trade



The [SME Competitiveness Outlook 2017](#) focuses on regions as a stepping-stone to international value chains for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It provides new evidence showing that deep regional integration is good for SMEs. These agreements can be both powerful and inclusive.

It finds that deep regional trade agreements help deliver inclusive growth. These agreements attract value chain activity and narrow the competitiveness gap between large and small firms. When investment is part of such agreements, the impact is stronger. The report provides targeted advice for policymakers, businesses, and trade and investment support institutions.

2016: Meeting the standard for trade



The [SME Competitiveness Outlook 2016](#) focuses on standards and regulations. The report combines data analysis, academic insights, thought leader opinions and case studies to provide guidance for policymakers, business managers and standard setters.


Standards and regulations have a major impact on SME competitiveness. By meeting the standard for trade, SMEs increase their chances to connect to international value chains and consumers in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner. The report contains governance insights for voluntary sustainability standards; new evidence on how standards and regulations affect trade and business performance; guidance for SMEs on how to select and implement standards and regulations; and a policy action plan to strengthen SMEs' ability to meet standards and regulations.

2015: Connect, compete and change for inclusive growth



The [SME Competitiveness Outlook 2015](#) is a "one-stop shop" on the topic of SME internationalization, and combines unique analysis, thought leader insights and case stories about developing country SMEs in international markets.

Organized around the theme Connect, Compete, Change for Inclusive Growth, the report shows that SMEs are generally less productive than large firms are. The productivity gap is wider in developing countries, and the wage gap is similar. It also shows that firms connected to international markets are more productive and create more employment. The book combines unique analysis, thought leader insights and case stories about developing country SMEs in international markets, along with 25 country profiles.



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